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BRITAIN    AT    BAY 


BRITAIN    AT    BAY 


BY 

SPENSER   WILKINSON 


NEW    YORK 
G.    P.    PUTNAM'S    SONS 

27  AND  29  West  23D  St. 
1909 


Y^ 


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V 

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TO   MY   CHILDREN 


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V 


2121.94 


CONTENTS 


CHAP. 
I. 

The  Nation  and  the  Parties 

PAGE 
I 

II. 

Defeat 

12 

III. 

Force  and  Right  ...... 

20 

IV. 

Arbitration  and  Disarmament 

27 

V. 

The  Nationalisation  of  War 

36 

VI. 

The  Balance  of  Power          .          .          .          . 

43 

VII. 

The  Rise  of  Germany  .         .         .         .         . 

49 

VIII. 

Nationhood  Neglected          .         .         .         . 

55 

IX. 

New  Conditions     ..... 

63 

X. 

Dynamics — The  Question  of  Might     . 

71 

XI. 

Policy — The  Question  of  Right  . 

81 

XII. 

The  Nation 

95 

XIII. 

The    Effect    of     the    Nationalisation     ot 

War  upon  Leadership 

109 

XIV. 

The  Needs  of  the  Navy 

124 

XV. 

England's  Military  Problem 

136 

XVI. 

Two  Systems  Contrasted 

145 

XVII. 

A  National  Army          .... 

152 

CVIII. 

The  Cost 

15S 

XIX. 

One  Army  Not  Two      .... 

169 

XX. 

The  Transition      ..... 

174 

XXI. 

The     Principles     on     which     Armies     ari 

Raised        ...... 

.     181 

XXII 

The  Chain  of  Duty       .... 

.     187 

Chapters  XIV.  to  XX.  have  appeared  as 
articles  in  the  Morning  Post  and  are  by  kind 
permission    reproduced    without    substantial 


change. 


BRITAIN    AT    BAY 


THE   NATION   AND   THE   PARTIES 

"  I  DO  not  believe  in  the  perfection  of  the  British 
constitution  as  an  instrument  of  war  ...  it  is 
evident  that  there  is  something  in  your  machinery 
that  is  wrong."  These  were  the  words  of  the 
late  Marquis  of  Salisbury,  speaking  as  Prime 
Minister  in  his  place  in  the  House  of  Lords  on 
the  30th  of  January  1900.  They  amounted  to 
a  declaration  by  the  British  Government  that  it 
could  not  govern,  for  the  first  business  of  a 
Government  is  to  be  able  to  defend  the  State  of 
which  it  has  charge,  that  is,  to  carry  on  war. 
Strange  to  say,  the  people  of  England  were  un- 
disturbed by  so  striking  an  admission  of  national 
failure. 

On  the  1 6th  of  March  1909  came  a  new 
declaration  from  another  Prime  Minister,  Mr. 
Asquith,  on  the  introduction  of  the  Navy  Esti- 
mates, explained  to  the  House  of  Commons  that 
the    Government  had   been  surprised   at  the    rate 


2  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

at  which  the  new  German  navy  was  being  con- 
structed, and  at  the  rapid  growth  of  Germany's 
power  to  build  battleships.  But  it  is  the  first 
duty  of  a  Government  to  provide  for  national 
security  and  to  provide  means  to  foresee.  A 
Government  that  is  surprised  in  a  matter  relat- 
ing to  war  is  already  half  defeated. 

The  creation  of  the  German  navy  is  the 
creation  of  means  that  could  be  used  to  challenge 
Great  Britain's  sea  power  and  all  that  depends 
upon  it.  There  has  been  no  such  challenge  these 
hundred  years,  no  challenge  so  formidable  as  that 
represented  by  the  new  German  fleet  these 
three  hundred  years.  It  brings  with  it  a  crisis 
in  the  national  life  of  England  as  orreat  as  has 
ever  been  known  ;  yet  this  crisis  finds  the  British 
nation  divided,  unready  and  uncertain  what  leader- 
ship it  is  to  expect. 

The  dominant  fact,  the  fact  that  controls  all 
others,  is  that  from  now  onwards  Great  Britain 
has  to  face  the  stern  reality  of  war,  immediately 
by  way  of  preparation  and  possibly  at  any  moment 
by  way  of  actual  collision.  England  is  drifting 
into  a  quarrel  with  Germany  which,  if  it  cannot 
be  settled,  involves  a  struggle  for  the  mastery 
with  the  strongest  nation  that  the  world  has  yet 
seen — a  nation  that,  under  the  pressure  of  necessity, 
has  learnt  to  organise  itself  for  war  as  for  peace ; 
that  sets  its  best  minds   to   direct  its  preparations 


THE   NATION   AND   THE    PARTIES         3 

for  war  ;  that  has  an  army  of  four  million  citizens, 
and  that  is  of  one  mind  in  the  determination  to 
make  a  navy  that  shall  fear  no  antagonist.  A 
conflict  of  this  kind  is  the  test  of  nations,  not 
only  of  their  strength  but  also  of  their  righteous- 
ness or  right  to  be.  It  has  two  aspects.  It  is 
first  of  all  a  quarrel  and  then  a  fight,  and  if  we 
are  to  enter  into  it  without  fear  of  destruction 
we  must  fulfil  two  conditions  :  in  the  quarrel  we 
must  be  in  the  right,  in  the  fight  we  must  win. 
The  two  conditions  are  inseparable.  If  there  is 
a  doubt  about  the  justice  of  our  cause  we  shall 
be  divided  among  ourselves,  and  it  will  be  im- 
possible for  us  to  put  forth  the  strength  of  a 
united  nation. 

Have  we  really  a  quarrel  with  Germany?  Is 
she  doing  us  any  wrong  ?  Some  of  our  people 
seem  to  think  so,  though  I  find  it  hard  to  say 
in  what  the  wronsf  consists.  Are  we  doine  her 
any  wrong  ?  Some  Germans  seem  to  think  so, 
and  it  behoves  us,  if  we  can,  to  find  out  what  the 
German  grievance  is. 

Suppose  that  there  is  a  cause  for  quarrel,  hidden 
at  present  but  sooner  or  later  to  be  revealed. 
What  likelihood  is  there  that  we  shall  be  able  to 
make  good  our  case  in  arms,  and  to  satisfy  the 
world  and  posterity  that  we  deserved  to  win  ? 

Germany  can  build  fleets  as  fast  as  we  can, 
and  although  we    have  a  start  the    race  will    not 


4  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

be  easy  for  us  ;  she  has  the  finest  school  of  war 
that  ever  existed,  against  which  we  have  to  set 
an  Admiralty  so  much  mistrusted  that  at  this 
moment  a  committee  of  the  Cabinet  is  inquiring 
into  its  efficiency. 

Is  it  not  time  for  us  to  find  the  answer  to  the 
question  raised  by  Lord  Salisbury  nine  years  ago, 
to  ascertain  what  it  is  that  interferes  with  the 
perfection  of  the  British  constitution  as  an  in- 
strument of  war,  and  to  set  right  what  is  wrong 
with  our  machinery  ? 

The  truth  is  that  we  have  ceased  to  be  a  nation  ; 
we  have  forgotten  nationhood,  and  have  become 
a  conglomerate  of  classes,  parties,  factions,  and 
sects.  That  is  the  disease.  The  remedy  consists 
in  reconstituting  ourselves  as  a  nation. 

What  is  a  nation  ?  The  inhabitants  of  a  country 
constituted  as  one  body  to  secure  their  corporate 
being  and  well-being.  The  nation  is  all  of  us, 
and  its  government  is  trusteeship  for  us  all  in 
order  to  give  us  peace  and  security,  and  in  order 
that  in  peace  and  security  we  may  make  each 
other's  lives  worth  living  by  doing  each  the  best 
work  he  can.  The  nature  of  a  nation  may  be 
seen  by  distinguishing  it  from  the  other  nations 
outside  and  from  the  parties  within.  The  mark 
of  a  nation  is  sovereignty,  which  means,  as  regards 
other  nations,  the  right  and  the  power  to  make 
peace  with  them  or  to  carry  on  war  against  them, 


THE   NATION   AND   THE    PARTIES         5 

and  which  means,  as  regards  those  within,  the 
right  and  the  power  to  command  them. 

A  nation  is  a  people  constituted  as  a  State, 
maintaining  and  supporting  a  Government  which 
is  at  once  the  embodiment  of  right  and  the  wielder 
of  force.  If  the  right  represented  by  the  Govern- 
ment is  challenged,  either  without  or  within,  the 
Government  asserts  it  by  force,  and  in  either  case 
disposes,  to  any  extent  that  may  be  required,  of  the 
property,  the  persons,  and  the  lives  of  its  subjects. 

A  party,  according  to  the  classical  theory  of  the 
British  constitution,  is  a  body  of  men  within  the 
State  who  are  agreed  in  regarding  some  measure 
or  some  principle  as  so  vital  to  the  State  that,  in 
order  to  secure  the  adoption  of  the  measure  or 
the  acceptance  of  the  principle,  they  are  willing 
to  sink  all  differences  of  opinion  on  other  matters, 
and  to  work  together  for  the  one  purpose  which 
they  are  agreed  in  regarding  as  fundamental. 

The  theory  of  party  government  is  based  on 
the  assumption  that  there  must  always  be  some 
measure  or  some  principle  in  regard  to  which  the 
citizens  of  the  same  country  will  differ  so  strongly 
as  to  subordinate  their  private  convictions  on  other 
matters  to  their  profound  convictions  in  regard 
to  the  one  great  question.  It  is  a  theory  of  per- 
manent civil  war  carried  on  through  the  forms  of 
parliamentary  debate  and  popular  election,  and, 
indeed,  the  two  traditional  parties  are  the  political 


6  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

descendants  of  the  two  sides  which  in  the  seventeenth 
century  were  actually  engaged  in  civil  war.  For 
the  ordinary  purposes  of  the  domestic  life  of  the 
country  the  system  has  its  advantages,  but  they 
are  coupled  with  grave  drawbacks.  The  party 
system  destroys  the  sincerity  of  our  political  life, 
and  introduces  a  dangerous  dilettantism  into  the 
administration  of  public  business. 

A  deliberative  assembly  like  the  House  of  Com- 
mons can  reach  a  decision  only  by  there  being  put 
from  the  chair  a  question  to  which  the  answer  must 
be  either  Yes  or  No.  It  is  evidently  necessary  to 
the  sincerity  of  such  decisions  that  the  answer 
given  by  each  member  shall  in  every  case  be  the 
expression  of  his  conviction  regarding  the  right 
answer  to  the  question  put.  If  every  member 
in  every  division  were  to  vote  according  to  his 
own  judgment  and  conscience  upon  the  question 
put,  there  would  be  a  perpetual  circulation  of 
members  between  the  Ayes  to  the  right  and  the 
Noes  to  the  left.  The  party  system  prevents  this. 
It  obliges  each  member  on  every  important  occa- 
sion to  vote  with  his  leaders  and  to  follow  the 
instruction  of  the  whips.  In  this  way  the  division 
of  opinion  produced  by  some  particular  question 
or  measure  is,  as  far  as  possible,  made  permanent 
and  dominant,  and  the  freedom  of  thought  and  of 
deliberation  is  confined  within  narrow  limits. 

Thus  there  creeps  into   the  system  an  element 


THE    NATION   AND   THE   PARTIES        7 

of  insincerity  which  has  been  enormously  increased 
since  the  extension  of  the  franchise  and  the  conse- 
quent organisation  of  parties  in  the  country.  Thirty 
or  forty  years  ago  the  caucus  was  established  in 
all  the  constituencies,  in  each  of  which  was  formed 
a  party  club,  association,  or  committee,  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  at  parliamentary  elections  the 
success  of  the  party  candidate.  The  association, 
club,  or  committee  consists,  as  regards  its  active  or 
working  portion,  of  a  very  small  percentage  of  the 
voters  even  of  its  own  party,  but  it  is  affiliated  to 
the  central  organisation  and  in  practice  it  controls 
the  choice  of  candidates. 

What  is  the  result  ?  That  the  affairs  of  the 
nation  are  entirely  given  over  to  be  disputed  be- 
tween the  two  organised  parties,  whose  leaders  are 
compelled,  in  shaping  their  policy  and  in  thinking 
about  public  affairs,  to  consider  first  and  foremost 
the  probable  effect  of  what  they  will  do  and  of 
what  they  will  say  upon  the  active  members  of 
the  caucus  of  their  own  party  in  the  constituencies. 
The  frame  of  mind  of  the  members  of  the  caucus 
is  that  of  men  who  regard  the  opposite  caucus  as 
the  adversary.  But  the  adversary  of  a  nation  can 
only  be  another  nation. 

In  this  way  the  leaders  of  both  parties,  the 
men  who  fill  the  places  which,  in  a  well-organised 
nation,  would  be  assigned  to  statesmen,  are  placed 
in  a  position  in  which  statesmanship  is  almost  im- 


8  BRITAIN   AT    BAY 

possible.  A  statesman  would  be  devoted  solely 
to  the  nation.  He  would  think  first,  second,  and 
third  of  the  nation.  Security  would  be  his  prime 
object,  and  upon  that  basis  he  would  aim  at  the 
elevation  of  the  characters  and  of  the  lives  of  the 
whole  population.  But  our  leaders  cannot  possibly 
think  first,  second,  and  third  of  the  nation.  They 
have  to  think  at  least  as  much  of  the  next  election 
and  of  the  opinions  of  their  supporters.  In  this 
way  their  attention  is  diverted  from  that  obser- 
vation of  other  nations  which  is  essential  for 
the  maintenance  of  security.  Moreover,  they  are 
obliged  to  dwell  on  subjects  directly  intelligible 
to  and  appreciable  by  the  voters  in  the  constitu- 
encies, and  are  thereby  hindered  from  giving  either 
the  time  or  the  attention  which  they  would  like 
to  any  of  those  problems  of  statesmanship  which 
require  close  and  arduous  study  for  their  solution. 
The  wonder  is  in  these  conditions  that  they  do 
their  work  so  well,  and  maintain  undiminished  the 
reputation  of  English  public  men  for  integrity  and 
ability. 

Yet  what  at  the  present  moment  is  the  principle 
about  which  parties  are  divided?  Is  there  any 
measure  or  any  principle  at  issue  which  is  really 
vital  to  Great  Britain?  Is  there  anything  in  dis- 
pute between  the  parties  which  would  not  be 
abandoned  and  forgotten  at  the  first  shot  fired 
in  a  war  between  England  and  a  great  continental 


THE   NATION   AND   THE   PARTIES         9 

nation  ?  I  am  convinced  that  that  first  shot  must 
cause  the  scales  to  fall  from  men's  eyes ;  that  it 
must  make  every  one  realise  that  our  divisions  are 
comparative  trifles  and  that  for  years  we  have 
been  wasting  time  over  them.  But  if  we  wait  for 
the  shock  of  war  to  arouse  us  to  a  sense  of  reality 
and  to  estimate  our  party  differences  at  their  true 
value,  it  will  be  too  late.  We  shall  wring  our 
hands  in  vain  over  our  past  blindness  and  the 
insight  we  shall  then  have  obtained  will  avail  us 
nothing. 

The  party  system  has  another  consequence 
which  will  not  stand  scrutiny  in  the  light  of 
reality ;  it  is  dilettantism  in  the  conduct  of  the 
nation's  principal  business.  Some  of  the  chief 
branches  of  the  executive  work  of  government  are 
the  provinces  of  special  arts  and  sciences,  each 
of  which  to  master  requires  the  work  of  a  life- 
time. Of  such  a  kind  are  the  art  of  carrying 
on  war,  whether  by  sea  or  land,  the  art  of  con- 
ductinof  foreign  relations,  which  involves  a  know- 
ledge  of  all  the  other  great  States  and  their 
policies,  and  the  direction  of  the  educational 
system,  which  cannot  possibly  be  properly  con- 
ducted except  by  an  experienced  educator.  But 
the  system  gives  the  direction  of  each  of  these 
branches  to  one  of  the  political  leaders  forming 
the  Cabinet  or  governing  committee,  and  the 
practice  is  to  consider  as  disqualified  from  member- 


10  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

ship  of  that  committee  any  man  who  has  given 
his  Hfe  either  to  war,  to  foreign  policy,  or  to 
education.  Yet  by  its  efficiency  in  these  matters 
the  nation  must  stand  or  fall.  By  all  means  let 
us  be  chary  of  lightly  making  changes  in  the 
constitution  or  in  the  arrangements  of  govern- 
ment. But,  if  the  security  and  continued  existence 
of  the  nation  are  in  question,  must  we  not  scruti- 
nise our  methods  of  government  with  a  view  to 
make  sure  that  they  accord  with  the  necessary 
conditions  of  success  in  a  national  struggle  for 
existence  ? 

I  am  well  aware  that  the  train  of  thought  to 
which  I  have  tried  to  give  expression  is  unpopular, 
and  that  most  people  think  that  any  modifica- 
tion of  the  traditional  party  system  is  impracti- 
cable. But  the  question  is  not  whether  the  system 
is  popular ;  it  is  whether  it  will  enable  the  country 
to  stand  in  the  hour  of  trial.  If  the  system  is 
inefficient  and  fails  to  enable  the  nation  to  carry 
on  with  success  the  functions  necessary  for  its 
preservation  and  if  at  the  same  time  it  is  imprac- 
ticable to  change  it,  then  nothing  can  avert  ruin 
from  this  country.  Yet  I  believe  that  a  very 
large  number  of  my  countrymen  are  in  fact  think- 
ing each  for  himself  the  thoughts  which  I  am 
trying  to  express.  They  are  perhaps  not  the 
active  members  of  the  caucus  of  either  party,  but 
they  are  men  who,  if  they  see  the  need,  will  not 


THE   NATION   AND   THE    PARTIES       ii 

shrink  from  exertions  or  from  sacrifices  which 
they  believe  to  be  useful  or  necessary  to  the 
country.  It  is  to  them  that  the  following  pages 
are  an  appeal.  I  appeal  with  some  confidence 
because  what  I  shall  try  to  show  to  be  necessary 
is  not  so  much  a  change  of  institutions  as  a  change 
of  spirit ;  not  a  new  constitution  but  a  return  to 
a  true  way  of  looking  at  public  and  private  life. 
My  contention  is  that  the  future  of  England 
depends  entirely  upon  the  restoration  of  duty, 
of  which  the  nation  is  the  symbol,  to  its  proper 
place  in  our  lives. 


II 

DEFEAT 

Great  Britain  is  drifting  unintentionally  and  half 
unconsciously  into  a  war  with  the  German  Empire, 
a  State  which  has  a  population  of  sixty  millions 
and  is  better  organised  for  war  than  any  State 
has  ever  been  in  modern  times.  For  such  a  con- 
flict, which  may  come  about  to-morrow,  and  un- 
less a  great  change  takes  place  must  come  about 
in  the  near  future,  Great  Britain  is  not  prepared. 

The  food  of  our  people  and  the  raw  material 
of  their  industries  come  to  this  country  by  sea, 
and  the  articles  here  produced  go  by  sea  to  their 
purchasers  abroad.  Every  transaction  carries  with 
it  a  certain  profit  which  makes  it  possible.  If 
the  exporter  and  the  manufacturer  who  supplies 
him  can  make  no  profit  they  cannot  continue 
their  operations,  and  the  men  who  work  for  them 
must  lose  their  employment. 

Suppose  Great  Britain  to  be  to-morrow  at  war 
with  one  or  more  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe. 
All  the  sailing  vessels  and  slow  steamers  will 
stop  running  lest  they  should  be  taken  by  hostile 


DEFEAT  13 

cruisers.     The  fast  steamers  will  have  to  pay  war 
rates    of   insurance   and    to    charge   extra   freights. 
Steamers    ready    to    leave    foreign    ports    for    this 
country    will    wait    for  instructions   and   for    news. 
On  the   outbreak  of  war,  therefore,  this    over-sea 
traffic  must  be  greatly  diminished   in   volume   and 
carried   on  with   enormously   increased    difficulties. 
The    supply    of   food    would    be    considerably    re- 
duced   and    the    certainty    of   the    arrival    of    any 
particular   cargo    would    have    disappeared.       The 
price   of  food   must  therefore   rapidly   and   greatly 
rise,    and    that    alone    would    immediately    impose 
very  great  hardships  on  the  whole  of  the  working 
class,  of  which  a  considerable  part  would  be  driven 
across    the   line   which    separates    modern   comfort 
from  the    starvation    margin.     The    diminution    in 
the    supply    of  the    raw  materials  of  manufacture 
would    be     much    greater    and     more    immediate. 
Something   like    half  the    manufacturers    of  Great 
Britain  must  close  their  works  for  want  of  materials. 
But    will    the   other    half    be    able    to    carry    on? 
Foreign   orders  they  cannot  possibly  execute,   be- 
cause there   can  be   no   certainty    of   the    delivery 
of  the    goods  ;  and   even   if  they  could,  the   price 
at    which    they    could    deliver   them   with   a    profit 
would   be   much  higher   than   it   is  in   peace.     For 
with  a  diminished  supply  the  price  of  raw  material 
must  go   up,   the  cost    of   marine    insurance    must 
be  added,   together  with    the    extra  wages    neces- 


14  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

sary  to  enable  the  workmen  to  live   with  food  at 
an  enhanced  price. 

Thus  the  effect  of  the  greater  difficulty  of  sea 
communication  must  be  to  destroy  the  margin  of 
profit  which  enables  the  British  capitalist  to  carry 
on  his  works,  while  the  effect  of  all  these  causes 
taken  together  on  the  credit  system  upon  which 
our  whole  domestic  economy  reposes  will  perhaps 
be  understood  by  business  men.  Even  if  this 
state  of  things  should  last  only  a  few  months,  it 
certainly  involves  the  transfer  to  neutrals  of  all 
trade  that  is  by  possibility  transferable.  Foreign 
countries  will  give  their  orders  for  cotton,  woollen, 
and  iron  goods  to  the  United  States,  France, 
Switzerland,  and  Austro- Hungary,  and  at  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  the  British  firms  that  before 
supplied  them,  if  they  have  not  in  the  meantime 
become  bankrupt,  will  find  that  their  customers 
have  formed  new  connections. 

The  shrinkage  of  credit  would  bring  a  multitude 
of  commercial  failures  ;  the  diminution  of  trade  and 
the  cessation  of  manufactures  a  great  many  more. 
The  unemployed  would  be  counted  by  the  million, 
and  would  have  to  be  kept  at  the  public  expense 
or  starve. 

If  in  the  midst  of  these  misfortunes,  caused  by 
the  mere  fact  of  war,  should  come  the  news  of 
defeat  at  sea,  still  more  serious  consequences  must 
follow.     After  defeat  at  sea  all  regular  and  secure 


DEFEAT  15 

communication  between  Great  Britain,  her  Colonies, 
and  India  comes  to  an  end.  With  the  terrible 
blow  to  Britain's  reputation  which  defeat  at  sea 
must  bring,  what  will  be  the  position  of  the  100,000 
British  in  India  who  for  a  century  have  governed 
a  population  of  nearly  300,000,000  ?  What  can 
the  Colonies  do  to  help  Great  Britain  under  such 
conditions  ?  For  the  command  of  the  sea  nothing, 
and  even  if  each  of  them  had  a  first-rate  army, 
what  would  be  the  use  of  those  armies  to  this 
country  in  her  hour  of  need  ?  They  cannot  be 
brought  to  Europe  unless  the  British  navy  com- 
mands the  sea. 

These  are  some  of  the  material  consequences  of 
defeat.  But  what  of  its  spiritual  consequences  ? 
We  have  brought  up  our  children  in  the  pride  of 
a  great  nation,  and  taught  them  of  an  Empire  on 
which  the  sun  never  sets.  What  shall  we  say 
to  them  in  the  hour  of  defeat  and  after  the  treaty 
of  peace  imposed  by  the  victor  ?  They  will  say  : 
"  Find  us  work  and  we  will  earn  our  bread  and 
in  due  time  win  back  the  greatness  that  has  been 
lost."  But  how  are  they  to  earn  their  bread  .-* 
In  this  country  half  the  employers  will  have  been 
ruined  by  the  war.  The  other  half  will  have  lost 
heavily,  and  much  of  the  wealth  even  of  the  very 
rich  will  have  gone  to  keep  alive  the  innumerable 
multitude  of  starving  unemployed.  These  will  be 
advised    after    the    war    to    emigrate.      To    what 


i6  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

country  ?  Englishmen,  after  defeat,  will  every- 
where be  at  a  discount.  Words  will  not  describe, 
and  the  imagination  cannot  realise,  the  suffering 
of  a  defeated  nation  living  on  an  island  which  for 
fifty  years  has  not  produced  food  enough  for  its 
population.  v 

The  material  and  spiritual  results  of  defeat  can  v 
easily  be  recognised  by  any  one  who  takes  the 
trouble  to  think  about  the  question,  though  only 
experience  either  at  first  hand  or  supplied  by 
history  can  enable  a  man  fully  to  grasp  its  terrible 
nature.  But  a  word  must  be  said  on  the  social 
and  political  consequences  inseparable  from  the 
wreck  of  a  State  whose  Government  has  been 
unable  to  fulfil  its  prime  function,  that  of  pro- 
viding security  for  the  national  life.  All  experience 
shows  that  in  such  cases  men  do  not  take  their 
troubles  calmly.  They  are  filled  with  passion. 
Their  feelino^s  find  vent  in  the  actions  to  which 
their  previous  currents  of  thought  tended.  The 
working  class,  long  accustomed  by  its  leaders  to 
regard  the  capitalists  as  a  class  with  interests  and 
aims  opposed  to  its  own,  will  hardly  be  able  in  the 
stress  of  unemployment  and  of  famine  to  change 
its  way  of  thinking.  The  mass  of  the  workmen, 
following  leaders  whose  judgment  may  not  perhaps 
be  of  the  soundest  but  who  will  undoubtedly  sin- 
cerely believe  that  the  doctrines  with  which  they 
have  grown  up  are  true,   may  assail   the  existing 


DEFEAT  17 

social  order  and  lay  the  blame  of  their  misfortunes 
upon  the  class  which  has  hitherto  had  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country  in  its  hands  and  has  supplied 
the  leaders  of  both  political  parties.  The  indig- 
nation which  would  inspire  this  movement  would 
not  be  altogether  without  justification,  for  it  cannot 
be  denied  that  both  political  parties  have  for  many 
years  regarded  preparation  for  war  and  all  that 
belongs  to  it  as  a  minor  matter,  subordinate  to 
the  really  far  less  important  questions  relying  upon 
which  each  side  has  sought  to  win  sufficient  votes 
to  secure  a  party  majority. 

Why  do  I  discuss  the  hypothesis  of  British  defeat 
rather  than  that  of  British  victory  ?  Because  it 
is  the  invariable  practice  of  the  masters  of  war  to 
consider  first  the  disagreeable  possibilities  and  to 
make  provision  for  them.  But  also  because,  ac- 
cording to  every  one  of  the  tests  which  can  be 
applied,  the  probability  of  defeat  for  Great  Britain 
in  the  present  state  of  Europe  is  exceedingly  great. 
Rarely  has  a  State  unready  for  conflict  been  able 
to  stand  against  a  nation  organised  for  war.  The 
last  of  a  long  series  of  examples  was  the  war 
between  Russia  and  Japan,  in  which  the  vast 
resources  of  a  great  Empire  were  exhausted  in 
the  struggle  with  a  State  so  small  as  to  seem  a 
pigmy  in  comparison  with  her  giant  adversary. 
On  the  loth  of  February  1904,  the  day  when  the 
news   reached    England    that    the    Russo-Japanese 


i8  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

war  had  begun,  I  gave  as  follows  my  reasons 
for  thinking  that  Japan  would  win : — 

"  The  hypothesis  of  a  considerable  Japanese 
success,  at  any  rate  at  first,  is  considered  rather 
than  its  opposite,  because  Japan  has  at  present 
all  the  marks  of  a  nation  likely  to  do  great  things 
in  war.  It  is  not  merely  that  she  has  transformed 
her  government  and  her  education,  has  introduced 
military  institutions  on  the  German  model,  especi- 
ally compulsory  training  and  that  vivifying  insti- 
tution, a  general  staff.  The  present  quarrel  arises 
from  the  deliberate  policy  of  Russia,  pursuing  aims 
that  are  incompatible  with  every  Japanese  tradition 
and  every  Japanese  hope.  The  whole  Japanese 
nation  has  for  years  been  burning  with  the  sense 
of  wrongs  inflicted  by  Russia,  and  into  this  war, 
as  into  the  preparation  for  it,  the  whole  people 
throws  itself,  mind,  soul,  and  body.  This  is  the 
condition  which  produces  great  strategical  plans 
and  extreme  energy  in  their  execution.  The 
Japanese  forces  are  well  organised,  armed,  and 
equipped.  They  are  intelligently  led  and  follow 
with  intelligence. 

"  Of  Russia  there  is  hardly  evidence  to  show  that 
the  cause  for  which  she  is  fighting  has  touched  the 
imaginations  or  the  feelings  of  more  than  a  small 
fraction  of  the  population.  It  is  the  war  of  a 
bureaucracy,  and  Russia  may  easily  fail  to  develop 
either    great     leading,    though     her     officers    are 


DEFEAT 


19 


instructed,  or  intelligent  following  of  the  leaders 
by  the  rank  and  file.  But  the  Russian  troops 
are  brave  and  have  always  needed  a  good  deal 
of  beating." 

Substitute  Great  Britain  for  Russia  and  Germany 
for  Japan  in  this  forecast,  which  has  been  proved 
true,  and  every  word  holds  good  except  two.  We 
now  know  that  Russia's  policy  was  not  deliberate  ; 
that  her  Government  bungled  into  the  war  without 
knowing  what  it  was  doing.  In  just  the  same 
way  British  Governments  have  drifted  blindly  into 
the  present  difficult  relations  with  Germany.  Those 
in  England  who  would  push  the  country  into  a  war 
with  Germany  are  indeed  not  a  bureaucracy,  they 
are  merely  a  fraction  of  one  of  the  parties,  and  do 
not  represent  the  mass  of  our  people,  who  have  no 
desire  for  such  a  war,  and  are  so  little  aware  of  its 
possibility  that  they  have  never  even  taken  the 
trouble  to  find  out  why  it  may  come.  A  larger 
section  of  the  other  party  is  steeped  in  the  belief 
that  force,  violence,  and  war  are  wicked  in  them- 
selves, and  ought  therefore  not  to  be  thought  about. 
It  is  a  prejudice  which,  unless  removed,  may  ruin 
this  country,  and  there  is  no  way  of  dissipating 
it  except  that  of  patient  argument  based  upon 
observation  of  the  world  we  live  in.  That  way 
I  shall  attempt  to  follow   in  the   next  chapter. 


Ill 

FORCE   AND   RIGHT 

"  Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath  been  said.  An  eye  for  an  eye,  and 
a  tooth  for  a  tooth  :  but  I  say  unto  you,  That  ye  resist  not  evil :  but 
whosoever  shall  smite  thee  on  thy  right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  other 
also.  And  if  any  man  will  sue  thee  at  the  law,  and  take  away  thy 
coat,  let  him  have  thy  cloke  also.  And  whosoever  shall  compel  thee 
to  go  a  mile,  go  with  him  twain.  Give  to  him  that  asketh  thee,  and 
from  him  that  would  borrow  of  thee  turn  not  thou  away.  Ye  have 
heard  that  it  hath  been  said.  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour,  and 
hate  thine  enemy:  but  I  say  unto  you,  Love  your  enemies." 
(Matt.  V.  38-44). 

If  there  are  any  among  us  who  adopt  these 
words  as  the  governing  rule  of  their  lives  they 
will  certainly  cause  no  difficulty  to  the  State  in 
its  military  policy  whatever  that  may  be,  and  will 
find  their  natural  places  even  in  time  of  war  to 
the  public  good.  If  the  whole  population  were 
of  their  way  of  thinking  and  acting  there  would 
be  no  need  to  discuss  war.  An  invader  would 
not  be  resisted.  His  troops  would  be  hospitably 
entertained  and  treated  with  affection.  No  opposi- 
tion would  be  made  to  the  change  of  Government 
which  he  would  introduce,  and  the  taxes  which 
he  imposed  would  be  cheerfully  paid.  But  there 
would  be  no  State,  except  that  created  by  the 
invader ;    and    the   problem    of   conduct    for   those 


FORCE   AND    RIGHT  21 

Hvine  the  life  described  would  arise  when  the 
State  so  set  up  issued  its  ordinances  requiring 
every  able-bodied  man  to  become  a  competent 
soldier. 

There  are  those  who  believe,  or  fancy  they 
believe,  that  the  words  I  have  quoted  involve 
the  principle  that  the  use  of  force  or  of  violence 
between  man  and  man,  or  between  nation  and 
nation,  is  wicked.  To  the  man  who  thinks  it 
right  to  submit  to  any  violence  or  to  be  killed 
rather  than  to  use  violence  in  resistance,  I  have 
no  reply  to  make.  The  world  cannot  conquer 
him  and  fear  has  no  hold  upon  him.  But  even 
he  can  carry  out  his  doctrine  only  to  the  extent 
of  allowing  himself  to  be  ill-treated,  as  I  will  now 
convince  him.  Many  years  ago  the  people  of 
South  Lancashire  were  horrified  by  the  facts  re- 
ported in  a  trial  for  murder.  In  a  village  on  the 
outskirts  of  Bolton  lived  a  young  woman,  much 
liked  and  respected  as  a  teacher  in  one  of  the 
Board  schools.  On  her  way  home  from  school 
she  was  accustomed  to  follow  a  footpath  through 
a  lonely  wood,  and  here  one  evening  her  body 
was  found.  She  had  been  strangled  by  a  ruffian 
who  had  thought  in  this  lonely  place  to  have  his 
wicked  will  of  her.  She  had  resisted  successfully 
and  he  had  killed  her  in  the  struggle.  Fortunately 
the  murderer  was  caught  and  the  facts  ascertained 
from    circumstantial    evidence    were    confirmed    by 


22  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

his  confession.  Now,  the  question  I  have  to  ask 
of  the  man  who  takes  his  stand  on  the  passage 
I  have  quoted  from  the  Gospel  is:  "  What  would 
have  been  your  duty  if  you  had  been  walking 
through  that  wood  and  come  upon  the  girl 
struggling  with  the  man  who  killed  her?"  This 
is  a  crucial  instance  which,  I  submit,  utterly  de- 
stroys the  doctrine  that  the  use  of  violence  is  in 
itself  wrong.  The  right  or  wrong  is  not  in  the 
employment  of  force  but  simply  in  the  purpose 
for  which  it  is  used.  What  the  case  establishes, 
I  think,  is  that  to  use  violence  in  resistance  to 
violent  wrong  is  not  only  right  but  necessary. 

The  employment  of  force  for  the  maintenance 
of  right  is  the  foundation  of  all  civilised  human  life, 
for  it  is  the  fundamental  function  of  the  State,  and 
apart  from  the  State  there  is  no  civilisation,  no  life 
worth  living.  The  first  business  of  the  State  is  to 
protect  the  community  against  violent  interference 
from  outside.  This  it  does  by  requiring  from  its 
subjects  whatever  personal  service  and  whatever 
sacrifice  of  property  and  of  time  may  be  necessary ; 
and  resistance  to  these  demands,  as  well  as  to  any 
injunctions  whatever  laid  by  the  State  upon  its 
subjects,  is  unconditionally  suppressed  by  force. 
The  mark  of  the  State  is  sovereignty,  or  the 
identification  of  force  and  right,  and  the  measure 
of  the  perfection  of  the  State  is  furnished  by  the 
completeness  of  this  identification.     In  the  present 


FORCE   AND   RIGHT  23 

condition  of  English  political  thought  it  may  be 
worth  while  to  dwell  for  a  few  moments  upon  the 
beneficent  nature  of  this  dual  action  of  the  State. 

Within  its  jurisdiction  the  State  maintains  order 
and  law  and  in  this  way  makes  life  worth  living 
for  its  subjects.  Order  and  law  are  the  necessary 
conditions  of  men's  normal  activities,  of  their 
industry,  of  their  ownership  of  whatever  the  State 
allows  them  to  possess — for  outside  of  the  State 
there  is  no  ownership — of  their  leisure  and  of  their 
freedom  to  enjoy  it.  The  State  is  even  the  basis 
of  men's  characters,  for  it  sets  up  and  establishes 
a  minimum  standard  of  conduct.  Certain  acts  are 
defined  as  unlawful  and  punished  as  crimes.  Other 
acts,  though  not  criminal,  are  yet  so  far  subject  to 
the  disapproval  of  the  courts  that  the  man  who 
does  them  may  have  to  compensate  those  who 
suffer  injury  or  damage  in  consequence  of  them. 
These  standards  have  a  dual  origin,  in  legisla- 
tion and  precedent.  Legislation  is  a  formal  ex- 
pression of  the  agreement  of  the  community  upon 
the  definition  of  crimes,  and  common  law  has  been 
produced  by  the  decisions  of  the  courts  in  actions 
between  man  and  man.  Every  case  tried  in  a 
civil  court  is  a  conflict  between  two  parties,  a 
struggle  for  justice,  the  judgment  being  justice 
applied  to  the  particular  case.  The  growth  of 
English  law  has  been  through  an  endless  series  of 
conflicts,  and  the  law  of  to-day  may  be  described 


24  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

as  a  line  passing  through  a  series  of  points  repre- 
senting an  infinite  number  of  judgments,  each  the 
decision  of  a  conflict  in  court.      For  seven  hundred 
years,  with  hardly  an  interruption,  every  judgment 
of  a  court  has  been  sustained  by  the  force  of  the 
State.     The  law  thus  produced,  expressed  in  legis- 
lation and  interpreted  by  the  courts,  is  the  founda- 
tion of  all  English  conduct  and  character.     Upon 
the   basis  thus  laid   there  takes   place  a  perpetual 
evolution  of  higher  standards.      In  the  intercourse 
of  a    settled   and    undisturbed    community  and    of 
the    many    societies    which     it    contains,    arise    a 
number    of    standards    of    behaviour    which    each 
man    catches    as    it    were    by    infection    from    the 
persons  with    whom    he    habitually   associates  and 
to    which    he    is    obliged    to    conform,    because    if 
his  conduct  falls   below   them  his  companions  will 
have    nothing   to    do    with   him.      Every    class    of 
society  has  its  notions  of  what  constitutes  proper 
conduct   and   constrains   its   members    to   carry  on 
their  lives,  so  far  as  they  are  open  to  inspection, 
according   to   these   notions.     The    standards  tend 
constantly    to    improve.     Men    form    an    ideal    of 
behaviour    by    observing   the  conduct  of  the   best 
of  their  class,  and  in  proportion  as  this  ideal  gains 
acceptance,  find  themselves  driven  to  adopt  it  for 
fear   of  the  social  ostracism   which   is  the   modern 
equivalent    of   excommunication.     Little    by    little 
what  was  at  first  a  rarely  attained   ideal   becomes 


FORCE   AND    RIGHT  25 

a  part  of  good  manners.  It  established  itself  as 
custom  and  finally  becomes  part  of  the  law. 

Thus  the  State,  in  co-operation  with  the  whole 
community,  becomes  the  educator  of  its  people. 
Standards  of  conduct  are  formed  slowly  in  the 
best  minds  and  exist  at  first  merely  in  what  Plato 
would  have  called  "the  intellectual  sphere,"  or  in 
what  would  have  been  called  at  a  later  date  in 
Palestine  the  "kingdom  of  heaven."  But  the 
strongest  impulse  of  mankind  is  to  realise  its 
ideals.  Its  fervent  prayer,  which  once  uttered  can 
never  cease,  is  "on  earth  as  it  is  in  heaven,"  and 
the  ideals  developed  in  man's  spiritual  life  gradu- 
ally take  shape  in  laws  and  become  prohibitions 
and  injunctions  backed  by  the  forces  of  the  State. 

The  State,  however,  is  not  an  abstraction.  For 
English  people  it  means  the  United  Kingdom  ; 
and  if  an  Englishman  wants  to  realise  what  he 
owes  to  his  country  let  him  look  back  through 
its  history  and  see  how  all  that  he  values  in  the 
character  of  the  men  he  most  admires  and  all 
that  is  best  in  himself  has  gradually  been  created 
and  realised  through  the  ceaseless  effort  of  his 
forefathers,  carried  on  continuously  from  the  time 
when  the  first  Englishman  crossed  the  North  Sea 
until  the  present  day.  Other  nations  have  their 
types  of  conduct,  perhaps  as  good  as  our  own, 
but  Englishmen  value,  and  rightly  value,  the  ideals 
particularly  associated  with  the  life  of  their   own 


26  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

country.  Perhaps  two  of  the  commonest  expres- 
sions convey  peculiarly  English  views  of  character. 
We  talk  of  "  fair  play "  as  the  essence  of  just 
dealing  between  man  and  man.  It  is  a  concep- 
tion we  have  developed  from  the  national  games. 
We  describe  ideal  conduct  as  that  of  a  gentleman. 
It  is  a  condensation  of  the  best  part  of  English 
history,  and  a  search  for  a  definition  of  the  func- 
tion of  Great  Britain  in  the  moral  economy  of  the 
world  will  hardly  find  a  better  answer  than  that 
it  is  to  stamp  upon  every  subject  of  the  King 
the  character  implied  in  these  two  expressions. 
Suppose  the  British  State  to  be  overthrown  or  to 
drop  from  its  place  among  the  great  Powers  of 
the  world,  these  ideals  of  character  would  be  dis- 
credited and  their  place  would  be  taken  by  others. 

The  justification  of  the  constraint  exercised  by 
the  State  upon  its  own  citizens  is  the  necessity  for 
security,  the  obligation  of  self-defence,  which  arises 
from  the  fact  that  outside  the  State  there  are  other 
States,  each  endowed  like  itself  with  sovereignty, 
each  of  them  maintaining  by  force  its  conception 
of  right.  The  power  of  the  State  over  its  own 
subjects  is  thus  in  the  last  resort  a  consequence 
of  the  existence  of  other  States.  Upon  the  com- 
petition between  them  rests  the  order  of  the  world. 
It  is  a  competition  extending  to  every  sphere  of 
life  and  in  its  acute  form  takes  the  shape  of  war,  a 
struggle  for  existence,  for  the  mastery  or  for  right. 


IV 

ARBITRATION    AND    DISARMAMENT 

To  some  people  the  place  of  war  in  the  economy 

of   nations    appears    to    be    unsatisfactory.      They 

think  war  wicked  and  a  world  where  it  exists  out 

of  joint.     Accordingly  they   devote  themselves   to 

sueOfestions   for  the  abolition    of  war  and   for  the 

discovery  of  some  substitute  for  it.     Two  theories 

are    common  ;    the    first,    that    arbitration    can    in 

every    case    be    a    substitute    for    war,    the   second 

that   the   hopes  of  peace    would    be   increased    by 

some  general  agreement  for  disarmament. 

The  idea  of  those  who  regard   arbitration  as  a 

universal  substitute  for  war  appears  to  be  that  the 

relations  between  States  can  be  put  upon  a  basis 

resembling  that   of  the   relations   between   citizens 

in    a   settled   and   civilised   country   like   our   own. 

In  Great  Britain  we  are  accustomed  to  a  variety  of 

means  for  settling  disagreements  between  persons. 

There    are    the    law    courts,    there    are    the    cases 

in  which  recourse  is  had,  with  the  sanction  of  the 

law    courts,    to    the    inquiry    and    decision    of   an 

arbitrator,  and  in  all  our  sports  we  are  accustomed 

to  the  presence   of  an    umpire   whose   duty    it  is 

27 


28  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

impartially  to  see  that  the  rules  of  the  game  are 
observed  and  immediately  to  decide  all  points 
that  might  otherwise  be  doubtful. 

The  work  of  an  umpire  who  sees  that  the  rules 
of  the  game  are  observed  is  based  upon  the  con- 
sent of  the  players  of  both  sides.  Without  that 
consent  there  could  be  no  game,  and  the  consent 
will  be  found  to  be  based  upon  the  fact  that  all 
the  players  are  brought  up  with  similar  traditions 
and  with  like  views  of  the  nature  of  the  game. 
Where  this  unity  does  not  exist,  difficulties  con- 
stantly arise,  as  is  notoriously  the  case  in  inter- 
national sports.  The  attempt  has  been  made,  with 
constantly  increasing  success,  to  mitigate  the  evils 
of  war  by  the  creation  of  institutions  in  some  way 
analogous  to  that  of  the  umpire  in  a  game.  The 
Declaration  of  London,  recently  published,  is  an 
agreement  between  the  principal  Powers  to  accept 
a  series  of  rules  concerning  maritime  war,  to  be 
administered  by  an  International  Prize  Court. 

The  function  of  an  arbitrator,  usually  to  decide 
questions  of  fact  and  to  assess  compensation  for 
inconvenience,  most  commonly  the  inconvenience 
occasioned  to  a  private  person  by  some  necessary 
act  of  the  State,  also  rests  upon  the  consent  of 
the  parties,  though  in  this  case  the  consent  is  usually 
imposed  upon  them  by  the  State  through  some 
legislative  enactment  or  through  the  decision  of 
a  court. 


ARBITRATION    AND   DISARMAMENT     29 

The  action  of  a  court  of  law,  on  the  other 
hand,  does  not  rest  upon  the  consent  of  the  parties. 
In  a  civil  action  the  defendant  may  be  and  very 
often  is  unwilling  to  take  any  part  in  the  proceed- 
ings. But  he  has  no  choice,  and,  whether  he  likes 
it  or  not,  is  bound  by  the  decision  of  the  court. 
For  the  court  is  the  State  acting  in  its  judicial 
capacity  with  a  view  to  insure  that  justice  shall 
be  done.  The  plaintiff  alleges  that  the  defendant 
has  done  him  some  wrong  either  by  breach  of 
contract  or  otherwise,  and  the  verdict  or  judgment 
determines  whether  or  not  this  is  the  case,  and,  if 
it  is,  what  compensation  is  due.  The  judgment 
once  given,  the  whole  power  of  the  State  will  be 
used  to  secure  its  execution. 

The  business  of  a  criminal  court  is  the  punish- 
ment of  offenders  whom  it  is  the  function  of  the 
State  to  discover,  to  bring  to  trial,  and,  when  con- 
victed, to  punish.  The  prisoner's  consent  is  not 
asked,  and  the  judgment  of  the  court  is  supported 
by  the  whole  power  of  the  State. 

In  the  international  sphere  there  is  no  parallel  to 
the  action  either  of  a  civil  or  of  a  criminal  court. 
Civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction  are  attributes  of 
sovereignty,  and  over  two  independent  States  there 
is  no  sovereign  power.  If,  therefore,  it  is  desired 
to  institute  between  two  States  a  situation  analogous 
to  that  by  which  the  subjects  of  a  single  Govern- 
ment are  amenable  to  judicial  tribunals,  the  proper 


30  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

way  is  to  bring  the  two  States  under  one  sove- 
reignty. This  can  be  effected,  and  is  constantly 
effected,  by  one  of  two  methods.  Either  the  two 
States  federate  and  form  a  united  State,  or  one 
of  them  conquers  and  annexes  the  other.  The 
former  process  has  been  seen  in  modern  times  in 
the  formation  of  the  United  States  of  America  : 
the  latter  formed  the  substance  of  the  history  of 
civilisation  during-  the  first  three  centuries  before 
Christ,  when  the  Roman  State  successively  con- 
quered, annexed,  and  absorbed  all  the  other  then 
existinof  States  surrounding  the  basin  of  the  Medi- 
terranean. 

The  history  of  no  State  justifies  the  belief  that 
order  and  justice  can  successfully  be  maintained 
merely  by  the  action  of  umpires  and  of  arbitrators. 
Every  State  worth  the  name  has  had  to  rely  upon 
civil  and  criminal  courts  and  upon  law  enforced 
by  its  authority,  that  is,  upon  a  series  of  principles 
of  right  expressed  in  legislation  and  upon  an 
organisation  of  force  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
those  principles  into  practical  effect. 

It  appears,  then,  that  so  far  from  the  experience 
of  States  justifying  the  view  that  it  is  wrong  to 
employ  force,  the  truth  is  that  right  or  law,  unless 
supported  by  force,  is  ineffective,  that  the  objec- 
tion in  principle  to  any  use  of  force  involves 
anarchy,  or  the  cessation  of  the  State,  and  that 
the  wish    to    substitute    judicial    tribunals   for   war 


ARBITRATION    AND    DISARMAMENT     31 

as  a  means  of  settling  disputes  between  State  and 
State  is  a  wish  to  amalgamate  under  a  single 
Government  all  those  States  which  are  to  benefit 
by  the  substitution. 

The  reasonable  attitude  with  regard  to  arbitra- 
tion is  to  accept  it  whenever  the  other  side  will 
accept  it.  But  if  the  adversary  refuses  arbitration 
and  insists  upon  using  force,  what  course  is  open 
to  any  State  but  that  of  resisting  force  by  force  ? 

Arbitration  has  from  the  earliest  times  been 
preferred  in  most  of  those  cases  to  which  it  was 
applicable,  that  is,  in  cases  in  which  there  was  a 
basis  of  common  view  or  common  tradition  sufficient 
to  make  agreement  practicable.  But  wherever 
there  has  been  a  marked  divergence  of  ideals  or 
a  different  standard  of  right,  there  has  been  a 
tendency  for  each  side  to  feel  that  to  submit  its 
conscience  or  its  convictions  of  right,  its  sense  of 
what  is  most  sacred  in  life,  to  an  outside  judgment 
would  involve  a  kind  of  moral  suicide.  In  such 
cases  every  nation  repudiates  arbitration  and 
prefers  to  be  a  martyr,  in  case  of  need,  to  its 
sense  of  justice.  It  is  at  least  an  open  question 
whether  the  disappearance  of  this  feeling  would 
be  a  mark  of  progress  or  of  degeneration.  At 
any  rate  it  is  practically  certain  that  the  period 
when  it  will  have  disappeared  cannot  at  present 
be  foreseen. 

The   abolition    of   war,    therefore,    involves    the 


32  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

abolition  of  independent  States  and  their  amalgama- 
tion into  one.  There  are  many  who  have  hoped 
for  this  ideal,  expressed  by  Tennyson  when  he 
dreamed  of 

"  The  Parliament  of  man,  the  Federation  of  the  world." 

That  it  is  the  ultimate  destiny  of  mankind  to 
be  united  under  a  single  Government  seems  prob- 
able enough,  but  it  is  rash  to  assume  that  that 
result  will  be  reached  either  by  a  process  of 
peaceful  negotiation,  or  by  the  spread  of  the  im- 
perfect methods  of  modern  democratic  government. 
The  German  Empire,  with  its  population  of  sixty 
millions,  educated  by  the  State,  disciplined  by  the 
State,  relying  on  the  State,  and  commanded  by 
the  State,  is  as  potent  in  comparison  with  the 
less  disciplined  and  less  organised  communities 
which  surround  it  as  was,  in  the  third  century  before 
Christ,  the  Roman  State  in  comparison  with  the 
disunited  multitude  of  Greek  cities,  the  commercial 
oligarchy  of  Carthage,  and  the  half-civilised  tribes 
of  Gaul  and  Spain.  Unless  the  other  States  of 
Europe  can  rouse  themselves  to  a  discipline  as 
sound  and  to  an  organisation  as  subtle  as  those 
of  Prussia  and  to  the  perception  of  a  common 
purpose  in  the  maintenance  of  their  independence, 
the  union  of  Europe  under  a  single  Government 
is  more  likely  to  be  brought  about  by  the  conquer- 
ing  hand    of   Germany   than   by  the  extension   of 


ARBITRATION    AND   DISARMAMENT     33 

democratic    institutions    and    of  sentimental   good 
understandinofs. 

Proposals  for  disarmament  stand  on  an  entirely 
different  footing  from  proposals  to  agree  to  arbitra- 
tion. The  State  that  disarms  renounces  to  the  ex- 
tent of  its  disarmament  the  power  to  protect  itself. 
Upon  what  other  power  is  it  suggested  that  it 
should  rely?  In  the  last  analysis  the  suggestion 
amounts  to  a  proposal  for  the  abolition  of  the 
State,  or  its  abandonment  of  its  claim  to  represent 
the  right.  Those  who  propose  agreements  for  dis- 
armament imagine  that  the  suggestion  if  adopted 
would  lead  to  the  establishment  of  peace.  Have 
they  considered  the  natural  history  of  peace  as 
one  of  the  phenomena  of  the  globe  which  we 
inhabit.-*  The  only  peace  of  any  value  is  that 
between  civilised  nations.  It  rests  either  upon 
the  absence  of  dispute  between  them  or  upon  an 
equilibrium  of  forces.  During  the  last  few  cen- 
turies there  has  usually  been  at  the  end  of  a 
great  European  war  a  great  European  congress 
which  has  regulated  for  the  time  being  the  matters 
which  were  in  dispute,  and  the  treaty  thus  negoti- 
ated has  remained  for  a  long  time  the  basis  of 
the  relations  between  the  Powers.  It  is  always 
a  compromise,  but  a  compromise  more  or  less  ac- 
ceptable to  all  parties,  in  which  they  acquiesce  until 
some  change  either  by  growth  or  decay  makes  the 

conditions  irksome.     Then  comes  a  moment  when 

c 


34  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

one  or  more  of  the  States  is  dissatisfied  and  wishes 
for  a  change.  When  that  has  happened  the  dis- 
satisfied State  attempts  to  bring  about  the  change 
which  it  desires,  but  if  the  forces  with  which  its 
wish  is  likely  to  be  opposed  are  very  great  it  may 
long  acquiesce  in  a  state  of  things  most  distasteful 
to  it.  Let  there  be  a  change  in  the  balance  of 
forces  and  the  discontented  State  will  seize  the 
opportunity,  will  assert  itself,  and  if  resisted  will 
use  its  forces  to  overcome  opposition.  A  proposal 
for  disarmament  must  necessarily  be  based  upon 
the  assumption  that  there  is  to  be  no  change  in 
the  system,  that  the  status  quo  is  everywhere  to 
be  preserved.  This  amounts  to  a  guarantee  of 
the  decaying  and  inefficient  States  against  those 
which  are  growing  and  are  more  efficient.  Such 
an  arrangement  would  not  tend  to  promote  the 
welfare  of  mankind  and  will  not  be  accepted  by 
those  nations  that  have  confidence  in  their  own 
future.  That  such  a  proposal  should  have  been 
announced  by  a  British  Government  is  evidence 
not  of  the  strength  of  Great  Britain,  not  of  a 
healthy  condition  of  national  life,  but  of  inability 
to  appreciate  the  changes  which  have  been  pro- 
duced during  the  last  century  in  the  conditions 
of  Europe  and  the  consequent  alteration  in  Great 
Britain's  relative  position  among  the  great  Powers. 
It  was  long  ago  remarked  by  the  German 
historian    Bernhardi    that    Great    Britain    was    the 


ARBITRATION    AND   DISARMAMENT    35 

first  country  in  Europe  to  revive  in  the  modern 
world  the  conception  of  the  State.  The  feudal 
conception  identified  the  State  with  the  monarch. 
The  English  revolution  of  1688  was  an  identifi- 
cation of  the  State  with  the  Nation.  But  the 
nationalisation  of  the  State,  of  which  the  example 
was  set  in  1688  by  Great  Britain,  was  carried  out 
much  more  thoroughly  by  France  in  the  period 
that  followed  the  revolution  of  1789;  and  in  the 
great  conflict  which  ensued  between  France  and 
the  European  States  the  principal  continental  op- 
ponents of  France  were  compelled  to  follow  her 
example,  and,  in  a  far  greater  degree  than  has 
ever  happened  in  England,  to  nationalise  the  State. 
It  is  to  that  struggle  that  we  must  turn  if  we  are 
to  understand  the  present  condition  of  Europe  and 
the  relations  of  Great  Britain  to  the  European 
Powers. 


V 

THE   NATIONALISATION   OF  WAR 

The  transformation  of  society  of  which  the  French 
Revolution  was  the  most  striking  symptom  pro- 
duced a  corresponding  change  in  the  character 
of  war. 

By  the  Revolution  the  French  people  consti- 
tuted itself  the  State,  and  the  process  was  accom- 
panied by  so  much  passion  and  so  much  violence 
that  it  shortly  involved  the  reconstituted  nation 
in  a  quarrel  with  its  neighbours  the  Germanic 
Empire  and  Prussia,  which  rapidly  developed  into 
a  war  between  France  and  almost  all  the  rest 
of  Europe.  The  Revolution  weakened  and  de- 
moralised the  French  army  and  disorganised  the 
navy,  which  it  deprived  of  almost  all  its  experi- 
enced officers.  When  the  war  began  the  regular 
army  was  supplemented  by  a  great  levy  of 
volunteers.  The  mixed  force  thus  formed,  in 
spite  of  early  successes,  was  unable  to  stand 
against  the  well-disciplined  armies  of  Austria  and 
Prussia,  and  as  the  war  continued,  while  the 
French    troops     gained    solidity    and    experience, 

their  numbers  had  to  be  increased   by  a  levy   en 

36 


THE   NATIONALISATION    OF  WAR       37 

masse  or  a  compulsory  drafting  of  all  the  men  of 
a  certain  age  into  the  army.  In  this  way  the 
army  and  the  nation  were  identified  as  they  had 
never  been  in  modern  Europe  before,  and  in  the 
fifth  year  of  the  war  a  leader  was  found  in  the 
person  of  General  Bonaparte,  who  had  imbued 
himself  with  the  principles  of  the  art  of  war,  as 
they  had  been  expounded  by  the  best  strategists 
of  the  old  French  army,  and  who  had  thus  thought 
out  with  unprecedented  lucidity  the  method  of 
conducting  campaigns.  His  mastery  of  the  art 
of  generalship  was  revealed  by  his  success  in  1796, 
and  as  the  conflict  with  Europe  continued,  he 
became  the  leader  and  eventually  the  master 
of  France.  Under  his  impulse  and  guidance  the 
French  army,  superior  to  them  in  numbers,  organ- 
isation, and  tactical  skill,  crushed  one  after  another 
the  more  old-fashioned  and  smaller  armies  of  the 
great  continental  Powers,  with  the  result  that  the 
defeated  armies,  under  the  influence  of  national 
resentment  after  disaster,  attempted  to  reorganise 
themselves  upon  the  French  model.  The  new 
Austrian  army  undertook  its  revenge  too  soon  and 
was  defeated  in  1809;  ^^^  the  Prussian  endeavour 
continued  and  bore  fruit,  after  the  French  dis- 
asters in  Russia  of  181 2,  in  the  national  rising  in 
which  Prussia,  supported  by  Russia  and  Austria 
and  assisted  by  the  British  operations  in  the 
Peninsula,  overthew  the  French   Empire  in   18 14. 


212194 


38  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

After  the  definitive  peace,  deferred  by  the 
hundred  days,  but  finally  forced  upon  France  on 
the  field  of  Waterloo,  the  Prussian  Government 
continued  to  foster  the  school  of  war  which  it 
had  founded  in  the  period  of  humiliation.  Prussian 
officers  trained  in  that  school  tried  to  learn  the 
lessons  of  the  long  period  of  war  which  they  had 
passed  through.  What  they  discovered  was  that 
war  between  nations,  as  distinct  from  war  be- 
tween dynasties  or  royal  houses,  was  a  struggle 
for  existence  in  which  each  adversary  risked  every- 
thing and  in  which  success  was  to  be  expected 
only  from  the  complete  prostration  of  the  enemy. 
In  the  long  run,  they  said  to  themselves,  the  only 
defence  consists  in  striking  your  adversary  to  the 
ground.  That  being  the  case,  a  nation  must  go 
into  war,  if  war  should  become  inevitable,  with 
the  maximum  force  which  it  can  possibly  produce, 
represented  by  its  whole  manhood  of  military  age, 
thoroughly  trained,  organised,  and  equipped.  The 
Prussian  Government  adhered  to  these  ideas,  to 
which  full  effect  was  given  in  1866,  when  the 
Prussian  army,  reorganised  in  i860,  crushed  in 
ten  days  the  army  of  Austria,  and  in  1870  when, 
in  a  month  from  the  first  shot  fired,  it  defeated 
one  half  of  the  French  army  at  Gravelotte  and 
captured  the  other  half  at  Sedan.  These  events 
proved  to  all  continental  nations  the  necessity  of 
adopting   the  system    of  the    nation   in    arms  and 


THE   NATIONALISATION   OF   WAR       39 

giving  to  their  whole  male  population,  up  to  the 
limits  of  possibility,  the  training  and  the  organisa- 
tion necessary  for  success  in  war. 

The  principle  that  war  is  a  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, and  that  the  only  effective  defence  consists 
in  the  destruction  of  the  adversary's  force,  received 
during  the  age  of  Napoleon  an  even  more  absolute 
demonstration  at  sea  than  was  possible  on  land. 
Great  Britain,  whether  she  would  or  no,  was  drawn 
into  the  European  conflict.  The  neglect  of  the 
army  and  of  the  art  of  war  into  which,  during 
the  eighteenth  century,  her  Governments  had  for 
the  most  part  fallen,  made  it  impracticable  for 
her  to  take  the  decisive  part  which  she  had  played 
in  the  days  of  William  III.  and  of  Marlborough 
in  the  struggle  against  the  French  army ;  her 
contributions  to  the  land  war  were  for  the  most 
part  misdirected  and  futile.  Her  expeditions  to 
Dunkirk,  to  Holland,  and  to  Hanover  embarrassed 
rather  than  materially  assisted  the  cause  of  her 
allies.  But  her  navy,  favourably  handicapped  by 
the  breakdown,  due  to  the  Revolution,  of  the  French 
navy,  eventually  produced  in  the  person  of  Nelson 
a  leader  who,  like  Napoleon,  had  made  it  the 
business  of  his  life  to  understand  the  art  of  war. 
His  victories,  like  Napoleon's,  were  decisive,  and 
when  he  fell  at  Trafalgar  the  navies  of  continental 
Europe,  which  one  after  another  had  been  pressed 
into  the  service  of  France,  had  all  been  destroyed. 


40  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

Then  were  revealed  the  prodigious  consequences 
of  complete  victory  at  sea,  which  were  more  im- 
mediate, more  decisive,  more  far-reaching,  more 
irrevocable  than  on  land.  The  sea  became  during 
the  continuance  of  the  war  the  territory  of  Great 
Britain,  the  open  highway  along  which  her  ships 
could  pass,  while  it  was  closed  to  the  ships  of 
her  adversaries.  Across  that  secure  sea  a  small 
army  was  sent  to  Spain  to  assist  the  national 
and  heroic,  though  miserably  organised,  resist- 
ance made  by  the  Spanish  people  against  the 
French  attempt  at  conquest.  The  British  Govern- 
ment  had    at    last    found    the    rio-ht    direction    for 

o 

such  military  force  as  it  possessed.  Sir  John 
Moore's  army  brought  Napoleon  with  a  great 
force  into  the  field,  but  it  was  able  to  retire 
to  its  own  territory,  the  sea.  The  army  under 
Wellington,  handled  with  splendid  judgment,  had 
to  wait  long  for  its  opportunity,  which  came  when 
Napoleon  with  the  Grand  Army  had  plunged  into 
the  vast  expanse  of  Russia.  Wellington,  marching 
from  victory  to  victory,  was  then  able  to  pro- 
duce upon  the  general  course  of  the  war  an  effect 
out  of  all  proportion  to  the  strength  of  the  force 
which  he  commanded  or  of  that  which  directly 
opposed  him. 

While  France  was  engaged  in  her  great  conti- 
nental struggle  England  was  reaping,  all  over  the 
world,   the   fruits   of  her   naval   victories.     Of  the 


THE   NATIONALISATION    OF   WAR       41 

colonies  of  her  enemies  she  took  as  many  as  she 
wanted,  though  at  the  peace  she  returned  most  of 
them  to  their  former  owners.  Of  the  world's  trade 
she  obtained  something  like  a  monopoly.  The 
nineteenth  century  saw  the  British  colonies  grow 
up  into  so  many  nations  and  the  British  adminis- 
tration of  India  become  a  great  empire.  These 
developments  are  now  seen  to  have  been  possible 
only  through  the  security  due  to  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain,  during  the  first  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  had  the  only  navy  worth  con- 
sidering in  the  world,  and  that  during  the  second 
half  its  strength  greatly  preponderated  over  that 
of  any  of  the  new  navies  which  had  been  built  or 
were  building.  No  wonder  that  when  in  1888 
the  American  observer.  Captain  Mahan,  published 
his  volume  "The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon 
History,"  other  nations  besides  the  British  read 
from  that  book  the  lesson  that  victory  at  sea 
carried  with  it  a  prosperity,  an  influence,  and 
a  greatness  obtainable  by  no  other  means.  It 
was  natural  for  Englishmen  to  draw  the  moral 
which  was  slumbering  in  the  national  conscious- 
ness that  England's  independence,  her  empire, 
and  her  greatness  depended  upon  her  sea  power. 
But  it  was  equally  natural  that  other  nations 
should  draw  a  different  moral  and  should  ask 
themselves  why  this  tremendous  prize,  the  primacy 
of  nations  and  the  first  place  in  the  world,  should 


42  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

for  ever  belong  to  the  inhabitants  of  a  small 
island,  a  mere  appendage  to  the  continent  of 
Europe. 

This  question  we  must  try  to  answer.  But  be- 
fore entering  upon  that  inquiry  I  will  ask  the 
reader  to  note  the  great  lesson  of  the  age  of 
Napoleon  and  of  Nelson.  It  produced  a  change 
in  the  character  of  war,  which  enlarged  itself 
from  a  mere  dispute  between  Governments  and 
became  a  struggle  between  nations.  The  instru- 
ment used  was  no  longer  a  small  standing  army, 
but  the  able-bodied  male  population  in  arms. 
Great  Britain  indeed  still  retained  her  standinof 
army,  but  for  the  time  she  threw  her  resources 
without  stint  into  her  navy  and  its  success  was 
decisive. 


VI 

THE   BALANCE   OF  POWER 

We  have  seen  what  a  splendid  prize  was  the 
result  of  British  victory  at  sea,  supplemented  by 
British  assistance  to  other  Powers  on  land,  a  cen- 
tury ago.  We  have  now  to  ask  ourselves  first  of 
all  how  it  came  about  that  Great  Britain  was  able 
to  win  it,  and  afterwards  whether  it  was  awarded 
once  for  all  or  was  merely  a  challenge  cup  to 
be  held  only  so  long  as  there  should  be  no 
competitor. 

The  answer  to  the  first  question  is  a  matter  of 
history.  England  was  peculiarly  favoured  by  for- 
tune or  by  fate  in  the  great  struggles  through 
which,  during  a  period  of  three  hundred  years, 
she  asserted  and  increased  her  superiority  at  sea 
until  a  century  ago  it  became  supremacy.  She 
rarely  had  to  fight  alone.  Her  first  adversary 
was  Spain.  In  the  conflict  with  Spain  she  had 
the  assistance  of  the  Dutch  Provinces.  When 
the  Dutch  were  strong  enough  to  become  her 
maritime  rivals  she  had  for  a  time  the  co- 
operation  of  P'rance.     Then    came  a  long   period 

43 


44  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

during  which  France  was  her  antagonist.  At  the 
beginning  of  this  epoch  William  III.  accepted 
the  British  crown  in  order  to  be  able  to  use 
the  strength  of  England  to  defend  his  native 
country,  Holland.  His  work  was  taken  up  by 
Marlborough,  whose  first  great  victory  was  won  in 
co-operation  with  the  Imperial  commander,  Prince 
Eugene.  From  that  time  on,  each  of  the  principal 
wars  was  a  European  war  in  which  France  was 
fighting  both  by  sea  and  land,  her  armies  being 
engaged  against  continental  foes,  while  Great 
Britain  could  devote  her  energies  almost  exclu- 
sively to  her  navy.  In  the  Seven  Years'  War  it 
was  the  Prussian  army  which  won  the  victories  on 
land,  while  small  British  forces  were  enabled  by 
the  help  of  the  navy  to  win  an  Empire  from 
France  in  Canada,  and  to  lay  the  foundations 
of  the  British  Empire  in  India.  In  the  war  of 
American  Independence,  Great  Britain  for  once 
stood  alone,  but  this  was  the  one  conflict  which 
contributed  little  or  nothing  towards  establishing 
the  ascendency  of  the  British  navy.  Great  Britain 
failed  of  her  object  because  that  ascendency  was 
incomplete.  Then  came  the  wars  of  the  French 
Revolution  and  Empire  in  which  the  British  navy 
was  the  partner  of  the  Austrian,  Prussian,  Russian, 
and  Spanish  armies. 

These  are  the  facts  which  we  have  to  explain. 
We  have  to  find  out   how  it    was  that    so  many 


THE    BALANCE   OF   POWER  45 

continental  nations,  whether  they  liked  it  or  not, 
found  themselves,  in  fighting  their  own  batdes, 
helping  to  bring  about  the  British  predominance 
at  sea.  It  must  be  remembered  that  land  war- 
fare involves  much  heavier  sacrifices  of  life  than 
warfare  at  sea,  and  that  though  Great  Britain  no 
doubt  spent  great  sums  of  money  not  merely  in 
maintaining  her  navy  but  also  in  subsidising  her 
allies,  she  could  well  afford  to  do  so  because  the 
prosperity  of  her  over-sea  trade,  due  to  her  naval 
success,  made  her  the  richest  country  in  Europe. 
The  other  nations  that  were  her  allies  might  not 
unnaturally  feel  that  they  had  toiled  and  that 
Great  Britain  had  gathered  the  increase.  What 
is  the  explanation  of  a  co-operation  of  which  in 
the  long  run  it  might  seem  that  one  partner  has 
had  the  principal  benefit  ? 

If  two  nations  carry  on  a  serious  war  on  the 
same  side,  it  may  be  assumed  that  each  of  them 
is  fighting  for  some  cause  which  it  holds  to  be 
vital,  and  that  some  sort  of  common  interest 
binds  the  allies  together.  The  most  vital  interest 
of  any  nation  is  its  own  independence,  and  while 
that  is  in  question  it  conceives  of  its  struggle 
as  one  of  self-defence.  The  explanation  of  Great 
Britain's  having  had  allies  in  the  past  may 
therefore  be  that  the  independence  of  Great 
Britain  was  threatened  by  the  same  danger  which 
threatened    the    independence    of    other    Powers. 


46  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

This  theory  is  made  more  probable  by  the  fact 
that  England's  great  struggles — that  of  Queen 
Elizabeth  against  Spain,  that  of  William  III. 
and  Marlborough  against  Louis  XIV.,  and  of 
Pitt  against  Napoleon — were,  each  one  of  them, 
against  an  adversary  whose  power  was  so  great 
as  to  overshadow  the  Continent  and  to  threaten 
it  with  an  ascendency  which,  had  it  not  been 
checked,  might  have  developed  into  a  universal 
monarchy.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  in  the  main 
England,  in  defending  her  own  interests,  was  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  the  champion  of  the  in- 
dependence of  nations  against  the  predominance 
of  any  one  of  their  number.  The  effect  of  Great 
Britain's  self-defence  was  to  facilitate  the  self- 
defence  of  other  nations,  and  thus  to  preserve 
to  Europe  its  character  of  a  community  of  inde- 
pendent States  as  opposed  to  that  which  it  might 
have  acquired,  if  there  had  been  no  England,  of 
a  single  Empire,  governed  from  a  single  capital. 
This  is,  however,  only  half  of  the  answer  we 
want.  It  explains  to  some  extent  why  England 
could  find  other  nations  co-operating  with  her,  and 
reveals  the  general  nature  of  the  cause  which  they 
maintained  in  common.  But  let  us  remember  the 
distinction  between  a  quarrel  in  which  the  main 
thing  is  to  be  in  the  right,  and  a  fight  in  which 
the  main  thing  is  to  win.  The  explanation  just 
sketched  is  a  justification  of  England's  policy,  an 


THE    BALANCE   OF    POWER  47 

attempt  to  show  that  in  the  main  she  had  right 
on  her  side.  That  is  only  part  of  the  reason 
why  she  had  alHes.  The  other  part  is  that  she 
was  strong  and  could  help  them. 

She  had  three  modes  of  action.  She  used  her 
navy  to  destroy  the  hostile  navy  or  navies  and  to 
obtain  control  of  the  seaways.  Then  she  used 
that  control  partly  to  destroy  the  seaborne  trade 
of  her  enemies,  and  partly  to  send  armies  across 
the  sea  to  attack  her  enemies'  armies.  It  was 
because  she  could  employ  these  three  modes  of 
warfare,  and  because  two  of  them  were  not  avail- 
able for  other  Powers,  that  her  influence  on  the 
course  of  events  was  so  great. 

The  question  of  moral  justification  is  more  or 
less  speculative.  I  have  treated  it  here  on  a 
hypothesis  which  is  not  new,  though  since  I 
propounded  it  many  years  ago  it  has  met  with 
little  adverse  criticism.  But  the  question  of  force 
is  one  of  hard  fact ;  it  is  fundamental.  If  England 
had  not  been  able  to  win  her  battles  at  sea  and 
to  help  her  allies  by  her  war  against  trade  and  by 
her  ubiquitous  if  small  armies,  there  would  have 
been  no  need  for  hypotheses  by  which  to  justify 
or  explain  her  policy  ;  she  would  have  long  ago 
lost  all  importance  and  all  interest  except  to 
antiquarians.  Our  object  is  to  find  out  how  she 
may  now  justify  her  existence,  and  enough  has 
been   said  to  make   it    clear    that  if  she  is  to  do 


48  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

that  she  must  not  only  have  a  cause  good  enough 
to  gain  the  sympathy  of  other  Powers,  but  force 
enough  to  give  them  confidence  in  what  she  can 
do  to  help  herself  and  them. 

We  are  now  ready  to  examine  the  second 
question,  whether  or  no  Great  Britain's  position, 
won  a  century  ago,  is  liable  to  challenge. 


VII 

THE   RISE   OF   GERMANY 

The  great  event  of  the  nineteenth  century  in  the 
history  of  Europe  is  the  union  of  Germany  into  a 
Federal  State.  The  secret  of  Prussia's  success 
in  accompHshing  that  union  and  in  leading  the 
federation  so  created,  has  been  the  organisation 
of  the  national  energies  by  a  far-seeing  Govern- 
ment, a  process  begun  as  a  means  of  self-defence 
against  the  French  domination  of  the  period 
betwen  1806  and  181 2.  The  Prussian  statesmen 
of  those  days  were  not  content  merely  to  re- 
organise the  army  on  the  basis  of  universal  service. 
They  organised  the  whole  nation.  They  swept 
away  an  ancient  system  of  land  tenure  in  order 
to  make  the  peasants  free  and  prosperous.  They 
established  a  system  of  public  education  far  in 
advance  of  anything  possessed  by  any  other  nation. 
They  especially  devoted  themselves  to  foster- 
ing industry,  manufacture,  and  commerce.  The 
result  of  this  systematic  direction  of  the  national 
energies  by  a  Government  of  experts,  continu- 
ously supported  by  the  patient  and  methodical 
diligence     of    the    people,    has    been    a     constant 

49  D 


50  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

and  remarkable  advance  of  the  national  pros- 
perity, a  wonderful  development  of  the  national 
resources,  and  an  enormous  addition  to  the  national 
strength.  For  the  last  forty  years  it  has  been 
the  settled  policy  of  the  German  Government  that 
her  organised  military  forces  should  be  strong 
enough  in  case  of  need  to  confront  two  enemies 
at  once,  one  on  either  frontier.  Feeling  themselves 
thus  stronger  than  any  other  European  state,  the 
Germans  have  watched  with  admiration  the  growth 
of  the  British  Colonies  and  of  British  trade.  It 
is  natural  that  they  should  think  that  Germany 
too  might  expect  to  have  colonies  and  a  great 
maritime  trade.  But  wherever  in  the  world  Ger- 
man travellers  have  gone,  wherever  German 
traders  have  settled,  wherever  the  German  Govern- 
ment has  thought  of  working  for  a  site  for  a 
colony,  everywhere  they  have  met  British  influ- 
ence,  British  trade,  the  British  flag. 

In  this  way  has  been  brought  home  to  them  as 
to  no  other  people  the  tremendous  influence  of 
sea-power.  Their  historians  have  recalled  to  them 
the  successive  attempts  which  have  been  made  in 
past  times  by  German  States  to  create  a  navy 
and  to  obtain  colonies,  attempts  which  to  our  own 
people  are  quite  unknown,  because  they  never, 
except  in  the  case  of  the  Hanseatic  League, 
attained  to  such  importance  as  to  figure  in  the 
general  history  of  Europe.      In  the  period  between 


THE    RISE   OF   GERMANY  51 

18 1 5  and  1870,  when  the  desire  for  national  unity- 
was  expressed  by  a  host  of  German  writers,  there 
were  not  wanting  pleas  for  the  creation  of  a 
German  navy.  Several  attempts  were  made  in 
those  days  to  construct  either  a  Prussian  or  a 
German  fleet  ;  but  the  time  was  not  ripe  and 
these  attempts  came  to  nothing.  The  constitution 
of  the  Empire,  promulgated  in  1871,  embodied  the 
principle  that  there  should  be  a  German  navy,  of 
which  the  Emperor  should  be  commander-in-chief, 
and  to  the  creation  of  that  navy  the  most  assiduous 
labour  has  been  devoted.  The  plan  pursued  was 
in  the  first  instance  to  train  a  body  of  officers  who 
should  thoroughly  understand  the  sea  and  maritime 
warfare,  and  for  this  purpose  the  few  ships  which 
were  first  built  were  sent  on  long  voyages  by 
way  of  training  the  crews  and  of  giving  the  officers 
that  self-reliance  and  initiative  which  were  thought 
to  be  the  characteristic  mark  of  the  officers  of  the 
British  navy.  In  due  time  was  founded  the  naval 
college  of  Kiel,  designed  on  a  large  scale  to  be  a 
great  school  of  naval  thought  and  of  naval  war. 
The  history  of  maritime  wars  was  diligently  studied, 
especially  of  course  the  history  of  the  British  navy. 
The  professors  and  lecturers  made  it  their  business 
to  explore  the  workings  of  Nelson's  mind  just  as 
German  military  professors  had  made  themselves 
pupils  of  Napoleon.  And  not  until  a  clear  and 
consistent  theory  of  naval  war  had  been  elaborated 


52  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

and  made  the  common  property  of  all  the  officers 
of  the  navy  was  the  attempt  made  to  expand  the 
fleet  to  a  scale  thought  to  be  proportionate  to  the 
position  of  Germany  among  the  nations.  When 
it  was  at  length  determined  that  that  constructive 
effort  should  be  made,  the  plan  was  thought  out 
and  embodied  in  a  law  regulating  the  construction 
for  a  number  of  years  of  a  fleet  of  predetermined 
size  and  composition  to  be  used  for  a  purpose 
defined  in  the  law  itself.  The  object  was  to 
have  a  fleet  of  sufficient  strength  and  of  suitable 
formation  to  be  able  to  hold  its  own  in  case  of 
need  even  against  the  greatest  maritime  Power. 
In  other  words,  Germany  thought  that  if  her  pros- 
perity continued  and  her  superiority  in  organisa- 
tion over  other  continental  nations  continued  to 
increase,  she  might  find  England's  policy  backed 
by  England's  naval  power  an  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  her  natural  ambition.  After  all,  no  one  can 
be  surprised  if  the  Germans  think  Germany 
as  well  entided  as  any  other  State  to  cherish 
the  ambition  of  being  the  first  nation  in  the 
world. 

It  has  for  a  century  been  the  rational  practice 
of  the  German  Government  that  its  chief  strategist 
should  at  all  times  keep  ready  designs  for  opera- 
tions in  case  of  war  against  any  reasonably  possible 
adversary.  Such  a  set  of  designs  would  naturally 
include  a  plan  of  operation  for  the  case  of  a  con- 


THE   RISE   OF   GERMANY  53 

flict  with  Great  Britain,  and  no  doubt,  every  time 
that  plan  of  operations  was  re-examined  and  re- 
vised, light  would  be  thrown  upon  the  difficulties 
of  a  struggle  with  a  great  maritime  Power  and 
upon  the  means  by  which  those  difficulties  might 
be  overcome.  The  British  navy  is  so  strong 
that,  unless  it  were  mismanaged,  the  German 
navy  ought  to  have  no  chance  of  overcoming  it. 
Yet  Germany  cannot  but  be  anxious,  in  case  of 
war,  to  protect  herself  against  the  consequences 
of  maritime  blockade,  and  of  the  effort  of  a 
superior  British  navy  to  close  the  sea  to  German 
merchantmen.  Accordingly,  the  law  which  regu- 
lates the  naval  shipbuilding  of  the  German  Empire 
lays  down  in  its  preamble  that — "  Germany  must 
possess  a  battle-fleet  so  strong  that  a  war  with 
her  would,  even  for  the  greatest  naval  Power,  be 
accompanied  with  such  dangers  as  would  render 
that  Power's  position  doubtful."  In  other  words, 
a  war  with  Great  Britain  must  find  the  German 
navy  too  strong  for  the  British  navy  to  be  able 
to  confine  it  to  its  harbours,  and  to  maintain,  in 
spite  of  it,  a  complete  command  of  the  seas  which 
border  the  German  coast.  As  German  strategists 
unanimously  accept  the  doctrine  that  the  first 
object  of  a  fleet  in  war  is  the  destruction  of  the 
enemy's  fleet  with  a  view  to  the  consequent 
command  of  the  sea,  the  German  Navy  Act  is 
equivalent   to    the   declaration    of  an    intention   in 


54  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

case  of  conflict  to  challenge  the  British  navy  for 
the  mastery.  This  is  the  answer  to  the  question 
asked  at  the  beginning  of  the  last  chapter,  whether 
the  command  of  the  sea  is  a  permanent  prize  or 
a  challenge  cup.  Germany  at  any  rate  regards 
it  as  a  challenge  cup,  and  has  resolved  to  be 
qualified,  if  occasion  should  arise,  to  make  trial 
of  her  capacity  to  win  it. 


VIII 

NATIONHOOD   NEGLECTED 

What  has  been  the  effect  upon  Great  Brltaui 
of  the  rise  of  Germany?  Is  there  any  cause  of 
quarrel  between  the  two  peoples  and  the  two 
States  ?  That  Germany  has  given  herself  a  strong 
military  organisation  is  no  crime.  On  the  con- 
trary, she  was  obliged  to  do  it,  she  could  not  have 
existed  without  it.  The  foundations  of  her  army 
were  laid  when  she  was  suffering  all  the  agonies 
of  conquest  and  oppression.  Only  by  a  tremen- 
dous effort,  at  the  cost  of  sacrifices  to  which  Eng- 
land's experience  offers  no  analogy,  was  she  able 
to  free  herself  from  the  over-lordship  of  Napoleon. 
King  William  I.  expanded  and  reorganised  his 
army  because  he  had  passed  through  the  bitter 
humiliation  of  seeing  his  country  impotent  and 
humbled  by  a  combination  of  Austria  and  Russia. 
Whether  Bismarck's  diplomacy  was  less  honourable 
than  that  of  the  adversaries  with  whom  he  had 
to  deal  is  a  question  to  which  different  answers 
may  be  given.  But  in  a  large  view  of  history  it 
is  irrelevant,  for  beyond  all  doubt  the  settlements 

effected  through  the  war  of  1866  and    1870  were 

ss 


56  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

sound  settlements  and  left  the  German  nation  and 
Europe  in  a  healthier  condition  than  that  which 
preceded  them.  The  unity  of  Germany  was  won 
by  the  blood  of  her  people,  who  were  and  are 
rightly  resolved  to  remain  strong  enough  and 
ready  to  defend  it,  come  what  may.  It  is  not  for 
Englishmen,  who  have  talked  for  twenty  years  of 
a  Two-Power  standard  for  their  navy,  to  reproach 
Germany  for  maintaining  her  army  at  a  similar 
standard.  Had  she  not  done  so  the  peace  of 
Europe  would  not  have  been  preserved,  nor  is  it 
possible  on  any  ground  of  right  or  justice  to  cavil 
at  Germany's  purpose  to  be  able  in  case  of  need 
to  defend  herself  at  sea.  The  German  Admiral 
Rosendahl,  discussing  the  British  and  German 
navies  and  the  proposals  for  disarmament,  wrote 
in  the  Deutsche  Revue  for  June  1909  : — 

"  If  England  claims  and  thinks  permanently 
necessary  for  her  an  absolute  supremacy  at  sea 
that  is  her  affair,  and  no  sensible  man  will  re- 
proach her  for  it ;  but  it  is  quite  a  different  thing 
for  a  Great  Power  like  the  German  Empire,  by 
an  international  treaty  supposed  to  be  binding 
for  all  time,  expressly  to  recognise  and  accept  this 
in  principle.  Assuredly  we  do  not  wish  to  enter 
into  a  building  competition  with  England  on  a 
footing  of  equality.  .  .  .  But  a  political  agreement 
on  the  basis  of  the  unconditional  superiority  of  the 


NATIONHOOD   NEGLECTED  57 

British  Fleet  would  be  equivalent  to  an  abandon- 
ment of  our  national  dignity,  and  though  we  do 
not,  speaking  broadly,  wish  to  dispute  England's 
predominance  at  sea,  yet  we  do  mean  in  case  of 
war  to  be  or  to  become  the  masters  on  our  own 
coasts." 

There  is  not  a  word  in  this  passage  which  can 
give  just  cause  of  offence  to  England  or  to 
Englishmen. 

That  there  has  been  and  still  is  a  good  deal  of 
mutual  ill-feeling  both  in  Germany  and  in  England 
cannot  be  denied.  Rivalry  between  nations  is 
always  accompanied  by  feeling  which  is  all  the 
stronger  when  it  is  instinctive  and  therefore,  though 
not  unintelligible,  apt  to  be  irrational.  But  what 
in  this  case  is  really  at  the  bottom  of  it  ?  There 
have  no  doubt  been  a  number  of  matters  that  have 
been  discussed  between  the  two  Governments,  and 
though  they  have  for  the  most  part  been  settled, 
the  manner  in  which  they  have  been  raised  and 
pressed  by  German  Governments  has  caused  them 
to  be  regarded  by  British  Ministers,  and  to  a  less 
extent  by  the  British  people,  as  sources  of  annoy- 
ance, as  so  many  diplomatic  "pin-pricks."  The 
manners  of  German  diplomacy  are  not  suave. 
Suavity  is  no  more  part  of  the  Bismarckian  tra- 
dition than  exactitude.  But  after  all,  the  manners 
of   the   diplomatists  of  any   country  are  a    matter 


58  BRITAIN   AT    BAY 

rather  for  the  nation  whose  honour  they  concern 
than  for  the  nations  to  which  they  have  given 
offence.  They  only  partially  account  for  the  deep 
feeling  which  has  grown  up  between  Great  Britain 
and  Germany. 

The  truth  is  that  England  is  disturbed  by  the 
rise  of  Germany,  which  her  people,  in  spite  of 
abundant  warnings,  did  not  foresee  and  have  not 
appreciated  until  the  moment  when  they  find  them- 
selves outstripped  in  the  race  by  a  people  whom 
they  have  been  accustomed  to  regard  with  some- 
thing of  the  superiority  with  which  the  prosperous 
and  polished  dweller  in  a  capital  looks  upon  his 
country  cousin  from  the  farm. 

Fifty  years  ago  Germany  in  English  estimation 
did  not  count.  The  name  was  no  more  than  a 
geographical  expression.  Great  Britain  was  the 
one  great  Power.  She  alone  had  colonies  and 
India.  She  as  good  as  monopolised  the  world's 
shipping  and  the  world's  trade.  As  compared 
with  other  countries  she  was  immeasurably  rich 
and  prosperous.  Her  population  during  the  long 
peace,  interrupted  only  by  the  Crimean  War  and 
the  Indian  Mutiny,  had  multiplied  beyond  men's 
wildest  dreams.  Her  manufacturers  were  amassing 
fortunes,  her  industry  had  no  rival.  The  Victorian 
age  was  thought  of  as  the  beginning  of  a  wonderful 
new  era,  in  which,  among  the  nations,  England 
was  first  and  the  rest  nowhere.     The  temporary 


NATIONHOOD   NEGLECTED  59 

effort  of  the  French  to  create  a  modern  navy- 
disturbed  the  sense  of  security  which  existed  and 
gave  rise  to  the  Volunteer  movement,  which  was 
felt  to  be  a  marvellous  display  of  patriotism. 

There  were  attempts  to  show  that  British  self- 
complacency  was  not  altogether  justified.  The 
warnings  of  those  who  looked  below  the  surface 
were  read  and  admired.  Few  writers  were  more 
popular  than  Carlyle,  Ruskin,  and  Matthew  Arnold. 
But  all  three  held  aloof  from  the  current  of  public 
life  which  flowed  in  the  traditional  party  channels. 
There  was  no  effort  to  revive  the  conception  of 
the  nation  as  the  organised  state  to  which  every 
citizen  is  bound,  the  source  and  centre  of  all  men's 
duties.  Accordingly  every  man  devoted  himself 
to  his  own  affairs,  of  which  the  first  was  to  make 
money  and  the  second  to  enjoy  life ;  those  who 
were  rich  enough  finding  their  amusement  in 
Parliament,  which  was  regarded  as  the  most  inter- 
esting club  in  London,  and  in  its  debates,  of  which 
the  charm,  for  those  who  take  part  in  them,  lies 
in  the  fact  that  for  success  not  knowledge  of  a 
subject,  but  fluency,  readiness,  and  wit  are  required. 

The  great  events  taking  place  in  the  world,  the 
wars  in  Bohemia,  in  France,  and  in  Turkey,  added 
a  certain  interest  to  English  life  because  they 
furnished  to  the  newspapers  matter  more  exciting 
than  any  novelist  could  produce,  and  in  this  way 
o-ratified   the   taste   for  sensation   which   had   been 


6o  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

acquired  both  by  rich  and  poor.  That  these 
events  meant  anything  in  particular  to  the  British 
nation  was  not  Hkely  to  be  realised  while  that 
nation  was,  in  fact,  non-existent,  and  had  re- 
solved itself  into  forty  million  individuals,  each  of 
them  living  for  his  own  ends,  slightly  enlarged  to 
include  his  family,  his  literary  or  scientific  society, 
perhaps  his  cricket  club,  and  on  Sunday  morning 
his  church  or  chapel.  There  was  also  a  widespread 
interest  in  *'  politics,"  by  which  was  meant  the 
particular  fads  cherished  by  one's  own  caucus  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  nation's  affairs,  it  being  more 
or  less  understood  that  the  army,  the  navy,  and 
foreign  policy  were  not  to  be  made  political 
questions. 

While  forty  million  English  people  have  thus 
been  spending  their  lives  self-centred,  content  to 
make  their  living,  to  enjoy  life,  and  to  behave  kindly 
to  their  fellows,  there  has  grown  up  in  Germany 
a  nation,  a  people  of  sixty  millions,  who  believe 
that  they  belong  together,  that  their  country  has 
the  first  call  on  them,  whose  children  go  to  school 
because  the  Government  that  represents  the  nation 
bids  them,  who  go  for  two  years  to  the  army 
or  the  navy  to  learn  war,  because  they  know  that 
if  the  nation  has  to  fight  it  can  do  so  only  by 
their  fighting  for  it.  Their  Government  thinks  it 
is  its  business  to  be  always  improving  the  organisa- 
tion of  its  sixty  millions  for  security,  for  knowledge, 


NATIONHOOD   NEGLECTED  6i 

for  instruction,  for  agriculture,  for  industry,  for 
navigation.  Thus  after  forty  years  of  common 
effort  for  a  common  good  Germany  finds  itself  the 
first  nation  in  Europe,  more  than  holding  its  own 
in  every  department  of  life,  and  eagerly  surveying 
the  world  in  search  of  opportunities. 

The  Englishman,  while  he  has  been  living  his 
own  life  and,  as  I  think,  improving  in  many  re- 
spects, has  at  the  same  time  been  admiring  the 
British  Empire,  and  discovering  with  pride  that  a 
number  of  new  nations  have  grown  up  in  distant 
places,  formed  of  people  whose  fathers  or  grand- 
fathers emigrated  from  Great  Britain.  He  re- 
members from  his  school  lessons  or  reads  in  the 
newspapers  of  the  greatness  of  England  in  past 
centuries,  and  naturally  feels  that  with  such  a  past 
and  with  so  great  an  Empire  existing  to-day,  his 
country  should  be  a  very  great  Power.  But  as 
he  discovers  what  the  actual  performance  of  Ger- 
many is,  and  becomes  acquainted  with  the  results 
of  her  efforts  in  science,  education,  trade,  and  in- 
dustry, and  the  way  in  which  the  influence  of  the 
German  Government  predominates  in  the  affairs 
of  Europe,  he  is  puzzled  and  indignant,  and  feels 
that  in  some  way  Great  Britain  has  been  surpassed 
and  outdone. 

The  state  of  the  world  which  he  thought  existed, 
in  which  England  was  the  first  nation  and  the 
rest    nowhere,    has    completely    changed    while    he 


62  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

has  been  attending  to  his  private  business,  his 
"  politics,"  and  his  cricket,  and  he  finds  the  true 
state  of  the  world  to  be  that,  while  in  industry 
England  has  hard  work  to  hold  her  own  against 
her  chief  rival,  she  has  already  been  passed  in 
education  and  in  science,  that  her  army,  good  as 
it  is,  is  so  small  as  scarcely  to  count,  and  that 
even  her  navy  cannot  keep  its  place  without  a 
great  and  unexpected  effort. 

Yet  fifty  years  ago  England  had  on  her  side 
all  the  advantages  but  one.  She  was  forgetting 
nationhood  while  Germany  was  reviving  it.  The 
British  people,  instead  of  organising  themselves  as 
one  body,  the  nation,  have  organised  themselves 
into  two  bodies,  the  two  "  political  "  parties.  Eng- 
land's one  chance  lies  in  recovering  the  unity  that 
has  been  lost,  which  she  must  do  by  restoring  the 
nation  to  its  due  place  in  men's  hearts  and  lives. 
To  find  out  how  that  is  to  be  done  we  must  once 
more  look  at  Europe  and  at  England's  relations 
to  Europe. 


IX 

NEW   CONDITIONS 

It  has  been  seen  how,  as  a  result  of  the  struggle 
with  Napoleon,  England,  from  1805  onwards,  was 
the  only  sea  power  remaining  in  Europe,  and  indeed, 
with  the  exception  of  the  United  States,  the  only 
sea  power  in  the  world.  One  of  the  results  was 
that  she  had  for  many  years  the  monopoly  of  the 
whole  ocean,  not  merely  for  the  purposes  of  war, 
but  also  for  the  purposes  of  trade.  The  British 
mercantile  marine  continued  through  the  greater 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  increase  its  pre- 
ponderance over  all  others,  and  this  remarkable, 
and  probably  quite  exceptional,  growth  was  greatly 
favoured  by  the  Civil  War  in  America,  during 
which  the  mercantile  marine  of  the  United  States 
received  from  the  action  of  the  Confederate  cruisers 
a  damaofe  from  which  it  has  never  recovered. 

In  the  years  immediately  following  1805,  Great 
Britain  in  self-defence,  or  as  a  means  of  continuing 
the  war  against  France,  in  regard  to  which  her 
resources  for  operations  on  land  were  limited,  had 
recourse  to  the  operations  of  blockade,   by  which 

the   sea   was  closed,  as  far  as   possible,   to  enemy 

63 


64  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

merchantmen  while  Great  Britain  prohibited  neutral 
ships  from  carrying  enemy  goods.  Napoleon  re- 
plied by  the  attempt  to  exclude  British  goods  from 
the  Continent  altogether,  and  indeed  the  pressure 
produced  by  Great  Britain's  blockades  compelled 
Napoleon  further  to  extend  his  domination  on  the 
Continent.  Thus  the  other  continental  States  found 
themselves  between  the  devil  and  the  deep  sea. 
They  had  to  submit  to  the  domination  of  Napoleon 
on  land  and  to  the  complete  ascendency  of  Great 
Britain  on  the  waters  which  surrounded  their  coasts. 
The  British  claims  to  supremacy  at  sea  were  un- 
animously resented  by  all  the  continental  States, 
which  all  suffered  from  them,  but  in  all  cases  the 
national  resentment  against  French  invasion  or 
French  occupation  of  territory  was  greater  than  the 
resentment  against  the  invisible  pressure  exercised 
by  the  British  navy.  In  the  wars  of  liberation, 
though  Great  Britain  was  the  welcome  ally  of 
all  the  States  that  were  fighting  against  France, 
the  pressure  of  British  sea  power  was  none  the 
less  disagreeable  and,  in  the  years  of  peace  which 
followed,  the  British  monopoly  of  sea  power,  ot 
sea-carriage,  of  manufacturing  industry,  and  of  inter- 
national trade  were  equally  disliked  by  almost  all 
the  nations  of  Europe.  Protective  duties  were  re- 
garded as  the  means  of  fostering  national  industries 
and  of  sheltering  them  against  the  overpowering 
competition  of  British  manufactures.     The  British 


NEW   CONDITIONS  65 

claim  to  the  dominion  of  the  sea  was  regarded  as 
unfounded  in  right,  and  was. in  principle  as  strongly 
denounced  as  had  been  the  territorial  domination 
of  France.  The  mistress  of  the  seas  was  regarded 
as  a  tyrant,  whom  it  would  be  desirable,  if  it  were 
possible,  to  depose,  and  there  were  many  who 
thought  that  as  the  result  of  a  conflict  in  which  the 
final  success  had  been  gained  by  the  co-operation 
of  a  number  of  States  acting  together,  the  gains  of 
Great  Britain  which,  as  time  went  on,  were  seen 
to  be  growing  into  a  world-wide  empire,  had  been 
out  of  proportion  to  the  services  she  had  rendered 
to  the  common  cause. 

Meantime  during  the  century  which  has  elapsed 
since  the  last  great  war,  there  has  been  a  complete 
change  in  the  conditions  of  intercourse  between 
nations  at  sea  and  of  maritime  warfare.  It  has 
come  about  gradually,  almost  imperceptibly,  so  that 
it  could  hardly  be  appreciated  before  the  close  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  But  it  is  vital  to  Great 
Britain  that  her  people  should  understand  the  nature 
of  the  transformation. 

The  first  thing  to  be  observed  is  that  the  British 
monopoly  of  shipping  and  of  oversea  trade  has 
disappeared.  Great  Britain  still  has  by  far  the 
largest  mercantile  marine  and  by  far  the  greatest 
share  in  the  world's  sea  traffic,  but  she  no  longer 
stands  alone.  Germany,  the  United  States,  France, 
Norway,    Italy,    and    Japan    all    have    great    fleets 


66  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

of  merchant  ships  and  do  an  enormous,  some 
of  them  a  rapidly  increasing,  seaborne  trade.  A 
large  number  of  the  principal  States  import  the  raw 
material  of  manufacture  and  carry  on  import  and 
export  on  a  large  scale.  The  railway  system 
connects  all  the  great  manufacturing  centres,  even 
those  which  lie  far  inland,  with  the  great  ports  to 
and  from  which  the  lines  of  steamers  ply.  The 
industrial  life  of  every  nation  is  more  than  ever 
dependent  upon  its  communications  with  and  by  the 
sea,  and  every  nation  has  become  more  sensitive 
than  ever  to  any  disturbance  of  its  maritime  trade. 
The  preponderance  of  the  British  navy  is  therefore 
a  subject  of  anxiety  in  every  State  which  regards 
as  possible  a  conflict  of  its  own  interests  with  those 
of  Great  Britain.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why 
continental  States  have  during  the  last  quarter  of 
a  century  been  disposed  to  increase  their  fleets  and 
their  naval  expenditure. 

In  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  renewed  and  ex- 
tended by  the  Declaration  of  London,  the  mari- 
time States  have  agreed  that  in  any  future  war 
enemy  goods  in  a  neutral  ship  are  to  be  safe  from 
capture  unless  the  ship  is  running  a  blockade,  which 
must  be  effective.  Whether  Great  Britain  was  well 
or  ill  advised  in  accepting  this  rule  is  a  question 
which  it  is  now  useless  to  discuss,  for  the  decision 
cannot  be  recalled,  and  the  rule  must  be  regarded 
as   established    beyond   controversy.     Its    effect   is 


NEW   CONDITIONS  67 

greatly  to  diminish  the  pressure  which  a  victorious 
navy  can  bring  to  bear  upon  a  hostile  State.  It 
deprives  Great  Britain  of  one  of  the  most  potent 
weapons  which  she  employed  in  the  last  great  war. 
To-day  it  would  be  impracticable  even  for  a  vic- 
torious navy  to  cut  off  a  continental  State  from 
seaborne  traffic.  The  ports  of  that  State  might 
be  blockaded  and  its  merchant  ships  would  be 
liable  to  capture,  but  the  victorious  navy  could  not 
interfere  with  the  traffic  carried  by  neutral  ships 
to  neutral  ports.  Accordingly,  Great  Britain  could 
not  now,  even  in  the  event  of  naval  victory  being 
hers,  exercise  upon  an  enemy  the  pressure  which 
she  formerly  exercised  through  the  medium  of  the 
neutral  States.  Any  continental  State,  even  if  its 
coasts  were  eff"ectively  blockaded,  could  still,  with 
increased  difficulty,  obtain  supplies  both  of  raw 
material  and  of  food  by  the  land  routes  through 
the  territory  of  its  neutral  neighbours.  But  Great 
Britain  herself,  as  an  insular  State,  would  not,  in 
case  of  naval  defeat,  have  this  advantage.  A 
decisive  defeat  of  the  British  navy  might  be 
followed  by  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to 
blockade  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain,  though  that 
would  no  doubt  be  difficult,  for  a  very  large  force 
would  be  required  to  maintain  an  effective  blockade 
of  the  whole  coast-line. 

It  is  conceivable  that  an   enemy    might  attempt 
in   spite    of  the    Declaration    of   London    to    treat 


68  BRITAIN   AT    BAY 

as  contraband  food  destined  for  the  civil  popula- 
tion and  this  course  ought  to  be  anticipated,  but 
in  the  military  weakness  of  Great  Britain  an  enemy 
whose  navy  had  gained  the  upper  hand  would 
almost  certainly  prefer  to  undertake  the  speedier 
process  of  bringing  the  war  to  an  end  by  landing  an 
army  in  Great  Britain.  A  landing  on  a  coast  so 
extensive  as  that  of  this  island  can  with  difficulty 
be  prevented  by  forces  on  land,  because  troops 
cannot  be  moved  as  quickly  as  ships. 

The  war  in  the  Far  East  has  shown  how  strong 
such  an  army  might  be,  and  how  great  a  military 
effort  would  be  needed  to  crush  it.  The  proper 
way  to  render  an  island  secure,  is  by  a  navy 
strong  enough  to  obtain  in  war  the  control  of 
the  surrounding  sea,  and  a  navy  unable  to  perform 
that  function  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  guarantee 
of  security. 

The  immediate  effects  of  naval  victory  can 
hardly  ever  again  be  so  far-reaching  as  they 
were  a  century  ago  in  the  epoch  of  masts  and 
sails.  At  that  time  there  were  no  foreign  navies, 
except  in  European  waters,  and  in  the  Atlantic 
waters  of  the  United  States.  When,  therefore, 
the  British  navy  had  crushed  its  European  ad- 
versaries, its  ships  could  act  without  serious  oppo- 
sition upon  any  sea  and  any  coast  in  the  world. 
To-day,  the  radius  of  action  of  a  victorious  fleet  is 
restricted  by  the  necessity  of  a  supply  of  coal,  and 


NEW   CONDITIONS  69 

therefore  by  the  secure  possession  of  coaling- 
stations  at  suitable  intervals  along  any  route  by 
which  the  fleet  proposes  to  move,  or  by  the 
goodwill  of  neutrals  in  permitting  it  to  coal  at 
their  depots.  To-day,  moreover,  there  are  navies 
established  even  in  distant  seas.  In  the  Pacific, 
for  example,  are  the  fleets  of  Japan  and  of  the 
United  States,  and  these,  in  their  home  waters, 
will  probably  be  too  strong  to  be  opposed  by 
European  navies  acting  at  a  vast  distance  from 
their  bases. 

It  seems  likely,  therefore,  that  neither  Great 
Britain  nor  any  other  State  will  in  future  enjoy 
that  monopoly  of  sea  power  which  was  granted 
to  Great  Britain  by  the  circumstances  of  her 
victories  in  the  last  great  war.  What  I  have 
called  the  great  prize  has  in  fact  ceased  to  exist, 
and  even  if  an  adversary  were  to  challenge  the 
British  navy,  the  reward  of  his  success  would  not 
be  a  naval  supremacy  of  anything  like  the  kind 
or  extent  which  peculiar  conditions  made  it  possible 
for  Great  Britain  to  enjoy  during  the  nineteenth 
century.  It  would  be  a  supremacy  limited  and 
reduced  by  the  existence  of  the  new  navies  that 
have  sprung  up. 

From  these  considerations  a  very  important 
conclusion  must  be  drawn.  In  the  first  place, 
though  victory  at  sea  is  in  case  of  war  as  indis- 
pensable to  Great  Britain  as  ever,  for   it  remains 


70  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

the  fundamental  condition  of  her  security,  yet  its 
results  can  hardly  in  future  be  as  great  as  they 
were  in  the  past,  and  in  particular  it  may  perhaps 
not  again  enable  her  to  exert  upon  continental 
States  the  same  effective  pressure  which  it  for- 
merly rendered  possible. 

In  order,  therefore,  to  bring  pressure  upon  a 
continental  adversary,  Great  Britain  is  more  than 
ever  in  need  of  the  co-operation  of  a  continental  ally. 
A  navy  alone  cannot  produce  the  effect  which 
it  once  did  upon  the  course  of  a  land  war,  and 
its  success  will  not  suffice  to  give  confidence  to 
the  ally.  Nothing  but  an  army  able  to  take  its 
part  in  a  continental  struggle  will,  in  modern  con- 
ditions, suffice  to  make  Great  Britain  the  effective 
ally  of  a  continental  State,  and  in  the  absence  of 
such  an  army  Great  Britain  will  continue  to  be,  as 
she  is  to-day,  without  continental  allies. 

A  second  conclusion  is  that  our  people,  while 
straining  every  nerve  in  peace  to  ensure  to  their 
navy  the  best  chances  of  victory  in  war,  must 
carefully  avoid  the  conception  of  a  dominion  of 
the  sea,  although,  in  fact,  such  a  dominion  actu- 
ally existed  during  a  great  part  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  new  conditions  which  have  grown 
up  during  the  past  thirty  years  have  made  this 
ideal  as  much  a  thing  of  the  past  as  the  mediaeval 
conception  of  a  Roman  Empire  in  Europe  to  whose 
titular  head  all  kings  were  subordinate. 


X 

DYNAMICS— THE    QUESTION    OF    MIGHT 

If  there  is  a  chance  of  a  conflict  in  which  Great 
Britain  is  to  be  engaged,  her  people  must  take 
thought  in  time  how  they  may  have  on  their  side 
both  right  and  might.  It  is  hard  to  see  how 
otherwise  they  can  expect  the  contest  to  be  de- 
cided in  their  favour. 

As  I  have  said  before,  in  the  quarrel  you  must 
be  in  the  right  and  in  the  fight  you  must  win. 
The  quarrel  is  the  domain  of  policy,  the  fight 
that  of  strategy  or  dynamics.  Policy  and  strategy 
are  in  reality  inextricably  interwoven  one  with 
another,  for  right  and  might  resemble,  more  than 
is  commonly  supposed,  two  aspects  of  the  same 
thing.  But  it  is  convenient  in  the  attempt  to 
understand  any  complicated  subject  to  examine 
its  aspects  separately. 

I  propose,  therefore,  in  considering  the  present 

situation  of  Great  Britain  and  her  relations  to  the 

rest    of  the  world,  to   treat    first   of   the    question 

of  force,  to  assume  that  a  quarrel  may  arise,  and 

to    ascertain    what    are    the    conditions    in    which 

Great    Britain    can    expect    to    win,    and    then   to 

71 


72  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

enter  into  the  question  of  right,  in  order  to 
find  out  what  Hght  can  be  thrown  upon  the 
necessary  aims  and  methods  of  British  policy  by 
the  conclusions  which  will  have  been  reached  as 
to  the  use  of  force. 

The  nationalisation  of  States,  which  is  the 
fundamental  fact  of  modern  history,  affects  both 
policy  and  strategy.  If  the  State  is  a  nation,  the 
population  associated  as  one  body,  then  the  force 
which  it  can  use  in  case  of  conflict  represents  the 
sum  of  the  energies  of  the  whole  population,  and 
this  force  cannot  and  will  not  be  used  except  as 
the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  whole  population. 
The  policy  of  such  a  State  means  its  collective  will, 
the  consciousness  of  its  whole  population  of  a  pur- 
pose, mission,  or  duty  which  it  must  fulfil,  with 
which  it  is  identified,  and  which,  therefore,  it 
cannot  abandon.  Only  in  case  this  national  pur- 
pose meets  with  resistance  will  a  people  organised 
as  a  State  enter  into  a  quarrel,  and  if  such  a 
quarrel  has  to  be  fought  out  the  nation's  resources 
will  be  expended  upon  it  without  limitation. 

The  chief  fact  in  regard  to  the  present  con- 
dition of  Europe  appears  to  be  the  very  great 
excess  in  the  military  strength  of  Germany  over 
that  of  any  other  Power.  It  is  due  in  part  to 
the  large  population  of  the  German  Empire,  and 
in  part  to  the  splendid  national  organisation  which 
has  been  eiven  to  it.      It  cannot  be  asserted  either 


THE   QUESTION    OF    MIGHT  73 

that  Germany  was  not  entitled  to  become  united, 
or  that  she  was  not  entitled  to  organise  herself 
as  efficiently  as  possible  both  for  peace  and  for 
war.  But  the  result  is  that  Germany  has  a  pre- 
ponderance as  great  if  not  greater  than  that  of 
Spain  in  the  time  of  Philip  II.,  or  of  France  either 
under  Louis  XIV.  or  under  Napoleon.  Every 
nation,  no  doubt,  has  a  right  to  make  itself  as 
strong  as  it  can,  and  to  exercise  as  much  influence 
as  it  can  on  the  affairs  of  the  world.  To  do 
these  things  is  the  mission  and  business  of  a 
nation.  But  the  question  arises,  what  are  the 
limits  to  the  power  of  a  single  nation  ?  The 
answer  appears  to  be  that  the  only  limits  are 
those  set  by  the  power  of  other  nations.  This  is 
the  theory  of  the  balance  of  power  of  which  the 
object  is  to  preserve  to  Europe  its  character  of 
a  community  of  independent  States  rather  than 
that  of  a  single  empire  in  which  one  State  pre- 
dominates. 

Without  attributing  to  Germany  any  wrong 
purpose  or  any  design  of  injustice  it  must  be 
evident  that  her  very  great  strength  must  give 
her  in  case  of  dispute,  always  possible  between 
independent  States,  a  corresponding  advantage 
against  any  other  Power  whose  views  or  whose 
intentions  should  not  coincide  with  hers.  It  is  the 
obvious  possibility  of  such  dispute  that  makes  it 
incumbent  upon   Great   Britain   to   prepare   herself 


74  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

in  case  of  disapfreement  to  enter  into  a  discussion 
with  Germany  upon  equal  terms. 

Only  upon  such  preparation  can  Great  Britain 
base  the  hope  either  of  averting  a  quarrel  with 
Germany,  or  in  case  a  quarrel  should  arise  and 
cannot  be  made  up  by  mutual  agreement,  of 
settling  it  by  the  arbitrament  of  war  upon  terms 
accordant  with  the  British  conception  of  right. 
Great  Britain  therefore  must  give  herself  a  national 
organisation  for  war  and  must  make  preparation 
for  war  the  nation's  first  business  until  a  reason- 
able security  has  been  attained. 

The  question  is,  what  weapons  are  now  available 
for  Great  Britain  in  case  of  a  disagreement  with 
Germany  leading  to  conflict?  In  the  old  wars, 
as  we  have  seen,  she  had  three  modes  of  action. 
She  used  her  navy  to  obtain  control  of  the  sea- 
ways, and  then  she  used  that  control  pardy  to 
destroy  the  sea-borne  trade  of  her  enemies,  and 
partly  to  send  armies  across  the  sea  to  attack 
her  enemies'  armies.  By  the  combination  of  these 
three  modes  of  operation  she  was  strong  enough 
to  give  valuable  help  to  other  Powers,  and  there- 
fore she  had  allies  whose  assistance  was  as  useful 
to  her  as  hers  to  them.  To-day,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  same  conditions  no  longer  exist.  The  British 
navy  may  indeed  hope  to  obtain  control  of  the 
sea-ways,  but  the  law  of  maritime  war,  as  it  has 
been  settled  by  the  Declarations  of  Paris  and   of 


THE  QUESTION    OF    MIGHT  75 

London,  makes  it  impracticable  for  Great  Britain 
to  use  a  naval  victory,  even  if  she  wins  it,  in  such 
a  way  as  to  be  able  commercially  to  throttle  a 
hostile  Power,  while  the  British  military  forces 
available  for  employment  on  the  Continent  are  so 
small  as  hardly  to  count  in  the  balance.  The 
result  is  that  Great  Britain's  power  of  action 
against  a  possible  enemy  is  greatly  reduced,  partly 
in  consequence  of  changes  in  the  laws  of  war,  but 
perhaps  still  more  in  consequence  of  the  fact  that 
while  other  Powers  are  organised  for  war  as 
nations,  England  in  regard  to  war  is  still  in  the 
condition  of  the  eighteenth  century,  relying  upon 
a  small  standing  army,  a  purely  professional  navy, 
and  a  large  half-trained  force,  called  Territorial, 
neither  ready  for  war  nor  available  outside  the 
United  Kingdom. 

There  is  a  school  of  politicians  who  imagine 
that  Great  Britain's  weakness  can  be  supplemented 
from  other  parts  of  the  British  Empire.  That  is 
an  idea  which  ought  not  to  be  received  without 
the  most  careful  examination  and  in  my  judgment 
must,  except  within  narrow  limits,  be  rejected. 

In  a  war  between  Great  Britain  and  a  con- 
tinental State  or  combination  the  assistance  which 
Great  Britain  could  possibly  receive  from  the 
King's  dominions  beyond  the  sea  is  necessarily 
limited.  Such  a  war  must  in  the  first  place  be 
a  naval  contest,  towards  which  the  most  that  the 


76  BRITAIN   AT    BAY 

colonies  can  contribute  consists  in  such  additions 
to  Great  Britain's  naval  strength  as  they  may 
have  given  during  the  preceding  period  of  peace. 
What  taken  together  they  may  do  in  this  way 
would  no  doubt  make  an  appreciable  difference  in 
the  balance  of  forces  between  the  two  contending 
navies ;  but  in  the  actual  struggle  the  colonies 
would  be  little  more  than  spectators,  except  in  so 
far  as  their  ports  would  offer  a  certain  number  of 
secure  bases  for  the  cruisers  upon  which  Great 
Britain  must  rely  for  the  protection  of  her  sea-borne 
trade.  Even  if  all  the  colonies  possessed  first-rate 
armies,  the  help  which  those  armies  could  give 
would  not  be  equal  to  that  obtainable  from  a  single 
European  ally.  For  a  war  against  a  European 
adversary  Great  Britain  must  rely  upon  her  own 
resources,  and  upon  such  assistance  as  she  might 
obtain  if  it  were  felt  by  other  Powers  on  the  Con- 
tinent not  only  that  the  cause  in  which  she  was 
fighting  was  vital  to  them  and  therefore  called  for 
their  co-operation,  but  also  that  in  the  struggle 
Great  Britain's  assistance  would  be  likely  to  turn 
the  scale  in  their  favour. 

Can  we  expect  that  history  will  repeat  itself,  and 
that  once  more  in  case  of  conflict  Great  Britain 
will  have  the  assistance  of  continental  allies  ? 
That  depends  chiefly  on  their  faith  in  her  power 
to  help  them.  One  condition  of  such  an  alliance 
undoubtedly    exists — the    desire    of    other    nations 


THE   QUESTION    OF   MIGHT  77 

for  it.  The  predominance  of  Germany  on  the 
Continent  rests  Hke  a  nightmare  upon  more  than 
one  of  the  other  States.  It  is  increased  by  the 
alHance  of  Austria,  another  great  miHtary  empire 
— an  empire,  moreover,  not  without  a  fine  naval 
tradition,  and,  as  is  proved  by  the  recent  announce- 
ment of  the  intention  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment to  build  four  "  Dreadnoughts,"  resolved  to 
revive  that  tradition. 

Against  the  combination  of  Germany  and  Austria, 
Russia,  which  has  hardly  begun  to  recover  from 
the  prostration  of  her  defeat  by  Japan,  is  help- 
less ;  while  France,  with  a  population  much  smaller 
than  that  of  Germany,  can  hardly  look  forward 
to  a  renewal  single-handed  of  the  struggle  which 
ended  for  her  so  disastrously  forty  years  ago. 
The  position  of  Italy  is  more  doubtful,  for  the 
sympathies  of  her  people  are  not  attracted  by 
Austria  ;  they  look  with  anxiety  upon  the  Austrian 
policy  of  expansion  towards  the  ^gean  and  along 
the  shore  of  the  Adriatic.  The  estrangement 
from  France  which  followed  upon  the  French 
occupation  of  Tunis  appears  to  have  passed  away, 
and  it  seems  possible  that  if  there  were  a  chance  of 
success  Italy  might  be  glad  to  emancipate  herself 
from  German  and  Austrian  influence.  But  even  if 
Germany's  policy  were  such  that  Russia,  France, 
and  Italy  were  each  and  all  of  them  desirous  to 
oppose  it,  and  to  assert  a  will  and  a  policy  of  their 


78  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

own  distinct  from  that  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment, it  is  very  doubtful  whether  their  strength 
is  sufficient  to  justify  them  in  an  armed  conflict, 
especially  as  their  hypothetical  adversaries  have 
a  central  position  with  all  its  advantages.  From 
a  military  point  of  view  the  strength  of  the  central 
position  consists  in  the  power  which  it  gives  to  its 
holder  to  keep  one  opponent  in  check  with  a  part 
of  his  forces  while  he  throws  the  bulk  of  them  into 
a  decisive  blow  against  another. 

This  is  the  situation  of  to-day  on  the  Continent 
of  Europe.  It  cannot  be  changed  unless  there 
is  thrown  into  the  scale  of  the  possible  opponents 
of  German  policy  a  weight  or  a  force  that  would 
restore  the  equality  of  the  two  parties.  The 
British  navy,  however  perfect  it  may  be  assumed 
to  be,  does  not  in  itself  constitute  such  a  force. 
Nor  could  the  British  army  on  its  present  footing 
restore  the  balance.  A  small  standing  army  able 
to  give  its  allies  assistance,  officially  estimated  at 
a  strength  of  160,000  men,  will  not  suffice  to  turn 
the  scale  in  a  conflict  in  which  the  troops  available 
for  each  of  the  great  Powers  are  counted  no  longer 
by  the  hundred  thousand  but  by  the  million.  But 
if  Great  Britain  were  so  organised  that  she  could 
utilise  for  the  purpose  of  war  the  whole  of  her 
national  resources,  if  she  had  in  addition  to  the 
navy  indispensable  for  her  security  an  army  equal 
in  efficiency  to  the  best  that  can  be  found  in  Europe 


THE   QUESTION    OF   MIGHT  79 

and  in  numbers  to  that  maintained  by  Italy,  which 
though  the  fifth  Power  on  the  Continent  is  most 
nearly  her  equal  in  territory  and  population,  the 
equilibrium  could  be  restored,  and  either  the  peace 
of  Europe  would  be  maintained,  or  in  case  of 
fresh  conflict  there  would  be  a  reasonable  pro- 
spect of  the  recurrence  of  what  has  happened 
in  the  past,  the  maintenance,  against  a  threatened 
domination,  of  the  independence  of  the  European 
States. 

The  position  here  set  forth  is  grave  enough  to 
demand  the  close  attention  of  the  British  nation, 
for  it  means  that  England  might  at  any  time  be 
called  upon  to  enter  into  a  contest,  likely  enough 
to  take  the  form  of  a  struggle  for  existence,  against 
the  greatest  military  empire  in  the  world,  supported 
by  another  military  empire  which  is  itself  in 
the  front  rank  of  great  Powers,  while  the  other 
European  States  would  be  looking  on  compara- 
tively helpless. 

But  this  is  by  no  means  a  full  statement  of  the 
case.  The  other  Powers  might  not  find  it  possible 
to  maintain  an  attitude  of  neutrality.  It  is  much 
more  probable  that  they  would  have  to  choose 
between  one  side  and  the  other  ;  and  that  if  they 
do  not  consider  Great  Britain  strong  enough  to 
help  them  they  may  find  it  their  interest,  and 
indeed  may  be  compelled,  to  take  the  side  of  Great 
Britain's  adversaries.     In   that   case  Great  Britain 


8o  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

would    have    to    carry  on  a  struggle  for  existence 
against  the  combined  forces  of  the  Continent. 

That  even  in  this  extreme  form  the  contest 
would  be  hopeless,  I  for  one  am  unwilling  to 
admit.  If  Great  Britain  were  organised  for  war 
and  able  to  throw  her  whole  energies  into  it,  she 
might  be  so  strong  that  her  overthrow  even  by 
united  Europe  would  by  no  means  be  a  foregone 
conclusion.  But  the  determined  preparation  which 
would  make  her  ready  for  the  extreme  contingency 
is  the  best  and  perhaps  the  only  means  of  prevent- 
inor  its  occurrence. 


XI 

POLICY— THE   QUESTION   OF   RIGHT 

I  HAVE  now  given  reasons  for  my  belief  that 
in  case  of  conflict  Great  Britain,  owino-  to  her 
lack  of  organisation  for  war,  would  be  in  a  posi- 
tion of  some  peril.  She  has  not  created  for 
herself  the  means  of  making  good  by  force  a 
cause  with  which  she  may  be  identified  but  which 
may  be  disputed,  and  her  weakness  renders  it 
improbable  that  she  would  have  allies.  There 
remains  the  second  question  whether,  in  the 
absence  of  might,  she  would  at  least  have  rio-ht 
on  her  side.  That  depends  upon  the  nature  of 
the  quarrel.  A  good  cause  ought  to  unite  her 
own  people,  and  only  in  behalf  of  a  good  cause 
could  she  expect  other  nations  to  be  on  her  side. 
From  this  point  of  view  must  be  considered  the 
relations  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  and 
in  the  first  place  the  aims  of  German  policy. 

A  nation  of  which  the  army  consists  of  four 
million  able-bodied  citizens  does  not  go  to  war 
lightly.  The  German  ideal,  since  the  foundation 
of  the  Empire,  has  been  rather  that  held  up  for 
Great   Britain    by    Lord    Rosebery   in    the    words : 

8i  F 


82  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

"  Peace  secured,  not  by  humiliation,  but  by  pre- 
ponderance." 

The  first  object  after  the  defeat  of  France  in 
1870  was  security,  and  this  was  sought  not  merely 
by  strengthening  the  army  and  improving  its  train- 
ing but  also  by  obtaining  the  alliance  of  neighbour- 
ing Powers.  In  the  first  period  the  attempt  was 
made  to  keep  on  good  terms,  not  only  with  Austria, 
but  with  Russia.  When  in  1876  disturbances  began 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  Germany,  while  giving 
Austria  her  support,  exerted  herself  to  prevent  a 
breach  between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  after  the 
Russo-Turkish  war  acted  as  mediator  between 
Russia  on  one  side  and  Austria  and  Great  Britain 
on  the  other,  so  that  without  a  fresh  war  the 
European  treaty  of  Berlin  was  substituted  for  the 
Russo-Turkish  Treaty  of  San  Stefano. 

After  1878  Russia  became  estranged  from  Ger- 
many, whereupon  Germany,  in  1879,  made  a  defen- 
sive alliance  with  Austria,  to  which  at  a  later  date 
Italy  became  a  party.  This  triple  alliance  served 
for  a  quarter  of  a  century  to  maintain  the  peace 
against  the  danger  of  a  Franco-Russian  combination 
until  the  defeat  of  Russia  in  Manchuria  and  con- 
sequent collapse  of  Russia's  military  power  removed 
that  danger. 

Shortly  before  this  event  the  British  agree- 
ment with  the  French  Government  had  been 
negotiated  by  Lord  Lansdowne.     The  French  were 


THE   QUESTION    OF   RIGHT  83 

very  anxious  to  bring  Morocco  into  the  sphere  of 
French  influence,  and  to  this  the  British  Govern- 
ment saw  no  objection,  but  in  the  preamble  to  the 
agreement,  as  well  as  in  its  text,  by  way  of  declara- 
tion that  Great  Britain  had  no  objection  to  this 
portion  of  the  policy  of  France,  words  were  used 
which  might  seem  to  imply  that  Great  Britain  had 
some  special  rights  in  regard  to  Morocco. 

The  second  article  of  the  Declaration  of  April  8, 
1904,  contains  the  following  clause: 

"  The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  de- 
clare that  they  have  no  intention  of  altering  the 
political  status  of  Morocco.  His  Britannic  Majesty's 
Government,  for  their  part,  recognise  that  it  apper- 
tains to  France,  more  particularly  as  a  Power  whose 
dominions  are  conterminous  for  a  great  distance 
with  Morocco,  to  preserve  order  in  that  country, 
and  to  provide  assistance  for  the  purpose  of  all 
administrative,  economic,  financial,  and  military  re- 
forms which  it  may  require." 

This  clause  seems  to  be  open  to  the  inter- 
pretation that  Great  Britain  assumes  a  right  to 
determine  what  nation  of  Europe  is  best  entitled 
to  exercise  a  protectorate  over  Morocco.  That 
would  involve  some  British  superiority  over  other 
Powers,  or  at  any  rate  that  Great  Britain  had  a 
special  right  over  Morocco,  a  sort  of  suzerainty 
of   which    she    could    dispose    at    will.      Germany 


84  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

disliked  both  this  claim  and  the  idea  that  France 
was  to  obtain  special  influence  in  Morocco.  She 
was  herself  anxious  for  oversea  possessions  and 
spheres  of  influence,  and  appears  to  have  thought 
that  if  Morocco  was  to  become  a  European  pro- 
tectorate she  ought  to  have  a  voice  in  any  settle- 
ment. The  terms  in  which  the  English  consent  to 
the  French  design  was  expressed  were  construed 
by  the  Germans  as  involving,  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain,  just  that  kind  of  supremacy  in  regard  to 
oversea  affairs  which  they  had  for  so  many  years 
been  learning  to  dislike.  At  any  rate,  when  the 
moment  convenient  to  her  came,  Germany  put 
her  veto  upon  the  arrangements  which  had  been 
made  and  required  that  they  should  be  submitted 
to  a  European  Conference.  France  was  not  pre- 
pared to  renew  the  struggle  for  existence  over 
Morocco,  while  Germany  appeared  not  unwilling 
to  assert  her  will  even  by  force.  Accordingly 
Germany  had  her  way. 

The  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by 
Austria-Hungary  again  afforded  an  opportunity 
for  the  exercise  of  Germany's  preponderance.  In 
1878  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  had  authorised  Austria- 
Hungary  to  occupy  and  administer  the  two 
provinces  without  limitation  of  time,  and  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  have  since  then  practically  been 
Austrian  provinces,  for  the  male  population  has 
been  subject  to  compulsory  service  in  the  Austrian 


THE   QUESTION    OF   RIGHT  85 

army  and  the  soldiers  have  taken  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  Emperor.  It  is  not  clear  that 
any  of  the  great  Powers  had  other  than  a  formal 
objection  to  the  annexation,  the  objection,  namely, 
that  it  was  not  consistent  with  the  letter  of  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin.  The  British  Government  pointed 
out  that,  by  international  agreement  to  which 
Austria-Hungary  is  a  party,  a  European  Treaty 
is  not  to  be  modified  without  the  consent  of 
all  the  signatory  Powers,  and  that  this  consent 
had  not  been  asked  by  Austria- Hungary.  The 
British  view  was  endorsed  both  by  France  and 
Russia,  and  these  three  Powers  were  in  favour 
of  a  European  Conference  for  the  purpose  of 
revising  the  clause  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  and 
apparently  also  of  giving  some  concessions  to 
Servia  and  Montenegro,  the  two  small  States 
which,  for  reasons  altogether  disconnected  with 
the  formal  aspect  of  the  case,  resented  the  annexa- 
tion. Neither  of  the  Western  Powers  had  any 
such  interest  in  the  matter  as  to  make  it  in  the 
least  probable  that  they  would  in  any  case  be 
prepared  to  support  their  view  by  force,  while 
Austria,  by  mobilising  her  army,  showed  that  she 
was  ready  to  do  so,  and  there  was  no  doubt  that 
she  was  assured,  in  case  of  need,  of  Germany's 
support.  The  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
publicly  explained  to  his  countrymen  that  Russia 
was    not    in    a    condition    to    carry    on     a     war. 


86  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

Accordingly  in  the  moment  of  crisis  the  Russian 
Government  withdrew  its  opposition  to  Austro- 
Hungarian  poHcy,  and  thus  once  more  was  re- 
vealed the  effect  upon  a  political  decision  of  the 
military  strength,  readiness,  and  determination  of 
the  two  central  Powers. 

A  good  deal  of  feeling  was  aroused,  at  any 
rate  in  Great  Britain,  by  the  disclosure  in  the 
case  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as  well  as  in  the 
earlier  case  of  Morocco,  of  Germany's  policy,  and 
in  the  later  negotiation  of  her  determination  to 
support  Austria- Hungary  by  force.  Yet  he  would 
be  a  rash  man  who,  on  now  looking  back,  would 
assert  that  in  either  case  a  British  Government 
would  have  been  justified  in  armed  opposition  to 
Germany's  policy. 

The  bearing  of  Germany  and  Austria- Hungary 
in  these  negotiations,  ending  as  they  did  at  the 
time  when  the  debate  on  the  Navy  Estimates 
disclosed  to  the  British  public  the  serious  nature 
of  the  competition  in  naval  shipbuilding  between 
Germany  and  Great  Britain,  was  to  a  large 
class  in  this  country  a  startling  revelation  of  the 
too  easily  forgotten  fact  that  a  nation  does  not 
get  its  way  by  asking  for  it,  but  by  being 
able  and  ready  to  assert  its  will  by  force  of 
arms  in  case  of  need.  There  is  no  reason  to 
believe  that  the  German  Government  has  any  in- 
tention to  enter  into   a  war  except   for  the  main 


THE   QUESTION   OF   RIGHT  87 

tenance  of  rights  or  interests  held  to  be  vital  for 
Germany,  but  it  is  always  possible  that  Germany 
may  hold  vital  some  right  or  interest  which  another 
nation  may  be  not  quite  ready  to  admit.  In  that 
case  it  behoves  the  other  nation  very  carefully  to 
scrutinise  the  German  claims  and  its  own  way  of 
regarding  them,  and  to  be  quite  sure,  before 
entering  into  a  dispute,  that  its  own  views  are 
right  and  Germany's  views  wrong,  as  well  as  that 
it  has  the  means,  in  case  of  conflict,  of  carrying  on 
with  success  a  war  against  the  German  Empire. 

If  then  England  is  to  enter  into  a  quarrel  with 
Germany  or  any  other  State,  let  her  people  take 
care  that  it  arises  from  no  obscure  issue  about 
which  they  may  disagree  among  themselves,  but 
from  some  palpable  wrong  done  by  the  other 
Power,  some  wrong  which  calls  upon  them  to 
resist  it  with  all  their  might. 

The  case  alleged  against  Germany  is  that  she 
is  too  strong,  so  strong  in  herself  that  no  Power 
in  Europe  can  stand  up  against  her,  and  so  sure 
of  the  assistance  of  her  ally,  Austria,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  other  ally,  Italy,  that  there  is  at 
this  moment  no  combination  that  will  venture  to 
oppose  the  Triple  Alliance.  In  other  words,  Ger- 
many is  thought  to  have  acquired  an  ascendency 
in  Europe  which  she  may  at  any  moment  at- 
tempt to  convert  into  supremacy.  Great  Britain 
is  thought  of,  at  any  rate  by  her  own  people,  as 


88  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

the  traditional  opponent  of  any  such  supremacy 
on  the  Continent,  so  that  if  she  were  strong 
enough  it  might  be  her  function  to  be  the  chief 
antagonist  of  a  German  ascendency  or  supremacy, 
though  the  doubt  whether  she  is  strong  enough 
prevents  her  from  fulfilHng  this  role. 

But  there  is  another  side  to  the  case.  The 
opinion  has  long  been  expressed  by  German 
writers  and  is  very  widespread  in  Germany  that 
it  is  Great  Britain  that  claims  an  ascendency  or 
supremacy,  and  that  Germany  in  opposing  that 
supremacy  is  making  herself  the  champion  of  the 
European  cause  of  the  independence  of  States. 
This  German  idea  was  plainly  expressed  twenty- 
five  years  ago  by  the  German  historian  Wilhelm 
Miiller,  who  wrote  in  a  review  of  the  year  1884: 
"  England  was  the  opponent  of  all  the  maritime 
Powers  of  Europe.  She  had  for  decades  assumed 
at  sea  the  same  dictatorial  attitude  as  France 
had  maintained  upon  land  under  Louis  XIV.  and 
Napoleon  I.  The  years  18 70-1 871  broke  the 
French  spell;  the  year  1884  has  shown  England 
that  the  times  of  her  maritime  imperialism  also 
are  over,  and  that  if  she  does  not  renounce  it  of 
her  own  free  will,  an  1870  will  come  for  the 
English  spell  too.  It  is  true,  England  need  not 
fear  any  single  maritime  Power,  but  only  a  coali- 
tion of  them  all ;  and  hitherto  she  has  done  all 
she  can  to  call  up  such  a  coalition." 


THE    QUESTION    OF    RIGHT  89 

The  lani^uage  which  Englishmen  naturally  use 
in  discussing  their  country's  naval  strength  might 
seem  to  lend  itself  to  the  German  interpretation. 
For  example,  on  the  loth  March  190S,  the  Prime 
Minister,  Mr.  Asquith,  expressing  an  opinion  in 
which  he  thought  both  parties  concurred,  said  : 
"  We  must  maintain  the  unassailable  supremacy 
of  this  country  at  sea."  Here,  at  any  rate,  is  the 
word  "supremacy"  at  which  the  Germans  take 
umbrage,  and  which  our  own  people  regard  as 
objectionable  if  applied  to  the  position  of  any 
Power  on  the  Continent. 

I  will  not  repeat  here  the  analysis  which  I 
published  many  years  ago  of  the  dealings  between 
the  German  and  British  Governments  during  the 
period  when  German  colonial  enterprise  was  be- 
ginning ;  nor  the  demonstration  that  in  those 
negotiations  the  British  Government  acted  with 
perfect  fairness,  but  was  grossly  misrepresented 
to  the  German  public.  The  important  thing  for 
the  people  of  Great  Britain  to  understand  to-day 
is  not  the  inner  diplomatic  history  of  that  and 
subsequent  periods,  but  the  impression  which  is 
current  in  Germany  with  regard  to  the  whole  of 
these  transactions. 

The  Germans  think  that  Great  Britain  lays 
claim  to  a  special  position  in  regard  to  the  ocean, 
in  the  nature  of  a  suzerainty  over  the  waters  of 
the  globe,   and  over  those  of  its  coasts  which  are 


90  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

not  the  possessions  of  some  strong  civilised  Power. 
What  they   have  perceived  in  the  last  quarter  of 
a  century  has   been  that,  somehow  or  other,  they 
care  not  how,  whenever  there  has  been  a  German 
attempt    in    the    way    of    what    is    called    colonial 
expansion,  it  has  led  to  friction  with  Great  Britain. 
Accordingly  they  have  the  impression  that  Great 
Britain  is  opposed  to  any  such  German  expansion, 
and  in  this  way,  as  they  are  anxious  for  dominions 
beyond  the  sea  and  for  the  spread  of  their  trade 
into  every   quarter  of  the  globe,  they  have  come 
to  regard   Great   Britain    as   the  adversary.     This 
German    feeling    found    vent    during    the    South 
African    War,    and    the    expressions    at   that   time 
freely  used    in    the    German    newspapers,    as    well 
as    by    German    writers    whose    works    were    less 
ephemeral,  could  not  but  deeply  offend  the  national 
consciousness,  to   say  nothing  of  the  pride  of  the 
people    of   this    country.      In    this    way   the   sym- 
pathy which  used  to  exist  between  the  two  peoples 
has  been  lost  and  they  have  come  to  regard  each 
other  with  suspicion,  which  has  not  been  without 
its  effect  on  the  relations  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments and  upon  the  course  of  European  diplomacy. 
This   is   the  origin  of  the   rivalry,  and  it  is  to 
the   resentment    which    has    been    diligently    culti- 
vated   in    Germany  against   the   supposed    British 
claim  to  supremacy  at  sea  that  is  attributable  the 
crreat  popularity  among  the  people  of  Germany  of 


THE   QUESTION    OF   RIGHT  91 

the  movement  in  favour  of  the  expansion  of  the 
German  navy.  Since  1884  the  people  of  Germany 
have  been  taught  to  regard  with  suspicion  every 
item  of  British  poHcy,  and  naturally  enough  this 
suspicious  attitude  has  found  its  counterpart  among 
the  people  of  this  country.  The  result  has  been 
that  the  agreements  by  which  England  has  dis- 
posed of  a  number  of  disagreements  with  France 
and  with  Russia  have  been  regarded  in  Germany 
as  inspired  by  the  wish  to  prepare  a  coalition 
against  that  country,  and,  in  view  of  the  past 
history  of  Great  Britain,  this  interpretation  can 
hardly  be  pronounced  unnatural. 

Any  cause  for  which  Great  Britain  would  fight 
ought  to  be  intelligible  to  other  nations,  first  of 
all  to  those  of  Europe,  but  also  to  the  nations 
outside  of  Europe,  at  any  rate  to  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  for  if  we  were  fighting  for 
something  in  regard  to  which  there  was  no  sym- 
pathy with  us,  or  which  led  other  nations  to 
sympathise  with  our  adversary,  we  should  be 
hampered  by  grave  misgivings  and  might  find 
ourselves  alone  in  a  hostile  world. 

Accordingly  it  cannot  be  sound  policy  for  Great 
Britain  to  assert  for  herself  a  supremacy  or  as- 
cendency of  the  kind  which  is  resented,  not  only 
by  Germany,  but  by  every  other  continental  State, 
and  indeed  by  every  maritime  State  in  the  world. 
It  ought  to  be  made  clear  to    all   the  world  that 


92  BRITAIN   AT    BAY 

in  fact,  whatever  may  have  been  the  language 
used  in  EngHsh  discussions,  Great  Britain  makes 
no  claim  to  suzerainty  over  the  sea,  or  over  terri- 
tories bordering  on  the  sea,  not  forming  parts  of 
the  British  Empire ;  that,  while  she  is  determined 
to  maintain  a  navy  that  can  in  case  of  war  secure 
the  "  command "  of  the  sea  against  her  enemies, 
she  regards  the  sea,  in  peace,  and  in  war  except 
for  her  enemies,  as  the  common  property  of  all 
nations,  the  open  road  forming  the  great  highway 
of  mankind. 

We  have  but  to  reflect  on  the  past  to  perceive 
that  the  idea  of  a  dominion  of  the  sea  must  neces- 
sarily unite  other  nations  against  us.  What  in 
the  sixteenth  century  was  the  nature  of  the  dispute 
between  England  and  Spain  ?  The  British  popular 
consciousness  to-day  remembers  two  causes,  of 
which  one  was  religious  antagonism,  and  the  other 
the  claim  set  up  by  Spain  and  rejected  by  Eng- 
land to  a  monopoly  of  America,  carrying  with  it 
an  exclusive  right  to  navigation  in  the  Western 
Atlantic  and  to  a  monopoly  of  the  trade  of  the 
Spanish  dominions  beyond  the  sea.  That  is  a 
chapter  of  history  which  at  the  present  time  de- 
serves a  place  in  the  meditations  of  Englishmen. 

I  may  now  try  to  condense  into  a  single  view 
the  general  survey  of  the  conditions  of  Europe 
which  I  have  attempted  from  the  two  points  of 
view  of  strategy  and    of  policy,    of   force    and    of 


THE    QUESTION    OF    RIGHT  93 

right.  Germany  has  such  a  preponderance  of  miH- 
tary  force  that  no  continental  State  can  stand  up 
against  her.  There  is,  therefore,  on  the  Continent 
no  nation  independent  of  German  influence  or 
pressure.  Great  Britain,  so  long  as  she  maintains 
the  superiority  of  her  navy  over  that  of  Germany 
or  over  those  of  Germany  and  her  allies,  is  not 
amenable  to  constraint  by  Germany,  but  her  mili- 
tary weakness  prevents  her  exerting  any  appre- 
ciable counter  pressure  upon  Germany. 

The  moment  the  German  navy  has  become 
strong  enough  to  confront  that  of  Great  Britain 
without  risk  of  destruction,  British  influence  in 
Europe  will  be  at  an  end,  and  the  Continent  will 
have  to  follow  the  direction  given  by  German 
policy.  That  is  a  consummation  to  be  desired 
neither  in  the  interest  of  the  development  of  the 
European  nations  nor  in  that  of  Great  Britain.  It 
means  the  prevalence  of  one  national  ideal  instead 
of  the  growth  side  by  side  of  a  number  of  types. 
It  means  also  the  exclusion  of  British  ideals  from 
European  life. 

Great  Britain  has  in  the  past  been  a  powerful 
contributor  to  the  free  development  of  the  Euro- 
pean nations,  and  therefore  to  the  preservation  in 
Europe  of  variety  of  national  growth.  I  believe 
that  she  is  now  called  upon  to  renew  that  service. 
The  method  open  to  her  lies  in  such  action  as  may 
relieve  the  other  European  States  from  the  over- 


94  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

whelming  pressure  which,  in  case  of  the  disappear- 
ance of  England  from  the  European  community, 
would  be  put  upon  them  by  Germany.  It  seems 
probable  that  in  default  of  right  action  she  will 
be  compelled  to  maintain  her  national  ideals 
against  Europe  united  under  German  guidance. 
The  action  required  consists  on  the  one  hand  in 
the  perfecting  of  the  British  navy,  and  on  the 
other  of  the  military  organisation  of  the  British 
people  on  the  principle,  already  explained,  of  the 
nationalisation  of  war. 


XII 

THE    NATION 

The  conclusion   to   which    a   review   of   England's 
position  and  of  the  state  of  Europe  points,  is  that 
while  there  is  no  visible  cause  of  quarrel  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany,  yet  there  is  between 
them  a  rivalry  such  as  is  inevitable  between  a  State 
that  has  long  held  something  like   the   first   place 
in   the    world  and    a    State    that    feels  entitled    in 
virtue  of  the  number  of  its  people,  their  character 
and   training,  their   work    and   their    corporate  or- 
ganisation,   to    aspire    to    the    first    place.       The 
German    nation    by   the    mere    fact   of   its  growth 
challenges  England  for  the  primacy.      It  could  not 
be   otherwise.      But   the    challenge    is    no    wrong 
done  to   England,  and   the    idea  that  it   ought  to 
be  resented  is  unworthy  of  British   traditions.     It 
must  be  cheerfully  accepted.     If  the  Germans  are 
better    men    than    we    are    they    deserve   to   take 
our  place.      If  we  mean  to  hold  our  own  we  must 
set  about  it    in    the    right    way — by   proving  our- 
selves better  than  the  Germans. 

There  ought  to   be   no    question   of  quarrel  or 
of  war.     Men  can  be  rivals  without  being  enemies. 

95 


96  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

It  is  the  first  lesson  that  an  EngHsh  boy  learns 
at  school.  Quarrels  arise,  as  a  rule,  from  mis- 
understandings or  from  faults  of  temper,  and  Eng- 
land ought  to  avoid  the  frame  of  mind  which 
would  render  her  liable  to  take  offence  at  trifles, 
while  her  policy  ought  to  be  simple  enough  to 
escape  being  misunderstood. 

In  a  competition  between  two  nations  the  quali- 
fication for  success  is  to  be  the  better  nation. 
Germany's  advantage  is  that  her  people  have 
been  learning  for  a  whole  century  to  subordinate 
their  individual  wishes  and  welfare  to  that  of  the 
nation,  while  the  people  of  Great  Britain  have 
been  steeped  in  individualism  until  the  conscious- 
ness of  national  existence,  of  a  common  purpose 
and  a  common  duty,  has  all  but  faded  away. 
What  has  to  be  done  is  to  restore  the  nation  to 
its  right  place  in  men's  minds,  and  so  to  organise 
it  that,  like  a  trained  athlete,  it  will  be  capable 
of  hard  and  prolonged  effort. 

By  the  nation  I  mean  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
commonwealth  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and 
I  distinguish  it  from  the  Empire  which  is  a  federa- 
tion of  several  nations.  The  nation  thus  defined 
has  work  to  do,  duties  to  perform  as  one  nation 
among  many,  and  the  way  out  of  the  present 
difficulties  will  be  found  by  attending  to  these 
duties. 

In    the    first    place    comes     Britain's    work    in 


THE    NATION  97 

Europe,  which  to  describe  has  been  the  purpose 
of  the  preceding  chapters.  It  cannot  be  right 
for  Britain,  after  the  share  she  has  taken  in 
securing  for  Europe  the  freedom  that  distinguishes 
a  series  of  independent  States  existing  side  by 
side  from  a  single  centralised  Empire,  to  turn 
her  back  upon  the  Continent  and  to  suppose  that 
she  exists  only  for  the  sake  of  her  own  colonies 
and  India.  On  the  contrary  it  is  only  by  playing 
her  part  in  Europe  that  she  can  hope  to  carry 
through  the  organisation  of  her  own  Empire  which 
she  has  in  view.  Her  function  as  a  European 
State  is  to  make  her  voice  heard  in  the  council 
of  the  European  nations,  so  that  no  one  State 
can  dictate  the  decisions  to  be  reached.  In  order 
to  do  that  she  must  be  strong  enough  to  be  able 
to  say  Aye  and  No  without  fear,  and  to  give 
effective  help  in  case  of  need  to  those  other 
States  which  may  in  a  decision  vote  on  the  same 
side  with  her. 

In  her  attitude  towards  the  Powers  of  Europe 
and  in  her  dealinirs  with  them  Great  Britain  is  the 
representative  of  the  daughter  nations  and  depend- 
encies that  form  her  Empire,  and  her  self-defence 
in  Europe  is  the  defence  of  the  whole  Empire,  at 
any  rate  against  possible  assaults  from  any  European 
Power.  At  the  same  time  she  is  necessarily  the 
centre  and  the  head  of  her  own  Empire.  She 
must  take  the  lead  in  its   organisation  and  in  the 


98  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

direction  of  its  policy.  If  she  is  to  fulfil  these 
duties,  on  the  one  hand  to  Europe  and  on  the 
other  to  the  daughter  nations  and  India,  she  must 
herself  be  organised  on  the  principle  of  duty.  An 
England  divided  against  herself,  absorbed  in  the 
disputes  of  factions  and  unconscious  of  a  purpose, 
can  neither  lead  nor  defend  her  Empire,  can  play 
her  proper  part  neither  in  Europe  nor  in  the 
world. 

The  great  work  to  be  done  at  home,  correspond- 
ing to  the  ultimate  purpose  of  national  life,  is  that 
she  should  bring  up  her  people  to  a  higher 
standard  of  human  excellence,  to  a  finer  type  than 
others.  There  are  English  types  well  recognised. 
Fifty  years  ago  the  standard  of  British  workman- 
ship was  the  acknowledged  mark  of  excellence  in 
the  industrial  world,  while  it  has  been  pointed  out 
in  an  earlier  chapter  that  the  English  standards 
of  character  displayed  in  conduct,  described  in 
one  aspect  by  the  word  "  gentleman,"  and  in 
another  by  the  expression  "fair-play,"  form  the 
best  part  of  the  nation's  inheritance.  It  is  the 
business  of  any  British  education  worth  thinking 
of  to  stamp  these  hall-marks  of  character  upon 
all  her  people. 

Nothing  reveals  in  a  more  amazing  light  the 
extent  to  which  in  this  country  the  true  meaning 
of  our  being  a  nation  has  been  forgotten  than 
the  use   that   has    been   made    in    recent    years   of 


THE   NATION  99 

the  term  "national  education."  The  leaders  of 
both  parties  have  discussed  the  subject  as  though 
any  system  of  schools  maintained  at  the  public 
expense  formed  a  system  of  national  education. 
But  the  diffusion  of  instruction  is  not  education, 
and  the  fact  that  it  is  carried  on  at  the  public 
expense  does  not  make  it  national.  Education  is 
training  the  child  for  his  life  to  come,  and  his 
life's  value  consists  in  the  work  which  he  will 
do.  National  education  means  bringing  up  every 
boy  and  girl  to  do  his  or  her  part  of  the  nation's 
work.  A  child  who  is  going  to  do  nothing  will  be 
of  no  use  to  his  country,  and  a  bringing  up  that 
leaves  him  prepared  to  do  nothing  is  not  an 
education  but  a  perversion.  A  British  national 
education  ought  to  make  every  man  a  good  work- 
man, every  man  a  gentleman,  every  man  a  servant 
of  his  country. 

My  contention,  then,  is  that  this  British  nation 
has  to  perform  certain  specific  tasks,  and  that  in 
order  to  be  able  to  do  her  work  she  must  insist 
that  her  people — every  man,  woman,  and  child — 
exist  not  for  themselves  but  for  her.  This  is  the 
principle  of  duty.  It  gives  a  standard  of  personal 
value,  for  evidently  a  man's  use  to  his  country 
consists  in  what  he  does  for  it,  not  in  what  he 
gets  or  has  for  himself,  which,  from  the  national 
point  of  view,  is  of  no  account  except  so  far  as 
it    either    enables    him    to    carry   on    the   work   for 


100  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

which  he  is  best  suited  or  can  be  applied  for  the 
nation's  benefit. 

How  then  in  practice  can  the  principle  of 
duty  be  brought  into  our  national  and  our  in- 
dividual life?  I  think  that  the  right  way  is  that 
we  should  join  in  doing  those  things  which  are 
evidently  needed,  and  should  postpone  other  things 
about  the  necessity  of  which  there  may  be  dis- 
agreement. I  shall  devote  the  rest  of  this  volume 
to  considering  how  the  nation  is  to  prepare  itself 
for  the  first  duty  laid  upon  it,  that  of  assuring 
its  security  and  so  making  good  its  position  as 
a  member  of  the  European  community.  But 
before  pursuing  that  inquiry  I  must  reiterate  once 
more  the  principle  which  it  is  my  main  purpose 
to  set  before  my  countrymen. 

The  conception  of  the  Nation  is  the  clue  to  the 
solution  of  all  the  problems  with  which  the  people 
of  Great  Britain  are  confronted.  They  are  those  of 
foreign  and  imperial  policy,  of  defence  national  and 
imperial,   of  education  and  of  social  life. 

Foreign  and  imperial  policy  include  all  affairs 
external  to  Great  Britain,  the  relations  of  Great 
Britain  to  Europe,  to  India,  to  the  Colonies,  and 
to  the  Powers  of  Asia  and  America.  In  all  these 
external  affairs  the  question  to  be  asked  is,  what 
is  Britain's  duty  ? 

It  is  by  the  test  of  duty  that  Great  Britain's 
attitude   towards    Germany  should    be    tried.       In 


THE   NATION  loi 

what  event  would  it  be  necessary  and  right  to  call 
on  every  British  citizen  to  turn  out  and  fight, 
ready  to  shed  his  blood  and  ready  to  shoot  down 
enemies  ?  Evidently  only  in  case  of  some  great 
and  manifest  wrong  undertaken  by  Germany.  As 
I  am  aware  of  no  such  wrong  actually  attempted, 
I  think  a  conflict  unnecessary.  It  is  true  I  began 
by  pointing  out  the  danger  of  drifting  into  a  war 
with  the  German  Empire,  but  I  wish  to  do  what 
I  can  to  prevent  it,  and  to  show  that  by  right 
action  the  risk  will  be  diminished. 

The  greatest  risk  is  due  to  fear — fear  in  this 
country  of  what  Germany  may  do,  fear  in  Ger- 
many of  what  Great  Britain  may  do.  Fear  is 
a  bad  adviser.  There  are  Englishmen  who 
seem  to  think  that  as  Germany  is  strengthening 
her  navy  it  would  be  wise  to  attack  her  while 
the  British  navy  is  superior  in  numerical  force. 
This  suggestion  must  be  frankly  discussed  and 
dealt  with. 

A  war  is  a  trial  of  strength.  To  begin  it  does 
not  add  to  your  force.  Suppose  for  the  sake  of 
the  argument  that  a  war  between  England  and 
Germany  were  "  inevitable  " — which  is  equivalent 
to  the  supposition  that  one  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments is  bound  to  wrong  the  other — one  of  the 
two  Governments  must  take  the  initiative.  You 
take  the  initiative  when  you  are  the  Power  that 
wants  something,  in  which  case  you  naturally  exert 


102  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

yourself  to  obtain  it,  while  the  adversary  who 
merely  says  No  to  your  request,  acts  only  in 
resistance.  England  wants  nothing  from  Ger- 
many, so  that  she  is  not  called  upon  for  an 
initiative.  But  the  initiative,  or  offensive,  requires 
the  stronger  force,  its  object  being  to  render 
the  other  side  powerless  for  resistance  to  its 
will.  The  defensive  admits  of  a  smaller  force. 
A  conflict  between  England  and  Germany  must 
be  primarily  a  naval  war,  and  Germany's  naval 
forces  are  considerably  weaker  than  those  of 
England.  England  has  no  political  reason  for  the 
initiative ;  Germany  is  debarred  from  it  by  the 
inferiority  of  her  navy.  If,  therefore,  Germany 
wants  anything  from  England,  she  must  wait  to 
take  the  initiative  until  she  has  forces  strong 
enough  for  the  offensive.  But  her  forces,  though 
not  strong  enough  for  the  offensive,  may  be  strong 
enough  for  the  defensive.  If,  therefore,  England 
should  take  the  initiative,  she  would  in  so  doing 
give  away  the  one  advantage  she  has.  It  may  be 
Germany's  interest  to  have  a  prompt  decision.  It 
can  hardly  be  her  interest  to  attack  before  she  is 
ready.  But  if  she  really  wanted  to  pick  a  quarrel 
and  get  some  advantage,  it  would  exactly  serve 
her  purpose  to  be  attacked  at  once,  as  that  would 
give  her  the  benefit  of  the  defensive.  The  English 
"Jingoes,"  then,  are  false  guides,  bad  strategists, 
and  worse  statesmen. 


THE   NATION  103 

Not  only  in  the  affairs  of  Europe,  but  in  those 
of  India,  Egypt,  and  the  Colonies,  and  in  all 
dealings  with  Asia,  Africa,  and  America  the  line 
of  British  policy  will  be  the  line  of  the  British 
nation's  duty. 

If  Britain  is  to  follow  this  line  two  conditions 
must  be  fulfilled.  She  must  have  a  leader  to 
show  the  way  and  her  people  must  walk  in  it 
with  confidence. 

The  mark  of  a  leader  is  the  single  eye.  But 
the  traditional  system  gives  the  lead  of  the 
nation  to  the  leader  of  one  party  chosen  for  his 
success  in  leading  that  party.  He  can  never 
have  a  single  eye  ;  he  serves  two  masters.  His 
party  requires  him  to  keep  it  in  office,  regarding 
the  Opposition  as  the  enemy.  But  his  country 
requires  him  to  guide  a  united  nation  in  the  ful- 
filment of  its  mission  in  Europe  and  a  united 
Empire  in  the  fulfilment  of  its  mission  in  the 
world.  A  statesman  who  is  to  lead  the  nation 
and  the  Empire  must  keep  his  eyes  on  Europe 
and  on  the  world.  A  party  leader  who  is  to 
defeat  the  other  party  must  keep  his  eyes  on  the 
other  party.  No  man  can  at  the  same  time  be 
looking  out  of  the  window  and  watching  an 
opponent  inside  the  house,  and  the  traditional 
system  puts  the  Prime  Minister  in  a  painful 
dilemma.  Either  he  never  looks  out  of  the 
window    at    all    or    he    tries    to    look    two    ways 


104  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

at  once.  Party  men  seem  to  believe  that  if  a 
Prime  Minister  were  to  look  across  the  sea  in- 
stead of  across  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons his  Government  would  be  upset.  That  may- 
be the  case  so  long  as  men  ignore  the  nation 
and  so  long  as  they  acquiesce  in  the  treasonable 
doctrine  that  it  is  the  business  of  the  Opposition 
to  oppose.  But  a  statesman  who  would  take 
courage  to  lead  the  nation  might  perhaps  find 
the  Opposition  powerless  against  him. 

The  counterpart  of  leadership  is  following.  A 
Government  that  shows  the  line  of  Britain's  duty 
must  be  able  to  utilise  the  whole  energies  of  her 
people  for  its  performance.  A  duty  laid  upon 
the  nation  implies  a  duty  laid  upon  every  man  to 
do  his  share  of  the  nation's  work,  to  assist  the 
Government  by  obedient  service,  the  best  of  which 
he  is  capable.  It  means  a  people  trained  every 
man  to  his  task. 

A  nation  should  be  like  a  team  in  which  every 
man  has  his  place,  his  work  to  do,  his  mission  or 
duty.  There  is  no  room  in  it  either  for  the  idler 
who  consumes  but  renders  no  service,  or  for  the 
unskilled  man  who  bungles  a  task  to  which  he 
has  not  been  trained.  A  nation  may  be  compared 
to  a  living  creature.  Consider  the  way  in  which 
nature  organises  all  things  that  live  and  grow.  In 
the  structure  of  a  living  thing  every  part  has  its 
function,  its  work  to  do.     There  are  no  superfluous 


THE   NATION  105 

organs,  and  if  any  fails  to  do  its  work  the  creature 
sickens  and  perhaps  dies. 

Take  the  idea  of  the  nation  as  I  have  tried 
to  convey  it  and  apply  it  as  a  measure  or  test 
to  our  customary  way  of  thinking  both  of  public 
affairs  and  of  our  own  lives.  Does  it  not  reveal 
that  we  attach  too  much  importance  to  having  and 
to  possessions — our  own  and  other  people's — and 
too  little  importance  to  doing,  to  service?  When 
we  ask  what  a  man  is  worth,  we  think  of  what  he 
owns.  But  the  words  ought  to  make  us  think  of 
what  he  is  fit  for  and  of  what  service  he  renders  to 
the  nation.  The  only  value  of  what  a  man  has 
springs  from  what  he  does  with  it. 

The  idea  of  the  nation  leads  to  the  right  way 
of  looking  at  these  matters,  because  it  constrains 
every  man  to  put  himself  and  all  that  he  has  at  the 
service  of  the  community.  Thus  it  is  the  opposite 
of  socialism,  which  merely  turns  upside  down  the 
current  worship  of  ownership,  and  which  thinks 
"having"  so  supremely  important  that  it  would 
put  "not  having"  in  its  place.  The  only  cry  I 
will  adopt  is  "England  for  ever,"  which  means 
that  we  are  here,  every  one  of  us,  with  all  that 
we  have  and  all  that  we  can  do,  as  members  of 
a  nation  that  must  either  serve  the  world  or  perish. 
But  the  idea  of  the  nation  carries  us  a  long 
way  further  than  I  have  yet  shown.  It  bids  us 
all  try   at  the  peril  of   England's    fall    to   get  the 


io6  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

best  Government  we  can  to  lead  us.  We  need  a 
man  to  preside  over  the  nation's  counsels,  to  settle 
the  line  of  Britain's  duty  in  Europe  and  in  her  own 
Empire,  and  of  her  duty  to  her  own  people,  to  the 
millions  who  are  growing  up  ill  fed,  ill  housed  and 
ill  trained,  and  yet  who  are  part  of  the  sovereign 
people.  We  need  to  give  him  as  councillors 
men  that  are  masters  of  the  tasks  in  which  for 
the  nation  to  fail  means  its  ruin,  the  tasks  of 
which  I  have  enumerated  those  that  are  vital. 
Do  we  give  him  a  master  of  the  history  of  the 
other  nations  to  guide  the  nation's  dealings  with 
them  ?  Do  we  give  him  a  master  of  war  to 
educate  admirals  and  generals  ?  Do  we  give 
him  a  master  of  the  sciences  to  direct  the  pur- 
suit of  knowledge,  and  a  master  of  character- 
building  to  supervise  the  bringing  up  of  boys 
and  girls  to  be  types  of  a  noble  life?  It  would 
serve  the  nation's  turn  to  have  such  men.  They 
are  among  us,  and  to  find  them  we  should  only 
have  to  look  for  them.  It  would  be  no  harder 
than  to  pick  apples  off  a  tree.  But  we  never 
dream  of  looking  for  them.  We  have  a  wonder- 
ful plan  of  choosing  our  leaders,  the  plan  which 
we  call  an  election.  Five  hundred  men  assemble 
in  a  hall  and  listen  to  a  speech  from  a  partisan, 
while  five  hundred  others  in  a  hall  in  the  next 
street  are  cheering  a  second  partisan  who  de- 
claims   against    the    first.     There    is    no    test    of 


THE   NATION  107 

either  speaker,  except  that  he  must  be  rich 
enough  to  pay  the  expenses  of  an  "election." 
The  voters  do  not  even  hsten  to  both  partisans 
in  order  to  judge  between  them.  Thus  we 
choose  our  members  of  Parhament.  Our  Govern- 
ment is  a  committee  of  some  twenty  of  them. 
Its  first  business  is  to  keep  its  authority  against 
the  other  party,  of  which  in  turn  the  chief  func- 
tion is  to  make  out  that  everything  the  Govern- 
ment does  is  wrong.  This  is  the  only  recognised 
plan  for  leading  the  nation. 

You  may  be  shocked  as  you  read  this  by  the 
plainness  of  my  words,  but  you  know  them  to 
be  true,  though  you  suppose  that  to  insist  on 
the  facts  is  "impracticable"  because  you  fancy 
that  there  is  no  way  out  of  the  marvellously 
absurd  arrangements  that  exist.  But  there  is 
a  way  out,  though  it  is  no  royal  road.  It  is 
this.  Get  the  meaning  of  the  nation  into  your 
own  head  and  then  make  a  present  to  England 
of  your  party  creed.  Ask  yourself  what  is 
the  one  thing  most  needed  now,  and  the  one 
thing  most  needed  for  the  future.  You  will 
answer,  because  you  know  it  to  be  true,  that  the 
one  thing  most  needed  now  is  to  get  the  navy 
right. 

The  one  thing  most  needed  for  the  future  is 
to  put  the  idea  of  the  nation  and  the  will  to 
help  England  into  every  man's  soul.     That  cannot 


io8  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

be  done  by  writing  or  by  talking,  but  only  by 
setting  every  man  while  he  is  young  to  do 
something  for  his  country.  There  is  one  way 
of  bringing  that  about.  It  is  by  making  every 
citizen  a  soldier  in  a  national  army.  The  man 
who  has  learned  to  serve  his  country  has  learned 
to  love  it.  He  is  the  true  citizen,  and  of  such  a 
nation  is  composed.  Great  Britain  needs  a  states- 
man to  lead  her  and  a  policy  at  home  and 
abroad.  But  such  a  policy  must  not  be  sought 
and  cannot  be  found  upon  party  lines.  The 
statesman  who  is  to  expound  it  to  his  country- 
men and  represent  it  to  the  world  must  be  the 
leader  not  of  one  party  but  of  both.  In  short,  a 
statesman  must  be  a  nation  leader,  and  the  first 
condition  of  his  existence  is  that  there  should  be 
a  nation  for  him  to  lead. 


XIII 

THE    EFFECT   OF   THE    NATIONALISATION 
OF   WAR   UPON    LEADERSHIP 

The  argument  of  the  preceding  chapters  points  to 
the  conclusion  that  if  Great  Britain  is  to  maintain 
her  position  as  a  great  Power,  probably  even  if 
she  is  to  maintain  her  independence,  and  certainly 
if  she  is  to  retain  the  administration  of  India  and 
the  leadership  of  the  nations  that  have  grown  out 
of  her  colonies,  her  statesmen  and  her  people  must 
combine  to  do  three  things  : — 

1.  To  adopt  a  policy  having  due  relation  to  the 

condition  and  needs  of  the  European  Con- 
tinent. 

2.  To  make  the  British  navy  the  best  possible 

instrument  of  naval  warfare. 

3.  To    make    the    British    army    strong    enough 

to    be    able  to    turn   the   scales   in   a   conti- 
nental war. 
What   are  for    the   navy   and    for  the  army  the 
essentials    of   victory  ?     If  there    had    never  been 
any  wars,  no  one  would  know  what  was  essential 
to  victory.     People   would   have   their  notions,  no 

doubt,   but    these    notions    would    be   guesses    and 

109 


no  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

could  not  be  verified  until  the  advent  of  a  war, 
which  might  bring  with  it  a  good  deal  of  dis- 
appointment to  the  people  who  had  guessed  wrong. 
But  there  have  already  been  wars  enough  to  afford 
ample  material  for  deductions  as  to  the  causes  and 
conditions  of  success.  I  propose  to  take  the  two 
best  examples  that  can  be  found,  one  for  war  at 
sea  and  the  other  for  war  on  land,  in  order  to 
show  exactly  the  way  in  which  victory  is  attained. 

By  victory,  of  course,  I  mean  crushing  the  enemy. 
In  a  battle  in  which  neither  side  is  crippled,  and 
after  which  the  fleets  part  to  renew  the  struggle 
after  a  short  interval,  one  side  or  the  other  may 
consider  that  it  has  had  the  honours  of  the  day. 
It  may  have  lost  fewer  ships  than  the  enemy,  or 
have  taken  more.  It  may  have  been  able  and 
willing  to  continue  the  fight,  though  the  enemy 
drew  off,  and  its  commander  may  be  promoted 
or  decorated  for  having  maintained  the  credit  of 
his  country  or  of  the  service  to  which  he  belongs. 
But  such  a  battle  is  not  victory  either  in  a  political 
or  a  strateeical  sense.  It  does  not  lead  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  purpose  of  the  war,  which 
is  to  dictate  conditions  of  peace.  That  result  can 
be  obtained  only  by  crushing  the  enemy's  force 
and  so  making  him  powerless  to  renew  the  contest. 

A  general  view  of  the  wars  of  the  eighteenth 
century  between  Great  Britain  and  France  shows 
that,  broadly  speaking,  there  was  no  decision  until 


NATIONALISATION  AND  LEADERSHIP  iii 

the  end  of  the  period.  The  nearest  approach  to 
it  was  when  Hawke  destroyed  the  French  ileet 
in  Quiberon  Bay.  But  this  was  hardly  a  stand- 
up  fight.  The  French  fleet  was  running  away, 
and  Hawke's  achievement  was  that,  in  spite  of  the 
difficulties  of  weather  on  an  extremely  dangerous 
coast,  he  was  able  to  consummate  its  destruction. 
The  real  decision  was  the  work  of  Nelson,  and  its 
principal  cause  was  Nelson  himself. 

The  British  navy  had  discovered  in  its  conflicts 
with  the  Dutch  during  the  seventeenth  century 
that  the  object  of  naval  warfare  was  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  which  must  be  won  by  breaking 
the  enemy's  force  in  battle.  This  was  also  per- 
fectly understood  by  the  Dutch  admirals,  and  in 
those  wars  was  begun  the  development  of  the 
art  of  fighting  battles  with  sailing  vessels.  A  for- 
mation, the  line  of  battle,  in  which  one  ship  sails 
in  the  track  of  the  ship  before  her,  was  found  to 
be  appropriate  to  the  weapon  used,  the  broadside 
of  artillery ;  and  a  type  of  ship  suitable  to  this 
formation,  the  line-of-battle  ship,  established  itself. 
These  were  the  elements  with  which  the  British 
and  French  navies  entered  into  their  long  eight- 
eenth century  struggle.  The  French,  however, 
had  not  grasped  the  principle  that  the  object  of 
naval  warfare  was  to  obtain  the  command  of  the 
sea.  They  did  not  consciously  and  primarily  aim, 
as  did    their    British   rivals,   at    the   destruction   of 


112  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

the    enemy's    fleet.      They    were    more    concerned 
with  the  preservation  of  their  own  fleet  than  with 
the   destruction    of   the    enemy's,   and   were    ready 
rather   to    accept    battle    than    to    bring    it    about. 
The   British  admirals   were   eager    for    battle,   but 
had    a    difficulty    in    finding    out    how    a    decisive 
blow  could  be  struck.     The  orthodox  and  accepted 
doctrine  of  the  British  navy  was  that  the  British 
fleet  should  be  brought  alongside  the  enemy's  fleet, 
the  two  lines  of  battleships   being  parallel  to  one 
another,    so    that    each    ship    in    the    British    fleet 
should  engage  a  corresponding  ship  in  the  French 
fleet.     It  was  a   manoeuvre   difficult   of  execution, 
because,    in    order   to    approach    the    French,    the 
British  must  in  the  first  place  turn   each   of  their 
ships  at  right  angles   to  the    line  or  obliquely  to 
it,  and  then,  when  they  were   near  enough  to  fire, 
must  turn  again  to  the  left  (or  right)  in  order  to 
restore  the  line  formation.     And  during  this  period 
of  approach  and  turning  they  must  be  exposed  to 
the  broadsides  of  the   French  without   being  able 
to  make  full  use  of  their  own  broadsides.     More- 
over,   it    was    next    to    impossible    in    this    way   to 
bring  up  the  whole   line  together.     Besides  being 
difficult,   the    manoeuvre  had    no    promise    of  suc- 
cess.    For  if  two   fleets  of  equal   numbers  are  in 
this  way   matched   ship   against  ship,   neither  side 
has  any  advantage  except   what   may  be  derived 
from   the  superior  skill   of  its  gunners.     So    long 


NATIONALISATION   AND   LEADERSHIP  113 

as  these  conditions  prevailed,  no  great  decisive 
victory  of  the  kind  for  which  we  are  seeking  was 
gained.  It  was  during  this  period  that  Nelson 
received  such  training  as  the  navy  could  give  him, 
and  added  to  it  the  necessary  finishing  touch  by 
never-ceasing  effort  to  find  out  for  himself  the  way 
in  which  he  could  strike  a  decisive  blow.  His 
daring  was  always  deliberate,  never  rash,  and  this 
is  the  right  frame  of  mind  for  a  commander. 
"You  may  be  assured,"  he  writes  to  Lord  Hood, 
March  11,  1794,  "I  shall  undertake  nothing  but 
what  I  have  moral  certainty  of  succeeding  in." 

His  fierce  determination  to  cfet  at  the  ultimate 
secrets  of  his  trade  led  him  to  use  every  means 
that  would  help  him  to  think  out  his  problem, 
and  among  these  means  was  reading.  In  1780 
appeared  Clerk's  "  Essay  on  Naval  Tactics."  Clerk 
pointed  out  the  weakness  of  the  method  of  fighting 
in  two  parallel  lines  and  suggested  and  discussed  a 
number  of  plans  by  which  one  fleet  with  the  bulk 
of  its  force  could  attack  and  destroy  a  portion  of 
the  other.  This  was  the  problem  to  which  Nelson 
gave  his  mind — how  to  attack  a  part  with  the 
whole.  On  the  19th  of  August  1796  he  writes  to 
the  Duke  of  Clarence  : — 

"We  are  now  22  sail  of  the  line,  the  combined 
fleet  will  be  above  35  sail  of  the  line.  ...  I  will 
venture  my  life  Sir  John  Jervis  defeats  them  ;  I  do 
not  mean  by  a  regular  battle  but  by  the  skill  of  our 

H 


114  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

Admiral,  and  the  activity  and  spirit  of  our  officers 
and  seamen.  This  country  is  the  most  favourable 
possible  for  skill  with  an  inferior  fleet  ;  for  the 
winds  are  so  variable  that  some  one  time  in  the 
24  hours  you  must  be  able  to  attack  a  part  of  a 
large  fleet,  and  the  other  will  be  becalmed,  or  have 
a  contrary  wind." 

His  opportunity  came  in  1798,  when  in  the 
battle  of  the  Nile  he  crushed  the  French  Medi- 
terranean Fleet.  In  a  letter  to  Lord  Howe, 
written  January  8,  1799,  he  described  his  plan  in 
a  sentence : — 

"  By  attacking  the  enemy's  van  and  centre,  the 
wind  blowing  directly  along  their  line,  I  was 
enabled  to  throw  what  force  I  pleased  on  a  few 
ships." 

We  know  that  Nelson's  method  of  fighting  had 
for  months  before  the  battle  been  his  constant  pre- 
occupation, and  that  he  had  lost  no  opportunity  of 
explaining  his  ideas  to  his  captains.  Here  are  the 
words  of  Captain  Berry's  narrative  : — 

"It  had  been  his  practice  during  the  whole  of 
the  cruise,  whenever  the  weather  and  circumstances 
would  permit,  to  have  his  captains  on  board  the 
Vanguard,  where  he  would  fully  develop  to  them 
his  own  ideas  of  the  difl"erent  and  best  modes  of 
attack,  and  such  plans  as  he  proposed  to  execute 
upon    falling    in  with    the    enemy,   whatever    their 


NATIONALISATION   AND   LEADERSHIP  115 

position  or  situation  might  be,  by  day  or  by  night. 
There  was  no  possible  position  in  which  they  might 
be  found  that  he  did  not  take  into  his  calculation, 
and  for  the  most  advantageous  attack  on  which  he 
had  not  digested  and  arranged  the  best  possible 
disposition  of  the  force  which  he  commanded." 

The  great  final  victory  of  Trafalgar  was  prepared 
in  the  same  way,  and  the  various  memoranda  written 
in  the  period  before  the  battle  have  revealed  to 
recent  investigation  the  unwearying  care  which 
Nelson  devoted  to  finding  out  how  best  to  concen- 
trate his  force  upon  that  portion  of  the  enemy's 
fleet  which  it  would  be  most  difficult  for  the  enemy 
to  support  with  the  remainder. 

Nelson's  great  merit,  his  personal  contribution  to 
his  country's  influence,  lay  first  and  foremost  in  his 
having  by  intellectual  effort  solved  the  tactical 
problem  set  to  commanders  by  the  conditions  of  the 
naval  weapon  of  his  day,  the  fieet  of  line-of-battle 
ships  ;  and  secondly,  in  his  being  possessed  and 
inspired  by  the  true  strategical  doctrine  that  the 
prime  object  of  naval  warfare  is  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy's  fleet,  and  therefore  that  the  decisive 
point  in  the  theatre  of  war  is  the  point  where  the 
enemy's  fieet  can  be  found.  It  was  the  conviction 
with  which  he  held  this  principle  that  enabled 
him  in  circumstances  of  the  greatest  difficulty  to 
divine  where  to  go  to  find  the  enemy's  fleet ;  which 
in    1798    led    him    persistently    up    and   down    the 


ii6  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

Mediterranean  till  he  had  discovered  the  French 
squadron  anchored  at  Aboukir;  which  in  1805  took 
him  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  West  Indies, 
and  from  the  West  Indies  back  to  the  Channel. 

So  much  for  Nelson's  share  of  the  work.  But 
Nelson  could  neither  have  educated  himself  nor 
made  full  use  of  his  education  if  the  navy  of  his 
day  had  not  been  inspired  with  the  will  to  fight 
and  to  conquer,  with  the  discipline  that  springs 
from  that  will,  and  had  not  obtained  through 
long  experience  of  war  the  high  degree  of  skill 
in  seamanship  and  in  gunnery  which  made  it  the 
instrument  its  great  commander  required.  These 
conditions  of  the  navy  in  turn  were  products  of 
the  national  spirit  and  of  the  will  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  people  of  Great  Britain  to  devote  to 
the  navy  as  much  money,  as  many  men,  and  as 
vigorous  support  as  might  be  necessary  to  realise 
the  national  purpose. 

The  efforts  of  this  nature  made  by  the  country 
were  neither  perfect  nor  complete.  The  Govern- 
ments made  mistakes,  the  Admiralty  left  much  to 
be  desired  both  in  organisation  and  in  personnel. 
But  the  will  was  there.  The  best  proof  of  the 
national  determination  is  to  be  found  in  the  best 
hated  of  all  the  institutions  of  that  time,  the  press- 
gang,  a  brutal  and  narrow-minded  form  of  asserting 
the  principle  that  a  citizen's  duty  is  to  fight  for 
his  country.     That  the  principle  should  take  such 


NATIONALISATION  AND   LEADERSHIP    117 

a  shape  is  decisive  evidence  no  doubt  that  society 
was  badly  organised,  and  that  education,  intellectual 
and  moral,  was  on  a  low  level,  but  also,  and  this 
is  the  vital  matter,  that  the  nation  well  understood 
the  nature  of  the  struggle  in  which  it  was  engaged 
and  was  firmly  resolved  not  only  to  fight  but  to 
conquer. 

The  causes  of  the  success  of  the  French  armies 
in  the  period  between  1792  and  1809  were  precisely 
analogous  to  those  which  have  been  analysed  in 
the  case  of  the  British  navy.  The  basis  was  the 
national  will,  expressed  in  the  volunteers  and  the 
levy  en  masse.  Upon  this  was  superimposed  the 
skill  acquired  by  the  army  in  several  years  of 
incessant  war,  and  the  formal  cause  of  the  victories 
was  Napoleon's  insight  into  the  art  of  command. 
The  research  of  recent  years  has  revealed  the  origin 
of  Napoleon's  mastery  of  the  method  of  direct- 
ing an  army.  He  became  an  officer  in  1785,  at  the 
age  of  sixteen.  In  1793,  as  a  young  captain  of 
artillery,  he  directed  with  remarkable  insight  and 
determination  the  operations  by  which  the  allied 
fleet  was  driven  from  Toulon.  In  1794  he  inspired 
and  conducted,  though  still  a  subordinate,  a  series 
of  successful  operations  in  the  Maridme  Alps.  In 
1796,  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  Italy, 
he  astonished  Europe  by  the  most  brilliant  campaign 
on  record.     For  these  achievements  he  had  prepared 


ii8  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

himself  by  assiduous  study.  As  a  young  officer  of 
artillery  he  received  the  best  professional  training 
then  to  be  had  in  Europe,  while  at  the  same  time, 
by  wide  and  careful  reading,  he  gave  himself  a 
general  education.  At  some  period  before  1796, 
probably  before  1794,  he  had  read  and  thoroughly 
digested  the  remarkable  treatise  on  the  principles 
of  mountain  war  which  had  been  left  in  manuscript 
by  General  Bourcet,  an  officer  who  during  the 
campaigns  of  half  a  century  had  assisted  as  Quarter- 
master-General a  number  of  the  best  Generals  of 
France.  Napoleon's  phenomenal  power  of  concen- 
tration had  enabled  him  to  assimilate  Bourcet's 
doctrine,  which  in  his  clear  and  vigorous  mind 
took  new  and  more  perfect  shape,  so  that  from 
the  beginning  his  operations  are  conducted  on  a 
system  which  may  be  described  as  that  of  Bourcet 
raised  to  a  higher  power. 

The  "  Nelson  touch "  was  acquired  by  the 
Admiral  through  years  of  effort  to  think  out,  to 
its  last  conclusion,  a  problem  the  nature  of  which 
had  never  been  adequately  grasped  by  his  pro- 
fessional predecessors  and  comrades,  though  it 
seems  probable  that  he  owed  to  Clerk  the  hint 
which  led  him  to  the  solution  which  he  found. 
Napoleon  was  more  fortunate  in  inheriting  a 
strategical  doctrine  which  he  had  but  to  appre- 
ciate to  expand  and  to  apply.  The  success  of 
both  men  is  due  to  the  habit  of  mind  which  clines 


NATIONALISATION  AND   LEADERSHIP    119 

tenaciously  to  the  subject  under  investigation  until 
it  is  completely  cleared  up.  Each  of  them  became, 
as  a  result  of  his  thinking,  the  embodiment  of  a 
theory  or  system  of  the  employment  of  force,  the 
one  on  sea  and  the  other  on  land  ;  and  such  an 
embodiment  is  absolutely  necessary  for  a  nation 
in  pursuit  of  victory. 

It  seems  natural  to  say  that  if  England  wants 
victory  on  sea  or  land,  she  must  provide  herself 
with  a  Nelson  or  a  Napoleon.  The  statement  is 
quite  true,  but  it  requires  to  be  rightly  interpreted. 
If  it  means  that  a  nation  must  always  choose  a 
great  man  to  command  its  navy  or  its  army  it  is 
an  impossible  maxim,  because  a  great  man  can- 
not be  recognised  until  his  power  has  been  re- 
vealed in  some  kind  of  work.  Moreover,  to  say 
that  Nelson  and  Napoleon  won  victories  because 
they  were  great  men  is  to  invert  the  order  of 
nature  and  of  truth.  They  are  recognised  as  great 
men  because  of  the  mastery  of  their  business  which 
they  manifested  in  action.  That  mastery  was  due 
primarily  to  knowledge.  Wordsworth  hit  the  mark 
when,  in  answer  to  the  question  "  Who  is  the 
Happy  Warrior?"  he  replied  that  it  was  he — 

"  Who  with  a  natural  instinct  to  discern 
What  knowledge  can  perform,  is  diligent  to  learn." 

The  quality   that   made   them   both   so  valuable 
was  that  they  knew  the  best  that  was  known  and 


120  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

thought  in  regard  to  the  art  of  war.  This  is  the 
quality  which  a  nation  must  secure  in  those  whom 
it  entrusts  with  the  design  and  the  conduct  of 
the  operations  of  its  fleets  and  its  armies. 

There   is    a   method    for    securing   this,   not    by 
any    means  a    new   one,  and   not   originally,  as  is 
commonly  supposed,  a  German  invention.      It  con- 
sists  in  providing  the  army  and  the  navy  with  a 
General  Staff  or  Department  for  the  study,  design, 
and  direction  of  operations.      In  such  a  department 
Bourcet,   Napoleon's   master,  spent  the  best  years 
of  his   life.     In   such    a   department    Moltke   was 
trained ;    over    such    a    department    he    presided. 
Its  characteristic  is  that  it  has  one  function,  that 
of  the  study,  design,  and  direction   of  the  move- 
ments in  fighting  of  a  fleet  or  an  army,  and  that 
it  has  nothing  whatever  to  do   with  the  mainten- 
ance of  an  army,  or  with  its  recruiting,  discipline, 
or   peace   administration.       Its  functions   in    peace 
are   intellectual    and    educational,    and    in    war    it 
becomes  the  channel  of  executive  power.     Bourcet 
described  the  head  of  such  a  department  as  "the 
soul   of   an   army."     The   British   navy  is   without 
such  a  department.     The  army  has  borrowed  the 
name,   but    has    not    maintained    the    speciality    of 
function  which  is  essential.      In  armies  other  than 
the    British,    the    Chief  of    the    General    Staff    is 
occupied    solely    with    tactics    and    strategy,    with 
the  work  of  intellectual  research  by  which  Nelson 


NATIONALISATION  AND   LEADERSHIP     121 

and  Napoleon  prepared  their  great  achievements. 
His  business  is  to  be  designing  campaigns,  to 
make  up  his  mind  at  what  point  or  points,  in  case 
of  war,  he  will  assemble  his  fleets  or  his  armies 
for  the  first  move,  and  what  the  nature  of  that 
move  shall  be.  The  second  move  it  is  impossible 
for  him  to  pre-arrange  because  it  depends  upon 
the  result  of  the  first.  He  will  determine  the 
second  move  when  the  time  comes.  In  order  that 
his  work  should  be  as  well  done  as  possible,  care 
is  taken  that  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  shall  have 
nothing  else  to  do.  Not  he  but  another  officer 
superintends  the  raising,  organising,  and  disciplining 
of  the  forces.  Thus  he  becomes  the  embodiment 
of  a  theory  or  system  of  operations,  and  with  that 
theory  or  system  he  inspires  as  far  as  possible 
all  the  admirals  or  generals  and  other  officers  who 
will  have  to  carry  out  his  designs. 

In  the  British  system  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  is  the  principal  military  member  of  the  Board 
which  administers  the  army.  Accordingly,  only  a 
fraction  of  his  time  can  be  given  to  thinking  out 
the  problems  of  strategy  and  tactics.  At  the  Ad- 
miralty the  principal  naval  member  of  the  Board 
is  made  responsible  not  only  for  the  distribution 
and  movements  of  ships — a  definition  which  in- 
cludes the  whole  domain  of  strategy  and  tactics 
— but  also  for  the  fighting  and  sea-going  efficiency 
of  the   fleet,    its    organisation  and    mobilisation,    a 


122  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

definition  so  wide  that  it  includes  the  greater  part 
of  the  administration  of  the  navy,  especially  as 
the  same  officer  is  held  responsible  for  advice  on 
all  large  questions  of  naval  policy  and  maritime 
warfare,  as  well  as  for  the  control  of  the  naval 
ordnance  department.  Thus  in  each  case  the  very 
constitution  of  the  office  entrusted  with  the  design 
of  operations  prevents  the  officer  at  its  head  from 
concentrating  himself  upon  that  vital  duty.  The 
result  is  that  the  intellectual  life  both  of  the  army 
and  of  the  navy  lags  far  behind  that  of  their 
German  rivals,  and  therefore  that  there  is  every 
chance  of  both  of  them  being  beaten,  not  for 
lack  of  courage  or  hard  work,  but  by  being 
opposed  to  an  adversary  whose  thinking  has  been 
better  done  by  reason  of  the  greater  concentration 
of  energy  devoted  to  it. 

The  first  reform  needed,  at  any  rate  in  the 
navy,  is  a  definition  of  the  functions  of  the  First 
Sea  Lord  which  will  confine  his  sphere  to  the 
distribution  and  movement  of  ships  and  the 
strategical  and  tactical  training  of  officers,  so  as 
to  compel  him  to  become  the  embodiment  or 
personification  of  the  best  possible  theory  or 
system  of  naval  warfare.  That  definition  adopted 
and  enforced,  there  is  no  need  to  lay  down 
regulations  giving  the  strategist  control  over  his 
colleagues  who  administer  matdriel  mid  personnel; 
they  will  of  themselves  always  be  anxious  to  hear 


NATIONALISATION    AND    LEADERSHIP    123 

his  views  as  to  the  methods  of  fighting,  and  will 
be  only  too  glad  to  build  ships  with  a  view  to 
their  being  used  in  accordance  with  his  design  of 
victory.  But  until  there  is  at  the  Admiralty 
department  devoted  to  designing  victory  and  to 
nothing  else,  what  possible  guarantee  can  there  be 
that  ships  will  be  built,  or  the  navy  administered 
and  organised  in  accordance  with  any  design  likely 
to  lead  to  victory  ? 


XIV 

THE    NEEDS    OF   THE    NAVY 

The  doubt  which,  suice  the  Prime  Minister's  state- 
ment on  the  introduction  of  the  Navy  Estimates, 
has  disturbed  the  public  mind,  is  concerned  almost 
exclusively  with  the  number  of  modern  battleships 
in  the  Royal  Navy.  The  one  object  which  the 
nation  ought  to  have  in  view  is  victory  in  the 
next  war,  and  the  question  never  to  be  forgotten  is, 
what  is  essential  to  victory  ?  While  it  is  probably 
true  that  if  the  disparity  of  numbers  be  too  great  a 
smaller  fleet  can  hardly  engage  a  larger  one  with 
any  prospect  of  success,  it  is  possible  to  exaggerate 
the  importance  both  of  numbers  and  of  the  size 
of  ships. 

The  most  decisive  victories  at  sea  which  are 
on  record  were  those  of  Tsusima,  of  Trafalgar, 
and  of  the  Nile.  At  Tsusima  the  numbers  and 
size  of  the  Japanese  Fleet  were  not  such  as, 
before  the  battle,  to  give  foreign  observers  grounds 
for  expecting  a  decisive  victory  by  the  Japanese. 
It  was  on  the  superior  intellectual  and  moral 
qualities  of  the  Japanese  that  those  who  expected 

them  to  win  based  their  hopes,  and  this  view  was 

124 


THE   NEEDS   OF   THE    NAVY  125 

justified  by  the  event.  At  the  battle  of  Trafalgar 
the  British  Fleet  numbered  twenty-seven,  the 
Franco- Spanish  Fleet  numbered  thirty-three  ;  at 
the  battle  of  the  Nile  the  numbers  were  equal— 
thirteen  on  each  side.  These  figures  seem  to  me 
sufficiently  to  prove  that  superior  numbers  are  not 
in  battle  the  indispensable  condition  of  victory. 
They  certainly  prove  that  the  numerically  inferior 
fleet  may  very  well  win. 

Writers  on  the  art  of  war  distinguish  between 
tactics,  the  art  of  winning  a  battle,  and  strategy, 
the  art  of  designing  and  conducting  the  whole  of 
the  operations  which  constitute  a  campaign,  of 
bringing  about  battles  in  conditions  favourable 
to  one's  own  side  and  of  making  the  best  use 
of  such  victories  as  may  be  won  for  contributing 
to  the  general  purpose  of  the  war,  which  is 
dictating  peace  on  one's  own  terms. 

The  decision  of  the  questions,  how  many  fleets 
to  send  out,  what  is  to  be  the  strength  and  com- 
position of  each  of  them,  and  what  the  objectives 
assigned  to  their  several  commanders  is  a  strate- 
gical decision.  It  is  a  function  of  the  strategist 
at  the  Board  of  Admiralty,  but  the  question  how 
to  handle  any  one  of  these  fleets  in  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  so  as  either  to  avoid  or  to  bring 
about  an  action  and  so  as  to  win  the  battle,  if  a 
battle  be  desirable,  is  a  question  for  the  admiral 
commanding  the  particular  fleet. 


126  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

Evidently  the  master  art,  because  it  dominates 
the  whole  war,  is  that  of  strategy,  and  for  that 
reason  it  must  have  a  seat  at  the  Admiralty  Board. 

As  is  well  known,  a  large  number  of  naval 
officers  have  for  several  years  past  been  troubled 
with  doubts  as  to  the  strategical  competence  dis- 
played by  the  Board  or  Boards  of  Admiralty  since 
1904.  The  Board  of  Admiralty  has  also  been 
criticised  for  other  reasons,  into  some  of  which  it 
is  not  necessary  to  enter,  but  it  is  desirable  to  state 
precisely  the  considerations  which  tend  to  show 
that  important  decisions  made  by  the  Admiralty 
have  not  been  based  upon  sound  strategical  prin- 
ciples, and  are,   indeed,  incompatible  with  them. 

When  four  or  five  years  ago  it  was  decided  to 
transfer  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  navy,  as 
represented  by  fleets  in  commission,  from  the 
Mediterranean  to  the  Atlantic  coasts  of  Europe, 
that  was  a  sound  decision.  But  when  the  principal 
fleet  in  commission  in  home  waters  was  reduced 
in  order  to  facilitate  the  creation  of  a  so-called 
Home  Fleet,  made  up  of  a  number  of  ships 
stationed  at  different  ports,  and  manned  for  the 
most  part  by  nucleus  crews,  the  Admiralty  an- 
nounced this  measure  in  a  very  remarkable  cir- 
cular. The]  change  clearly  involved  a  reduction  of 
the  number  of  men  at  sea,  and  also  a  reduction  in 
the  number  of  ships  which  would  be  immediately 
available    under    war   conditions.      It    was    further 


THE   NEEDS   OF   THE   NAVY  127 

evident  that  the  chief  result  of  this  measure  would 
be  a  reduction  of  expenditure,  yet  the  circular 
boldly  stated  that  the  object  of  the  measure  was 
to  increase  the  power  and  readiness  of  the  navy 
for  instant  war. 

In  any  case,  the  decision  announced  revealed  an 
ignorance  of  one  of  the  fundamental  conditions  of 
naval  warfare,  which  differentiates  it  completely 
from  operations  on  land.  A  ship  in  commission 
carries  on  board  everything  that  is  necessary  for 
a  fight.  She  can  be  made  ready  for  battle  in  a 
few  minutes  on  the  order  to  clear  for  action.  No 
other  mobilisation  is  necessary  for  a  fleet  in  com- 
mission, and  if  a  war  should  break  out  suddenly, 
as  wars  normally  always  do  break  out,  whichever 
side  is  able  at  once  with  its  fleets  already  in  com- 
mission to  strike  the  first  blow  has  the  incalculable 
advantage  of  the  initiative. 

A  fleet  divided  between  several  ports  and  not 
fully  manned  is  not  a  fleet  in  commission;  it  is 
not  ready,  and  its  assembly  as  a  fleet  depends 
on  a  contingency,  which  there  is  no  means  of 
guaranteeing,  that  the  enemy  shall  not  be  able  to 
prevent  its  assembly  by  moving  a  fleet  immediately 
to  a  point  at  sea  from  which  it  would  be  able  to 
oppose  by  force  the  union  of  the  constituent  parts 
of  the  divided  and  unready  fleet. 

Later  official  descriptions  of  the  Home  Fleet 
explained  that  it  was  part  of  the  Admiralty  design 


128  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

that  this  fleet  should   offer   the   first  resistance   to 
an  enemy.     The  most  careful  examination  of  these 
descriptions   leaves    no    room    for    doubt   that   the 
idea  of  the   Admiralty  was   that   one   of  its  fleets 
should,    in   case  of  war,   form   a   sort   of  advance- 
guard  to  the  rest  of  the  navy.     But  it  is  a  funda- 
mental truth  that  in  naval   war  an  advance-guard 
is   absurd    and    impossible.      In    the   operations   of 
armies,   an  advance-guard    is    both   necessary  and 
useful.      Its  function  is  to  delay  the  enemy's  army 
until    such    time  as   the    commander-in-chief  shall 
have   assembled    his   own    forces,    which    may    be, 
to    some    extent,    scattered    on    the    march.      This 
delay    is    always    possible    on    land,    because    the 
troops  can  make  use  of  the  ground,  that  is,  of  the 
positions  which   it  affords  favourable  for  defence, 
and  because  by  means  of  those  positions  a  small 
force  can  for  a  long  time  hold  in  check  the  advance 
of  a  very  much  larger  one.     But  at  sea  there  are 
no  positions  except  those  formed  by  narrow  straits, 
estuaries,  and  shoals,  where  land  and  sea  are  more 
or   less    mixed    up.     The   open    sea    is    a    uniform 
surface   offering  no   advantage  whatever  to  either 
side.     There   is   nothing  in   naval    warfare   resem- 
bling  the  defence   of  a  position   on  land,   and  the 
whole   difference   between    offence   and   defence  at 
sea  consists   in   the  will   of  one  side  to   bring  on 
an  action  and  that  of  the  other  side   to  avoid   or 
postpone  it. 


THE   NEEDS   OF   THE    NAVY  129 

At  sea  a  small  force  which  endeavours  by- 
fighting  to  delay  the  movement  of  a  large  force 
exposes  itself  to  destruction  without  any  corre- 
sponding gain  of  time.  Accordingly,  at  sea,  there 
is  no  analogy  to  the  action  of  an  advance-guard, 
and  the  mere  fact  that  such  an  idea  should  find 
its  way  into  the  official  accounts  of  the  Admiralty's 
views  regarding  the  opening  move  of  a  possible 
war  must  discredit  the  strategy  of  the  Admiralty 
in  the  judgment  of  all  who  have  paid  any  attention 
to  the  nature  of  naval  war. 

The  second  requisite  for  victory,  that  is,  for 
winning  a  battle  against  a  hostile  fleet,  is  tactical 
superiority,  or,  as  Nelson  put  it:  "The  skill  of 
our  admirals  and  the  activity  and  spirit  of  our 
officers  and  seamen."  The  only  way  to  obtain 
this  is  through  the  perpetual  practice  of  the 
admirals  commanding  fleets.  An  admiral,  in 
order  to  make  himself  a  first-rate  tactician,  must 
not  merely  have  deeply  studied  and  pondered  the 
subject,  but  must  spend  as  much  time  as  possible 
in  exercising,  as  a  whole,  the  fleet  which  he 
commands,  in  order  not  only  by  experimental 
manoeuvres  thoroughly  to  satisfy  himself  as  to  the 
formation  and  mode  of  attack  which  will  be  best 
suited  to  any  conceivable  circumstance  in  which 
he  may  find  himself,  but  also  to  inculcate  his 
ideas  into  his  subordinates  ;  to  inspire  them  with 
his  own  knowledge,  and  to  give  them  that  training 


130  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

in  working  together  which,  in  all  those  kinds  of 
activities  which  require  large  numbers  of  men  to 
work  together,  whether  on  the  cricket  field,  at 
football,  in  an  army,  or  in  a  navy,  constitutes  the 
advantage  of  a  practised  over  a  scratch  team. 

If  the  practice  is  to  make  the  fleet  ready  for 
war,  it  must  be  carried  out  with  the  fleet  in  its 
war  composition.  All  the  different  elements, 
battleships,  cruisers,  torpedo  craft,  and  the  rest, 
must  be  fully  represented,  otherwise  the  admiral 
would  be  practising  in  peace  with  a  different 
instrument  from  that  with  which  he  would  need 
to  operate  in  war. 

The  importance  of  this  perpetual  training  ought 
to  be  self-evident.  It  may  be  well  to  remind  the 
reader  that  it  has  also  been  historically  proved. 
The  great  advantage  which  the  British  possessed 
over  the  French  navy  in  the  Wars  of  the  Revolu- 
tion and  the  Empire  was  that  the  British  fleets 
were  always  at  sea,  whereas  the  French  fleets, 
for  years  blockaded  in  their  ports,  were  deficient 
in  that  practice  which,  in  the  naval  as  in  all  other 
professions,  makes  perfect.  One  of  the  complaints 
against  the  present  Board  of  Admiralty  is  that  it 
has  not  encouraged  the  training  and  exercise  of 
fleets  as  complete  units. 

Another  point,  in  regard  to  which  the  recent 
practice  of  the  Admiralty  is  regarded  with  very 
grave    doubts,   not    only    by   many    naval   officers. 


THE   NEEDS   OF   THE   NAVY  131 

but  also  by  many  of  those  who,  without  being 
naval  officers,  take  a  serious  interest  in  the  navy, 
is  that  of  naval  construction.  For  several  years 
the  Admiralty  neglected  to  build  torpedo  craft  of 
the  quality  and  in  the  quantity  necessary  for  the 
most  probable  contingencies  of  war,  while,  at  the 
same  time,  large  sums  of  money  were  spent  in 
building  armoured  cruisers,  vessels  of  a  fighting 
power  so  great  that  an  admiral  would  hesitate  to 
detach  them  from  his  fleet,  lest  he  should  be 
needlessly  weakened  on  the  day  of  battle,  yet  not 
strong  enough  safely  to  replace  the  battleships  in 
the  fighting  line.  The  result  has  been  that  the 
admirals  in  command  of  fleets  have  for  some  time 
been  anxiously  asking  to  be  better  supplied  with 
scouts  or  vessels  of  great  speed,  but  not  of  such 
fighting  power  that  they  could  not  be  spared  at 
a  distance  from  the  fleet  even  on  the  eve  of  an 
action.  These  two  defects  in  the  shipbuilding 
policy  of  the  Admiralty  make  it  probable  that 
for  some  years  past  the  navy  has  not  been  con- 
structed in  accord  with  any  fully  thought-out 
design  of  operations ;  in  other  words,  that  the 
great  object  "victory"  has  been  forgotten  by  the 
supreme  authority. 

The  doubt  whether  victory  has  been  borne  in 
mind  is  confirmed  by  what  is  known  of  the  design 
of  the  original  Dreadnought.  A  battleship  ought  to 
be  constructed  for  battle,  that  is,  for  the  purpose 


132  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

of  destroying  the  enemy's  fleet,  for  which  purpose  it 
will  never  be  used  alone,  but  in  conjunction  with  a 
number  of  ships  like  itself  forming  the  weapon  of 
an  admiral  in  command.  A  battleship  requires  three 
qualities,  in  the  following  order  of  importance  : — 

First,  offensive  power.  A  fleet  exists  in  order 
to  destroy  the  enemy,  but  it  has  no  prospect  of 
performing  that  function  if  its  power  of  destruction 
is  less  than  its  enemy's.  The  chief  weapon  to-day, 
as  in  the  past,  is  artillery.  Accordingly  the  first 
requisite  of  a  fleet,  as  regards  its  material  qualities, 
those  produced  by  the  constructor,  is  the  capacity 
to  pour  on  to  the  enemy's  fleet  a  heavier  rain  of 
projectiles  than  he  can  return. 

The  second  quality  is  the  power  of  movement. 
The  advantage  of  superior  speed  in  a  fleet — for 
the  superior  speed  of  an  individual  ship  is  of  little 
importance — is  that  so  long  as  it  is  preserved  it  en- 
ables the  admiral,  within  limits,  to  accept  or  decline 
battle  according  to  his  own  judgment.  This  is  a 
great  strategical  advantage.  It  may  in  some  con- 
ditions enable  an  inferior  fleet  to  postpone  an  action 
which  might  be  disastrous  until  it  has  effected  a 
junction  with  another  fleet  belonging  to  its  own  side. 

The  third  quality  is  that  the  ships  of  a  fleet 
should  be  strong  enough  to  offer  to  the  enemy's 
projectiles  a  sufficient  resistance  to  make  it  im- 
probable that  they  can  be  sunk  before  having  in- 
flicted their  fair  share  of  damage  on  the  adversary. 


THE   NEEDS   OF   THE    NAVY  133 

There  is  always  a  difficulty  in  combining  these 
qualities  in  a  given  ship,  because  as  a  ship  weighs 
the  quantity  of  water  which  she  displaces,  a  ship 
of  any  given  size  has  its  weight  given,  and  the 
designer  cannot  exceed  that  limit  of  weight.  He 
must  divide  it  between  guns  with  their  ammuni- 
tion, engines  with  their  coal,  and  armour.  Every 
ton  given  to  armour  diminishes  the  tonnage  possible 
for  guns  and  engines,  and,  given  a  minimum  for 
armour,  every  extra  ton  given  to  engines  and  coal 
reduces  the  possible  weight  of  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion. In  the  Dreadnought  a  very  great  effort  was 
made  to  obtain  a  considerable  extra  speed  over 
that  of  all  other  battleships.  This  extra  speed  was 
defended  on  the  ground  that  it  would  enable  a 
fleet  of  Dreadnoughts  to  fight  a  battle  at  long 
ranee,  and  with  a  view  to  such  battle  the  Dread- 
nought  was  provided  only  with  guns  of  the  heaviest 
calibre  and  deprived  of  those  guns  of  medium 
calibre  with  which  earlier  battleships  were  well 
provided.  The  theories  thus  embodied  in  the  new 
class  of  ships  were  both  of  them  doubtful,  and 
even  dangerous.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  in  the 
highest  degree  injurious  to  the  spirit  and  courage 
of  the  crew  to  have  a  ship  which  they  know  will 
be  at  a  disadvantage  if  brought  into  close  proximity 
with  the  enemy.  Their  great  object  ought  to  be 
to  get  as  near  to  the  enemy  as  possible.  The 
hypothesis  that  more  damage  will  be  done   by   an 


134  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

armament  exclusively  of  the  largest  guns  is  in 
the  opinion  of  many  of  the  best  judges  likely  to 
be  refuted.  There  is  some  reason  to  believe  that 
a  given  tonnage,  if  devoted  to  guns  of  medium 
calibre,  would  yield  a  very  much  greater  total 
damage  to  an  enemy's  ship  than  if  devoted  to  a 
smaller  number  of  guns  of  heavy  calibre  and  firing 
much  less  rapidly. 

There  is,  moreover,  a  widespread  belief  among 
naval  officers  of  the  highest  repute,  among  whom 
may  be  named  the  author  of  the  "  Influence  of  Sea 
Power  upon  History,"  than  whom  no  one  has 
thought  more  profoundly  on  the  subject  of  naval 
war,  that  it  is  bad  economy  to  concentrate  in  a  few 
very  large  ships  the  power  which  might  be  more 
conveniently  and  effectively  employed  if  distributed 
in  a  great  number  of  ships  of  more  moderate  size. 

Surely,  so  long  as  naval  opinion  is  divided  about 
the  tactical  and  strategical  wisdom  of  a  new  type 
of  battleship,  it  is  rash  to  continue  building  battle- 
ships exclusively  of  that  type,  and  it  would  be  more 
reasonable  to  make  an  attempt  to  have  naval 
opinion  sifted  and  clarified,  and  thus  to  have  a 
secure  basis  for  a  shipbuilding  programme,  than 
to  hurry  on  an  enormous  expenditure  upon  what 
may  after  all  prove  to  have  been  a  series  of  doubt- 
ful experiments. 

All  the  questions  above  discussed  seem  to  me 
to  be  more  important  than  that  of  mere  numbers 


THE   NEEDS   OF   THE   NAVY  135 

of  ships.  Numbers  are,  however,  of  great  im- 
portance in  their  proper  place  and  for  the  proper 
reasons.  The  policy  adopted  and  carried  out  by 
the  British  navy,  at  any  rate  during  the  latter 
half  of  the  war  against  the  French  Empire,  was 
based  on  a  known  superiority  of  force.  The  British 
fleet  set  out  by  blockading  all  the  French  fleets, 
that  is,  by  taking  stations  near  to  the  great  French 
harbours  and  there  observing  those  harbours,  so 
that  no  French  fleet  should  escape  without  being 
attacked.  If  this  is  to  be  the  policy  of  the 
British  navy  in  future  it  will  require  a  preponder- 
ance of  force  of  every  kind  over  that  of  the 
enemy,  and  that  preponderant  force  will  have  to 
be  fully  employed  from  the  very  first  day  of  the 
war.  In  other  words,  it  must  be  kept  in  commis- 
sion during  peace.  But,  in  addition,  it  is  always 
desirable  to  have  a  reserve  of  strength  to  meet 
the  possibility  that  the  opening  of  a  war  or  one 
of  its  early  subsequent  stages  may  bring  into  action 
some  additional  unexpected  adversary.  There  are 
thus  two  reasons  that  make  for  a  fleet  of  great 
numerical  strength.  The  first,  that  only  great 
superiority  renders  possible  the  strategy  known  as 
blockade,  or,  as  I  have  ventured  to  call  it,  of 
"  shadowing "  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  forces. 
The  second,  that  only  great  numerical  strength 
renders  it  possible  to  provide  a  reserve  against 
unexpected  contingencies. 


XV 
ENGLAND'S   MILITARY  PROBLEM 

After   the  close  of  the   South  African  war,   two 

Royal  Commissions  were  appointed.     One  of  them, 

known  as  the  War  Commission,  was  in  a  general 

way  to  inquire  into  and  report  upon  the  lessons  of 

the    war.     This    mission   it   could   fulfil   only   very 

imperfectly,    because    its    members    felt    precluded 

from   discussing  the  policy  in  which  the  war  had 

its  origin   and  incapable  of  reviewing  the  military 

conduct    of  the   operations.     This    was    very   like 

reviewing  the  play  of  "  Hamlet "  without  reference 

to  the  characters  and  actions  either  of  Hamlet  or 

of  the  King,  for  the  mainsprings  which  determine 

the  course,  character,  and  issue  of  any  war  are  the 

policy  out  of  which  it  arises  and  the  conduct  of  the 

military  operations.     The  main  fact  which  impressed 

itself  on    the   members    of  the    War    Commission 

was  that  the  forces  employed  on  the  British  side 

had  been  very  much  larger  than  had  been  expected 

at  the  beorinninor  of  the  war,  and  the  moral  which 

they  drew  was  contained  in  the  one  sentence  of 

their    report    which    has    remained    in   the   public 

mind,  to  the  effect  that  the  Government  ought  to 

136 


ENGLAND'S   MILITARY   PROBLEM      137 

make  provision  for  the  expansion  of  the  army 
beyond  the  limit  of  the  regular  forces  of  the 
Crown. 

About  the  same  time  another  Commission,  under 
the  chairmanship  of  the  Duke  of  Norfolk,  was 
appointed  to  inquire  and  report  whether  any,  and, 
if  any,  what  changes  were  required  in  order  to 
secure  that  the  Militia  and  Volunteer  forces  should 
be  maintained  in  a  condition  of  military  efficiency 
and  at  an  adequate  strength.  The  Norfolk  Com- 
mission recommended  certain  changes  which  it 
thought  would  lead  to  a  great  improvement  in  the 
efficiency  of  both  forces,  while  permitting  them  to 
maintain  the  requisite  numerical  strength.  With 
regard  to  the  Volunteer  force,  the  report  said  : — 

"  The  governing  condition  is  that  the  Volunteer, 
whether  an  officer,  non-commissioned  officer,  or 
private,  earns  his  own  living,  and  that  if  demands 
are  made  upon  him  which  are  inconsistent  with 
his  doing  so  he  must  cease  to  be  a  Volunteer. 
No  regulations  can  be  carried  out  which  are  incom- 
patible with  the  civil  employment  of  the  Volunteers, 
who  are  for  the  most  part  in  permanent  situations. 
Moreover,  whatever  may  be  the  goodwill  and 
patriotism  of  employers,  they  cannot  allow  the 
Volunteers  they  may  employ  more  than  a  certain 
period  of  absence.  Their  power  to  permit  their 
workmen  to  attend  camp  or  other  exercises  is 
controlled  by  the  competition  which  exists  in  their 
trade.     Those  who  permit  Volunteers  in  their  ser- 


138  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

vice  to  take  holidays  longer  than  are  customary  in 
their  trade  and  district,  are  making  in  the  public 
interest  a  sacrifice  which  some  of  them  think  ex- 
cessive." 

The  report  further  laid  stress  on  the  cardinal 
principle  that  no  Volunteer,  whatever  his  rank, 
should  be  put  to  expense  on  account  of  his  ser- 
vice. Subject  to  this  governing  condition  and  to 
this  cardinal  principle,  the  Commission  made  re- 
commendations from  which  it  expected  a  marked 
improvement  and  the  gradual  attainment  of  a 
standard  much  in  advance  of  anything  which  until 
then  had  been  reached. 

Most  of  these  recommendations  have  been 
adopted,  with  modifications,  in  the  arrangements 
which  have  since  been  made  for  the  Volunteers 
under  the  new  name  "The  Territorial  Force." 

The  Norfolk  Commission  felt  no  great  confi- 
dence in  the  instructions  given  it  by  the  Govern- 
ment on  the  subject  of  the  standard  of  efficiency 
and  of  numerical  strength.  Accordingly  the  Com- 
mission added  to  its  report  the  statement : — 

"  We  cannot  assert  that,  even  if  the  measures 
recommended  were  fully  carried  out,  these  forces 
would  be  equal  to  the  task  of  defeating  a  modern 
continental  army  in  the  United  Kingdom." 

The  Commission's  chief  doubt  was  whether, 
under  the  conditions  inseparable  at  any  rate  from 


ENGLAND'S   MILITARY    PROBLEM      139 

the  volunteer  system,  any  scheme  of  training 
would  give  to  forces  officered  largely  by  men  who 
are  not  professional  soldiers  the  cohesion  of  armies 
that  exact  a  progressive  two-years'  course  from 
their  soldiers  and  rely,  except  for  expanding  the 
subaltern  ranks  on  mobilisation,  upon  professional 
leaders.  The  Commission  then  considered  "  Mea- 
sures which  may  provide  a  Home  Defence  Army 
equal  to  the  task  of  defeating  an  invader."  They 
were  unable  to  recommend  the  adoption  of  the 
Swiss  system,  partly  because  the  initial  training 
was  not,  in  their  judgment,  sufficient  for  the  pur- 
pose, and  partly  because  they  held  that  the  modern 
method  of  extending  the  training  to  all  classes, 
while  shortening  its  duration,  involves  the  employ- 
ment of  instructors  of  the  highest  possible  qualifi- 
cations. The  Commission  concluded  by  reporting 
that  a  Home  Defence  Army  capable,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  the  whole  or  the  greater  portion  of  the 
regular  forces,  of  protecting  this  country  against 
invasion  can  be  raised  and  maintained  only  on  the 
principle  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  citizen  of 
military  age  and  sound  physique  to  be  trained  for 
the  national  defence  and  to  take  part  in  it  should 
emergency  arise. 

The  Norfolk  Commission  gave  expression  to  two 
different  views  without  attempting  to  reconcile 
them.  On  the  one  hand  it  laid  down  the  main 
lines  along  which  the  improvement  of  the  militia 


140  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

and  volunteers  was  to  be  sought,  and  on  the  other 
hand  it  pointed  out  the  advantages  of  the  principle 
that  it  is  the  citizen's  duty  to  be  trained  as  a  soldier 
and  to  fight  in  case  of  need.  To  go  beyond  this 
and  to  attempt  either  to  reconcile  the  two  currents 
of  thought  or  to  decide  between  them,  was  im- 
possible for  a  Commission  appointed  to  deal  with 
only  a  fraction  of  the  problem  of  national  defence. 
The  two  sets  of  views,  however,  continue  to  exist 
side  by  side,  and  the  nation  yet  has  to  do  what  the 
Norfolk  Commission  by  its  nature  was  debarred 
from  doing.  The  Government,  represented  in  this 
matter  by  Mr.  Haldane,  is  still  in  the  position  of 
relying  upon  an  improved  militia  and  volunteer 
force.  The  National  Service  League,  on  the 
other  hand,  advocates  the  principle  of  the  citizen's 
duty,  though  it  couples  with  it  a  specific  programme 
borrowed  from  the  Swiss  system,  the  adoption  of 
which  was  deprecated  in  the  Commission's  Report. 
The  public  is  somewhat  puzzled  by  the  appearance 
of  opposition  between  what  are  thought  of  as  two 
schools,  and  indeed  Mr.  Haldane  in  his  speech 
introducing  the  Army  Estimates  on  March  4, 
1909,  described  the  territorial  force  as  a  safeguard 
against  universal  service. 

The  time  has  perhaps  come  when  the  attempt 
should  be  made  to  find  a  point  of  view  from 
which  the  two  schools  of  thought  can  be  seen 
in    due   perspective,  and   from    which,  therefore,  a 


ENGLAND'S   MILITARY   PROBLEM     141 

definite  solution  of  the  military  problem  may  be 
reached. 

By  what  principle  must  our  choice  between  the 
two  systems  be  determined  ?  By  the  purpose  in 
hand.  The  sole  ultimate  use  of  an  army  is  to 
win  the  nation's  battles,  and  if  one  system  pro- 
mises to  fulfil  that  purpose  while  the  other  system 
does  not,  we  cannot  hesitate. 

Great  Britain  requires  an  army  as  one  of  the 
instruments  of  success  in  a  modern  British  war, 
and  we  have  therefore  to  ascertain,  in  general,  the 
nature  of  a  modern  war,  and  in  particular  the 
character  of  such  wars  as  Great  Britain  may  have 
to  wage. 

The  distinguishing  feature  of  the  conflict 
between  two  modern  great  States  is  that  it  is  a 
struggle  for  existence,  or,  at  any  rate,  a  wrestle 
to  a  fall.  The  mark  of  the  modern  State  is  that  it 
is  identified  with  the  population  which  it  comprises, 
and  to  such  a  State  the  name  "  nation "  properly 
belonofs.  The  French  Revolution  nationalised  the 
State  and  in  consequence  nationalised  war,  and 
every  modern  continental  State  has  so  organized 
itself  with  a  view  to  war  that  its  army  is  equivalent 
to  the  nation  in  arms. 

The  peculiar  character  of  a  British  war  is  due 
to  the  insular  character  of  the  British  State.  A 
conflict  with  a  great  continental  Power  must  begin 
with  a  naval  struggle,  which  will  be  carried  on  with 


142 


BRITAIN   AT   BAY 


the  utmost  energy  until  one  side  or  the  other  has 
estabHshed  its  predominance  on  the  sea.  If  in  this 
struggle  the  British  navy  is  successful,  the  effect 
which  can  be  produced  on  a  continental  State  by 
the  victorious  navy  will  not  be  sufficient  to  cause 
the  enemy  to  accept  peace  upon  British  conditions. 
For  that  purpose,  it  will  be  necessary  to  invade 
the  enemy's  territory  and  to  put  upon  him  the 
constraint  of  military  defeat,  and  Great  Britain 
therefore  requires  an  army  strong  enough  either 
to  effect  this  operation  or  to  encourage  continental 
allies  to  join  with  it  in  making  the  attempt. 

In  any  British  war,  therefore,  which  is  to  be 
waged  with  prospect  of  success,  Great  Britain's 
battles  must  be  fought  and  won  on  the  enemy's 
territory  and  against  an  army  raised  and  main- 
tained on  the  modern  national  principle. 

This  is  the  decisive  consideration  affecting 
British  military  policy. 

In  case  of  the  defeat  of  the  British  navy  a 
continental  enemy  would,  undoubtedly,  attempt 
the  invasion  and  at  least  the  temporary  conquest 
of  Great  Britain.  The  army  required  to  defeat 
him  in  the  United  Kingdom  would  need  to  have 
the  same  strength  and  the  same  qualities  as  would 
be  required  to  defeat  him  in  his  own  territory, 
though,  if  the  invasion  had  been  preceded  by 
naval  defeat,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  any 
military   success    in    the    United    Kingdom    would 


ENGLAND'S   MILITARY   PROBLEM      143 

enable  Great  Britain  to  continue  her  resistance 
with  much  hope  of  ultimate  success. 

For  these  reasons  I  cannot  believe  that  Great 
Britain's  needs  are  met  by  the  possession  of  any 
force  the  employment  of  which  is,  by  the  con- 
ditions of  its  service,  limited  to  fighting  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  A  British  army,  to  be  of  any 
use,  must  be  ready  to  go  and  win  its  country's 
battles  in  the  theatre  of  war  in  which  its  country 
requires  victories.  That  theatre  of  war  will  never 
be  the  United  Kingdom  unless  and  until  the  navy 
has  failed  to  perform  its  task,  in  which  case  it 
will  probably  be  too  late  to  win  battles  in  time  to 
avert  the  national  overthrow  which  must  be  the 
enemy's  aim. 

There  are,  however,  certain  subsidiary  services 
for  which  any  British  military  system  must  make 
provision. 

These  are : — 

(i)  Sufficient  garrisons  must  be  maintained 
during  peace  in  India,  in  Egypt,  for  some 
time  to  come  in  South  Africa,  and  in 
certain  naval  stations  beyond  the  seas,  viz., 
Gibraltar,  Malta,  Ceylon,  Hong  Kong, 
Singapore,  Mauritius,  West  Africa,  Bermuda, 
and  Jamaica.  It  is  generally  agreed  that 
the  principle  of  compulsory  service  cannot 
be  applied  for  the  maintenance  of  these 
garrisons,  which  must  be  composed  of  pro- 
fessional paid  soldiers. 


144  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

(2)  Experience  shows  that  a  widespread  Empire, 
Hke  the  British,  requires  from  time  to  time 
expeditions  for  the  maintenance  of  order  on 
its  borders  against  half  civilised  or  savage 
tribes.  This  function  was  described  in  an 
essay  on  "  Imperial  Defence,"  published  by 
Sir  Charles  Dilke  and  the  present  writer 
in  1892  as  "  Imperial  Police." 

It  would  not  be  fair,  for  the  purpose  of 
one  of  these  small  expeditions,  arbitrarily 
to  call  upon  a  fraction  of  a  force  maintained 
on  the  principle  of  compulsion.  Accord- 
ingly any  system  must  provide  a  special 
paid  reserve  for  the  purpose  of  furnishing 
the  men  required  for  such  an  expedition. 

An  army  able  to  strike  a  serious  blow  against 
a  continental  enemy  in  his  own  territory  would 
evidently  be  equally  able  to  defeat  an  invading 
army  if  the  necessity  should  arise.  Accordingly 
the  military  question  for  Great  Britain  resolves 
itself  into  the  provision  of  an  army  able  to  carry 
on  serious  operations  against  a  European  enemy, 
together  with  the  maintenance  of  such  profes- 
sional forces  as  are  indispensable  for  the  garrisons 
of  India,  Egypt,  and  the  over-sea  stations  enumer- 
ated above  and  for  small  wars. 


XVI 

TWO   SYSTEMS   CONTRASTED 

I  PROCEED  to  describe  a  typical  army  of  the 
national  kind,  and  to  show  how  the  system  of 
such  an  army  could  be  applied  in  the  case  of 
Great  Britain. 

The  system  of  universal  service  has  been  estab- 
lished longer  in  Germany  than  in  any  other  State, 
and  can  best  be  explained  by  an  account  of  its 
working  in  that  country.  In  Germany  every  man 
becomes  liable  to  military  service  on  his  seventeenth 
birthday,  and  remains  liable  until  he  is  turned  forty- 
five.  The  German  army,  therefore,  theoretically 
includes  all  German  citizens  between  the  ages  of 
seventeen  and  forty-five,  but  the  liability  is  not 
enforced  before  the  age  of  twenty  nor  after  the  age 
of  thirty-nine,  except  in  case  of  some  supreme 
emergency.  Young  men  under  twenty,  and  men 
between  thirty-nine  and  forty-five,  belong  to  the 
Landsturm.  They  are  subjected  to  no  training, 
and  would  not  be  called  upon  to  fight  except  in 
the  last  extremity.  Every  year  all  the  young 
men  who  have  reached  their  twentieth  birthday 
are   mustered  and   classified.     Those  who  are   not 

145  K 


146  BRITAIN   AT    BAY 

found  strong  enough  for  military  service  are  divided 
into  three  grades,  of  which  one  is  dismissed  as 
unfit ;  a  second  is  excused  from  training  and  en- 
rolled in  the  Landsturm ;  while  a  third,  whose 
physical  defects  are  minor  and  perhaps  temporary, 
is  told  off  to  a  supplementary  reserve,  of  which 
some  members  receive  a  short  training.  Of  those 
selected  as  fit  for  service  a  few  thousand  are  told 
off  to  the  navy,  the  remainder  pass  into  the  army 
and  join  the  colours. 

The  soldiers  thus  obtained  serve  in  the  ranks 
of  the   army    for    two   years    if    assigned    to    the 
infantry,    field    artillery,    or    engineers,    and    for 
three   years    if  assigned  to  the    cavalry   or   horse 
artillery.     At  the  expiration  of  the   two   or  three 
years  they  pass   into  the  reserve  of  the  standing 
army,    in    which    they    remain    until    the    age    of 
twenty-seven,   that  is,   for   five   years  in   the  case 
of  the  infantry  and  engineers,  and   for  four  years 
in    the   case   of    the   cavalry   and    horse   artillery. 
At  twenty-seven  all  alike  cease  to  belong  to  the 
standing   army,   and  pass    into   the   Landwehr,   to 
which  they  continue  to  belong  to  the  age  of  thirty- 
nine.      The   necessity    to   serve    for   at   least   two 
years  with  the   colours  is  modified  in  the  case  of 
young  men  who  have   reached  a  certain   standard 
of  education,  and  who  engage  to  clothe,  feed,  equip, 
and   in   the   mounted    arms    to    mount   themselves. 
These  men  are  called  "one  year  volunteers,"  and 


TWO   SYSTEMS   CONTRASTED  147 

are  allowed  to  pass  into  the  reserve  of  the  standing 
army  at  the  expiration  of  one  year  with  the  colours. 

In  the  year  1906,  511,000  young  men  were 
mustered,  and  of  these  275,000  were  passed  into 
the  standing  army,  55,000  of  them  being  one 
year  volunteers.  The  men  in  any  year  so  passed 
into  the  army  form  an  annual  class,  and  the  stand- 
ing army  at  any  time  is  made  up,  in  the  infantry, 
of  two  annual  classes,  and  in  the  cavalry  and 
horse  artillery  of  three  annual  classes.  In  case 
of  war,  the  army  of  first  line  would  be  made  up 
by  adding  to  the  two  or  three  annual  classes 
already  with  the  colours  the  four  or  five  annual 
classes  forming  the  reserve,  that  is,  altogether  seven 
annual  classes.  Each  of  these  classes  would 
number,  when  it  first  passed  into  the  army,  about 
275,000 ;  but  as  each  class  must  lose  every  year 
a  certain  number  of  men  by  death,  by  diseases 
which  cause  physical  incapacity  from  service,  and 
by  emigration,  the  total  army  of  first  line  must 
fall  short  of  the  total  of  seven  times  275,000.  It 
may  probably  be  taken  at  a  million  and  a  half. 
In  the  second  line  come  the  twelve  annual  classes 
of  Landwehr,  which  will  together  furnish  about 
the  same  numbers  as  the  standing  army. 

Behind  the  Landwehr  comes  the  supplementary 
reserve,  and  behind  that  again  the  Landsturm, 
comprising  the  men  who  have  been  trained  and 
are  between  the  ages  of  thirty-nine  and  forty-five, 


148  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

the  young  men  under  twenty,  and  all  those  who, 
from  physical  weakness,  have  been  entirely  ex- 
empted from  training. 

During  their  two  or  three  years  with  the  colours 
the  men  receive  an  allowance  or  pay  of  twopence 
halfpenny  a  day.  Their  service  is  not  a  contract 
but  a  public  duty,  and  while  performing  it  they 
are  clothed,  lodged,  and  fed  by  the  State.  When 
passed  into  the  reserve  they  resume  their  normal 
civil  occupation,  except  that  for  a  year  or  two 
they  are  called  up  for  a  few  weeks'  training  and 
manoeuvres  durino-  the  autumn. 

In  this  way  all  German  citizens,  so  far  as 
they  are  physically  fit,  with  a  few  exceptions,  such 
as  the  only  son  and  support  of  a  widow,  receive 
a  thorough  training  as  soldiers,  and  Germany  relies 
in  case  of  war  entirely  and  only  upon  her  citizens 
thus  turned  into  soldiers. 

The  training  is  carried  out  by  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers,  who  together  are  the  mili- 
tary schoolmasters  of  the  nation,  and,  like  other 
proficient  schoolmasters,  are  paid  for  their  services 
by  which  they  live.  Broadly  speaking,  there  are 
in  Germany  no  professional  soldiers  except  the 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  from  whom 
a  high  standard  of  capacity  as  instructors  and 
trainers  during  peace  and  as  leaders  in  war  is 
demanded  and  obtained. 

The  high   degree   of  military   proficiency  which 


TWO   SYSTEMS   CONTRASTED  149 

the  German  army  has  acquired  Is  due  to  the 
excellence  of  the  training  given  by  the  officers  and 
to  the  thoroughness  with  which,  during  a  course 
of  two  or  three  years,  that  training  can  be  im- 
parted. The  great  numbers  which  can  be  put  into 
the  field  are  due  to  the  practice  of  passing  the 
whole  male  population,  so  far  as  it  is  physically 
qualified,  through  this  training,  so  that  the  army 
in  war  represents  the  whole  of  the  best  manhood  of 
the  country  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  forty. 

The  total  of  three  millions  which  has  been  given 
above  is  that  which  was  mentioned  by  Prince 
Bismarck  in  a  speech  to  the  Reichstag  in  1887. 
The  increase  of  population  since  that  date  has 
considerably  augmented  the  figures  for  the  present 
time,  and  the  corresponding  total  to-day  slightly 
exceeds  four  millions. 

The  results  of  the  British  system  are  shown  in 
the  following  table,  which  gives,  from  the  Army 
Estimates,  the  numbers  of  the  various  constituents 
of  the  British  army  on  the  ist  of  January  1909. 
There  were  at  that  date  in  the  United  Kingdom  : — 


Regular  forces    . 

.     123,250 

Army  reserve 

•      134,110 

Special  reserves 

.       67,780 

Militia 

.         .         9,158 

Territorial  force 

•     209,977 

Officers'  training 

corps 

416 

Total  in  the  United  Kingdom     .     544.691 


I50  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

In  Egypt  and  the  Colonies: — 

Regular  forces    .....       45,002 

The  British  troops  in  India  are  paid  for  by  the 
Indian  Government  and  do  not  appear  in  the 
British  Army  Estimates.  Of  the  force  maintained 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  it  will  be  observed  that 
it  falls,  roughly,  into  three  categories. 

In  the  first  place  come  the  first-rate  troops 
which  may  be  presumed  to  have  had  a  thorough 
training  for  war.  This  class  embraces  only  the 
regulars  and  the  army  reserve,  which  together 
slightly  exceed  a  quarter  of  a  million.  In  the 
second  class  come  the  68,000  of  the  special 
reserve,  which,  in  so  far  as  they  have  enjoyed 
the  six  months'  training  laid  down  in  the  recent 
reorganisation,  could  on  a  sanguine  estimate  be 
classified  as  second-class  troops,  though  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  their  officers  are  not  professional  and 
are  for  the  most  part  very  slightly  trained,  that 
classification  would  be  exceedingly  sanguine.  Next 
comes  the  territorial  force  with  a  maximum  annual 
training  of  a  fortnight  in  camp,  preceded  by  ten  to 
twenty  lessons  and  officered  by  men  whose  pro- 
fessional training,  though  it  far  exceeds  that  of  the 
rank  and  file,  falls  yet  very  much  short  of  that  given 
to  the  professional  officers  of  a  first-rate  continental 
army.  The  territorial  force,  by  its  constitution, 
is  not  available    to  fight  England's  battles  except 


TWO   SYSTEMS   CONTRASTED  i^f 

in  the  United  Kingdom,  where  they  can  never 
be  fought  except  in  the  event  of  a  defeat  of 
the  navy. 

This  heterogeneous  tripartite  army  is  exceedingly 
expensive,  its  cost  during  the  current  year  being, 
according  to  the  Estimates,  very  little  less  than 
29  m.illions,  the  cost  of  the  personnel  being  23J- 
millions,  that  of  matdriel  being  4  millions,  and  that 
of  administration  i|  millions. 

The  British  regular  army  cannot  multiply  soldiers 
as  does  the  German  army.  It  receives  about 
37,000  recruits  a  year.  But  it  sends  away  to  India 
and  the  Colonies  about  23,000  each  year  and  seldom 
receives  them  back  before  their  eight  years'  colour 
service  are  over,  when  they  pass  into  the  first-class 
reserve.  There  pass  into  the  reserve  about  24,000 
men  a  year,  and  as  the  normal  term  of  reserve 
service  is  four  years,  its  normal  strength  is  about 
96,000  men. 

As  the  regular  army  contains  only  professional 
soldiers,  who  look,  at  any  rate  for  a  period  of  eight 
years,  to  soldiering  as  a  living,  and  are  prepared 
for  six  or  seven  years  abroad,  there  is  a  limit  to  the 
supply  of  recruits,  who  are  usually  under  nineteen 
years  of  age,  and  to  whom  the  pay  of  a  shilling 
a  day  is  an  attraction.  Older  men  with  prospects 
of  regular  work  expect  wages  much  higher  than 
that,  and  therefore  do  not  enlist  except  when  in 
difficulties. 


XVII 

A  NATIONAL  ARMY 

I  PROPOSE  to  show  that  a  well-trained  homo- 
geneous army  of  great  numerical  strength  can  be 
obtained  on  the  principle  of  universal  service  at  no 
greater  cost  than  the  present  mixed  force.  The 
essentials  of  a  scheme,  based  upon  training  the  best 
manhood  of  the  nation,  are  :  first,  that  to  be  trained 
is  a  matter  of  duty  not  of  pay  ;  secondly,  that  every 
trained  man  is  bound,  as  a  matter  of  duty,  to  serve 
with  the  army  in  a  national  war  ;  thirdly,  that  the 
training  must  be  long  enough  to  be  thorough,  but 
no  longer  ;  fourthly,  that  the  instructors  shall  be 
the  best  possible,  which  implies  that  they  must  be 
paid  professional  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers. 

I  take  the  aee  at  which  the  traininsf  should 
begin  at  the  end  of  the  twentieth  year,  in  order 
that,  in  case  of  war,  the  men  in  the  ranks  may  be 
the  equals  in  strength  and  endurance  of  the  men  in 
the  ranks  of  any  opposing  army.  The  number  of 
men  who  reach  the  age  of  twenty  every  year  in  the 
United  Kingdom  exceeds  400,000.  Continental 
experience  shows  that  less  than  half  of  these  would 


A   NATIONAL   ARMY  153 

be  rejected  as  not  strong  enough.  The  annual 
class  would  therefore  be  about  200,000. 

The  principle  of  duty  applies  of  course  to  the 
navy  as  well  as  to  the  army,  and  any  man  going  to 
the  navy  will  be  exempt  from  army  training.  But 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the  navy  can  be  effectively 
manned  on  a  system  of  very  short  service  such  as 
is  inevitable  for  a  national  army.  The  present 
personnel  of  the  navy  is  maintained  by  so  small  a 
yearly  contingent  of  recruits  that  it  will  be  covered 
by  the  excess  of  the  annual  class  over  the  figure 
here  assumed  of  200,000.  The  actual  number  of 
men  reaching  the  age  of  twenty  is  more  than 
400,000,  and  the  probable  number  out  of  400,000 
who  will  be  physically  fit  for  service  is  at  least 
213,000. 

I  assume  that  for  the  infantry  and  field 
artillery  a  year's  training  would,  with  good  in- 
struction, be  sufficient,  and  that  even  better  and 
more  lasting  results  would  be  produced  if  the  last 
two  months  of  the  year  were  replaced  by  a  fortnight 
of  field  manoeuvres  in  each  of  the  four  summers 
following  the  first  year.  For  the  cavalry  and 
horse  artillery  I  believe  that  the  training  should 
be  prolonged  for  a  second  year. 

The  liability  to  rejoin  the  colours,  in  case  of  a 
national  war,  should  continue  to  the  end  of  the  27th 
year,  and  be  followed  by  a  period  of  liability  in  the 
second  line,  Landwehr  or  Territorial  Army. 


154 


BRITAIN   AT   BAY 


The  first  thinof  to  be  observed  is  the  numerical 
strength  of  the  army  thus  raised  and  trained. 

If  we  assume  that  any  body  of  men  loses  each 
year,  from  death,  disablement,  and  emigration,  five 
per  cent,  of  its  number,  the  annual  classes  would  be 
as  follows  : — 


I  St  year,  age  20-21 


200,000     (At  the  end  of  the 


2nd 

21-22 

170,000 

first  year  20,000 

3rd 

23-24     . 

.     161,300 

are  to  go  abroad 

4th 

24-25     . 

.     153,425 

as  explained  be- 

5th 

25-26     . 

.     145,754 

low) 

6th 

26-27     . 

•     138,467 

Total  on  mobilisation 


968,946 


This  gives  an  army  of  close  upon  a  million  men 
in  first  line  in  addition  to  the  British  forces  in 
India,  Egypt,  and  the  colonial  stations. 

If  from  the  age  of  27  to  that  of  31  the  men  were 
in  the  Landwehr,  that  force  would  be  composed  of 
four  annual  classes  as  follows  : — 


7th  year,  age  27-28  . 

Sth      „      „    28-29  . 

9th      „      „    29-30  . 

loth      „      „    30-31  . 

Total  of  Landwehr 


131,544 
124,967 
118,719 
112,784 

488,014 


There  is  no  need  to  consider  the  further  strength 
that  would  be  available  if  the  liability  were  pro- 
longed to  the  age  of  39,  as  it  is  in  Germany. 

The  liability  thus  enforced  upon  all  men  of  sound 


A   NATIONAL   ARMY  155 

physique  is  to  fight  in  a  national  war,  a  conflict  in- 
volving for  England  a  struggle  for  existence.  But 
that  does  not  and  ought  not  to  involve  serving  in 
the  garrison  of  Egypt  or  of  India  during  peace,  nor 
being  called  upon  to  take  part  in  one  of  the  small 
wars  waged  for  the  purpose  of  policing  the  Empire 
or  its  borders.  These  functions  must  be  performed 
by  professional,  i.e.  paid  soldiers. 

The  British  army  has  76,000  men  in  India  and 
45,000  in  Egypt,  South  Africa,  and  certain  colonial 
stations.  These  forces  are  maintained  by  drafts 
from  the  regular  army  at  home,  the  drafts  amount- 
ing in  1908  to  12,000  for  India  and  1 1,000  for  the 
Colonies. 

Out  of  every  annual  class  of  200,000  young 
men  there  will  be  a  number  who,  after  a  year's 
training,  will  find  soldiering  to  their  taste,  and  will 
wish  to  continue  it.  These  should  be  given  the 
option  of  engaging  for  a  term  of  eight  years  in 
the  British  forces  in  India,  Egypt,  or  the  Colonies. 
There  they  would  receive  pay  and  have  prospects 
of  promotion  to  be  non-commissioned  officers, 
sergeants,  warrant  officers  or  commissioned  officers, 
and  of  renewing  their  engagement  if  they  wished 
either  for  service  abroad  or  as  instructors  in  the 
army  at  home.  These  men  would  leave  for  India, 
Egypt,  or  a  colony  at  the  end  of  their  first  year. 
I  assume  that  20,000  would  be  required,  because 
eight  annual  classes  of  that  strength,  diminishing 


IS6  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent,  per  annum,  give  a  total 
of  122,545,  and  the  eight  annual  classes  would 
therefore  suffice  to  maintain  the  121,000  now  in 
India,  Egypt,  and  the  Colonies.  Provision  is  thus 
made  for  the  maintenance  of  the  forces  in  India, 
Egypt,  and  the  Colonies. 

There  must  also  be  provision  for  the  small 
wars  to  which  the  Empire  is  liable.  This  would 
be  made  by  engaging  every  year  20,000  who 
had  finished  their  first  year's  training  to  serve 
for  pay,  say  is.  a  day,  for  a  period  say  of  six 
months,  of  the  second  year,  and  afterwards  to  join 
for  five  years  the  present  first-class  reserve  at 
6d.  a  day,  with  liability  for  small  wars  and  expedi- 
tions. At  the  end  of  the  five  years  these  men  would 
merge  in  the  general  unpaid  reserve  of  the  army. 
They  might  during  their  second  year's  training  be 
formed  into  a  special  corps  devoting  most  of  the 
time  to  field  manoeuvres,  in  which  supplementary 
or  reserve  officers  could  receive  special  instruction. 

It  would  be  necessary  also  to  keep  with  the  colours 
for  some  months  after  the  first  year's  training  a 
number  of  garrison  artillery  and  engineers  to  provide 
for  the  security  of  fortresses  during  the  period 
between  the  time  of  sending  home  one  annual  class 
and  the  preliminary  lessons  of  the  next.  These 
men  would  be  paid.  I  allow  10,000  men  for  this 
purpose,  and  these,  with  the  20,000  prolonging 
their  training  for  the   paid   reserve,   and   with  the 


i 


A   NATIONAL   ARMY  157 

mounted  troops  undergoing  the  second  year's 
training,  would  give  during  the  winter  months  a 
garrison  strength  at  home  of  50,000  men. 

The  mobilised  army  of  a  million  men  would 
require  a  great  number  of  extra  officers,  who  should 
be  men  of  the  type  of  volunteer  officers  selected 
for  good  education  and  specially  trained,  after  their 
first  year's  service,  in  order  to  qualify  them  as 
officers.  Similar  provision  must  be  made  for  sup- 
plementary non-commissioned  officers. 


XVIII 

THE   COST 

It  will  probably  be  admitted  that  an  army  raised 
and  trained  on  the  plan  here  set  forth  would  be 
far  superior  in  war  to  the  heterogeneous  body 
which  figures  in  the  Army  Estimates  at  a  total 
strength  of  540,000  regulars,  militia,  and  volunteers. 
Its  cost  would  in  no  case  be  more  than  that  of 
the  existing  forces,  and  would  probably  be  con- 
siderably less.  This  is  the  point  which  requires 
to  be  proved. 

The  17th  Appendix  to  the  Army  Estimates  is 
a  statement  of  the  cost  of  the  British  army, 
arranged  under  the  four  headings  of: — 

1.  Cost  of  personnel  of  regular  army  and 

army  reserve    .....  ^,iS,2'jg,2^4. 

2.  Cost  of  special  reserves  and  territorial 

forces 5,149,843 

3.  Cost  of  armaments,  works,  stores,  Szc. .         3,949,463 

4.  Cost  of  staff  and  administration  .         .  1,414,360 

Making  a  total  of    .         .         .    ;j^28, 792,900 


In  the  above  table  nearly  a  million  is  set  down 

for  the  cost  of  certain  labour  establishments  and 

158 


THE   COST  159 

of  certain  instructional  establishments,  which  may 
for  the  present  purpose  be  neglected.  Leaving 
them  out,  the  present  cost  of  the  personnel  of  the 
Regular  Army,  apart  from  staff,  is  ^15,942,802. 
For  this  cost  are  maintained  officers,  non-com- 
missioned officers  and  men,  numbering  altogether 
1 70,000. 

The  lowest  pay  given  is  that  of  is.  a  day 
to  infantry  privates,  the  privates  of  the  other 
arms  receiving  somewhat  higher  and  the  non- 
commissioned officers  very  much  higher  rates 
of  pay. 

If  compulsory  service  were  introduced  into 
Great  Britain,  pay  would  become  unnecessary 
for  the  private  soldier ;  but  he  ought  to  be  and 
would  be  given  a  daily  allowance  of  pocket- 
money,  which  probably  ought  not  to  exceed 
fourpence.  The  mounted  troops  would  be  paid 
at  the  rate  of  is.  a  day  during  their  second  year's 
service. 

Assuming  then  that  the  private  soldier  re- 
ceived fourpence  a  day  instead  of  is.  a  day,  and 
that  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers 
were  paid  as  at  present,  the  cost  of  the  army 
would  be  reduced  by  an  amount  corresponding 
to  8d.  a  day  for  148,980  privates.  That  amount 
is  £1,812, sgo,  the  deduction  of  which  would 
reduce  the  total  cost  to  /^  14,1 37, 2 12.  At  the 
same    rate    an    army    of    200,000     privates     and 


i6o  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

20,000   non-commissioned  officers  and   men  would 
cost ^^18,295,215 

Second    year    of    20,000    mounted 

troops  at  ;^6o  a  year  each       .         1,200,000 

Add  to  this  cost  of  first-class  Re- 
serve of  96,000  at  ;^io  7s.  6d. 
each         .....  997,600 

Cost  of  30,000  men  for  six  months' 
extra  training  at  the  rate  of 
^60  a  year  each       .  .         .  900,000 

Cost  of  extra  training  for  supple- 
mentary officers  and  non-com- 
missioned officers    .         .  .  500,000 


^21,892,815 
Add  to  this  the  cost  of  the  troops 

maintained  in  the  Colonies  and 

Egypt    so    far   as    charged    to 

British  Estimates     .         .         .        3,401,704 


Total  personnel         .         .  ;^'25, 294,5 19 
Materiel    (allowing    for    additional 

outlay  due  to  larger  numbers)  .        4,500,000 
Staff  and  administration .         .  .         1,500,000 


Total  Cost  of  Army  at  Home 

and  in  the  Colonies  .         ,   ^31,294,519 

This  is    slightly   in    excess   of  the    present  cost 
of  the   personnel  of  the   Army,   but,   whereas  the 


THE   COST  i6i 

present  charge  only  provides  for  the  heterogeneous 
force  already  described  of  589,000  men,  the  charges 
here  explained  provide  for  a  short-service  homo- 
o-eneous  army  of  one  million  and  a  half,  as  well 
as  for  the  45,000  troops  permanently  maintained 
in  Egypt  and  the  Colonies. 

The  estimate  just  given  is,  however,  extra- 
vagant. The  British  system  has  innumerable  dif- 
ferent rates  of  pay  and  extra  allowances  of  all 
kinds,  and  is  so  full  of  anomalies  that  it  is  bound 
to  be  costly.  Unfortunately,  the  Army  Estimates 
are  so  put  together  that  it  is  difficult  to  draw 
from  them  any  exact  inferences  as  to  the  actual 
annual  cost  of  a  private  soldier  beyond  his  pay. 

The  average  annual  cost,  effective  and  non- 
effective, of  an  officer  in  the  cavalry,  artillery, 
engineers,  and  infantry  is  ;^473>  this  sum  covering 
all  the  arrangements  for  pensions  and  retiring 
allowances. 

I  propose  in  the  following  calculations  to  assume 
the  average  cost  of  an  officer  to  be  ^500  a  year, 
a  sum  which  would  make  it  possible  for  the  average 
combatant  officer  to  be  somewhat  better  paid  than 
he  is  at  present. 

The  normal  pay  of  a  sergeant  in  the  infantry  of 
the  line  is  2s.  46.  a  day,  or  £d,2,  iis.  8d.  a  year. 
The  Army  Estimates  do  not  give  the  cost  of 
a  private  soldier,  but  the  statement  is  made  that 
the    average    annual    cost    per    head    of    1 50,000 

L 


i62  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

warrant  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and 
men  is  £6s,  6s.  yd.  The  warrant  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  appear  to  be  much  more 
expensive  than  the  private,  and  as  the  minimum 
pay  of  a  private  is  ;^i8,  Ss.,  the  balance,  ^45,  is.  yd., 
is  probably  much  more  than  the  cost  of  housing, 
clothing,  feeding,  and  equipping  the  private,  whose 
food,  the  most  expensive  item,  certainly  does  not 
cost  a  shilling  a  day  or  ^18  a  year. 

I  assume  that  the  cost  of  maintaining  a  private 
soldier  is  covered  by  ^36  a  year,  while  his 
allowance  of  4d.  a  day  amounts  to  £6,  is.  4d.  In 
order  to  cover  the  extra  allowances  which  may  be 
made  to  corporals,  buglers,  and  trumpeters,  I  assume 
the  average  cost  of  the  rank  and  file  to  be  ^45 
a  year.  I  also  assume  that  the  average  cost  of  a 
sergeant  does  not  exceed  ^100  a  year,  which  allows 
from  ^40  to  ^50  for  his  pay  and  the  balance  for 
his  housing,  clothing,  equipment,  and  food.  I  add 
provisions  for  pensions  for  sergeants  after  twenty- 
five  years'  service. 

These  figures  lead  to  the  following  estimate  : — 

7000  officers  at  ^500     ....     ^^3,500,000 

14,000  sergeants  at  ;£ioo        .         .         .         1,400,000 

Pension  after  twenty-five  years  for  ser- 
geants, ^52  a  year      ....  396,864 

(An  annual  class  of  14,000,  decreasing 
annually  by  2  J  per  cent.,  would  consist, 
after  twenty-five  years,  of  7632) 

Carry  forward  ....     ^^5, 296,864 


THE    COST 


163 


Brought  forward 
200,000  privates  at  ^45  a  year 
2nd  year  of  20,000  mounted  troops  (cavalry 
and  horse  artillery  at  ^60  a  year  each) . 
Six  months'  extra  training  for  30,000  men 
with  pay  (total  rate  per  man  ;i^6o  a  year) 
(20,000  for  paid   reserve   and   10,000 
fortress  troops)  ..... 
First-class  reserve  ..... 
Training  supplementary  officers  and  ser- 
geants        ...... 


Colonial  troops 

Total  personnel 


^5,296,864 
9,000,000 

1,200,000 


900,000 
997,600 

500,000 

^17,894,464 
3,500,000 

;^2I, 394,464 


Materiel,  allowing  for  additional  cost  due 

to  larger  numbers        ....         4,500,000 
Staff  and  administration  .         .         .  1,500,000 


Total  cost  of  army  at  home  and  in  the 


Colonies 


•  ^27,394,464 


The  figures  here  given  will,  it  is  hoped,  speak  for 
themselves.  They  are,  if  anything,  too  high  rather 
than  too  low.  The  number  of  officers  is  calculated 
on  the  basis  of  the  present  war  establishments, 
which  give  5625  officers  for  160,500  of  the  other 
ranks.  It  does  not  include  those  in  Egypt  and  the 
Colonies.  The  cost  of  the  officers  is  taken  at  a 
higher  average  rate  than  that  of  British  officers 
of  the  combatant  arms  under  the  present  system, 
and,  both  for  sergeants  and  for  privates,  ample 
allowance  appears  to  me  to  be  made  even  on  the 
basis  of  their  present  cost. 


i64  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

When  it  is  considered  that  Germay  maintains 
with  the  colours  a  force  of  600,000  men  at  a  cost  of 
^29,000,000,  that  France  maintains  550,000  for 
^27,000,000,  and  that  Italy  maintains  221,000  for 
;^7, 500,000,  it  cannot  be  admitted  that  Great 
Britain  would  be  unable  to  maintain  220,000 
officers  and  men  at  an  annual  cost  of  /"  17, 500,000, 
and  the  probability  is  that  with  effective  adminis- 
tration this  cost  could  be  considerably  reduced. 

It  may  at  first  sight  seem  that  the  logical  course 
would  have  been  to  assume  two  years'  service  in 
the  infantry  and  three  years'  service  in  the  mounted 
arms,  in  accord  with  the  German  practice,  but  there 
are  several  reasons  that  appear  to  me  to  make 
such  a  proposal  unnecessary.  In  the  first  place, 
Great  Britain's  principal  weapon  must  always  be 
her  navy,  while  Germany's  principal  weapon  will 
always  be  her  army,  which  guarantees  the  integrity 
of  her  three  frontiers  and  also  guards  her  against 
invasion  from  oversea.  Germany's  navy  comes 
only  in  the  second  place  in  any  scheme  for  a 
German  war,  while  in  any  scheme  for  a  British  war 
the  navy  must  come  in  the  first  place  and  the  army 
in  the  second. 

The  German  practice  for  many  years  was  to 
retain  the  bulk  of  the  men  for  three  years  with  the 
colours.  It  was  believed  by  the  older  generation 
of  soldiers  that  any  reduction  of  this  period  would 
compromise  that  cohesion  of  the  troops  which   is 


THE   COST  165 

the  characteristic  mark  of  a  disciplined  army.  But 
the  views  of  the  younger  men  prevailed  and  the 
period  has  been  reduced  by  a  third.  The  reduc- 
tion of  time  has,  however,  placed  a  heavier  respon- 
sibility upon  the  body  of  professional  instructors. 

The  actual  practice  of  the  British  army  proves 
that  a  recruit  can  be  fully  trained  and  be  made  fit 
in  every  way  to  take  his  place  in  his  company 
by  a  six  months'  training,  but  in  my  opinion  that 
is  not  sufficient  preparation  for  war.  The  recruit 
when  thoroughly  taught  requires  a  certain  amount  of 
experience  in  field  operations  or  manoeuvres.  This 
he  would  obtain  during  the  summer  immediately 
following  upon  the  recruit  training ;  for  the  three 
months  of  summer,  or  of  summer  and  autumn, 
ought  to  be  devoted  almost  entirely  to  field 
exercises  and  manoeuvres.  If  the  soldier  is  then 
called  out  for  manoeuvres  for  a  fortnight  in  each  of 
four  subsequent  years,  or  for  a  month  in  each  of 
two  subsequent  years,  I  believe  that  the  lessons  he 
has  learned  of  operations  in  the  field  will  thereby 
be  refreshed,  renewed,  and  digested,  so  as  to  give 
him  sufficient  experience  and  sufficient  confidence 
in  himself,  in  his  officers,  and  in  the  system  to 
qualify  him  for  war  at  any  moment  during  the  next 
five  or  six  years.  The  additional  three  months' 
manoeuvre  training,  beyond  the  mere  recruit 
training,  appears  to  me  indispensable  for  an  army 
that  is  to  be  able  to  take  the  field  with  effect.     But 


i66  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

that  this  period  should  suffice,  and  that  the  whole 
training  should  be  given  in  nine  or  ten  months  of 
one  year,  followed  by  annual  periods  of  manoeuvre, 
involves  the  employment  of  the  best  methods  by  a 
body  of  officers  steeped  in  the  spirit  of  modern 
tactics  and  inspired  by  a  general  staff  of  the  first 
order. 

The  question  what  is  the  shortest  period  that 
will  suffice  to  produce  cohesion  belongs  to  educa- 
tional psychology.  How  long  does  it  take  to  form 
habits  ?  How  many  repetitions  of  a  lesson  will 
bring  a  man  into  the  condition  in  which  he  re- 
sponds automatically  to  certain  calls  upon  him, 
as  does  a  swimmer  dropped  into  the  water,  a 
reporter  in  forming  his  shorthand  words,  or  a 
cyclist  guiding  and  balancing  his  machine?  In 
each  case  two  processes  are  necessary.  There  is 
first  the  series  of  progressive  lessons  in  which 
the  movements  are  learned  and  mastered  until  the 
pupil  can  begin  practice.  Then  follows  a  period 
of  practice  more  or  less  prolonged,  without  which 
the  lessons  learned  do  not  become  part  of  the 
man's  nature  ;  he  retains  the  uncertainty  of  a  be- 
ginner. The  recruit  course  of  the  British  army 
is  of  four  months.  A  first  practice  period  of 
six  months  followed  by  fresh  practice  periods  of 
a  month  each  in  two  subsequent  years  or  by  four 
practice  periods  of  a  fortnight  each  in  four  suc- 
cessive years  are    in  the   proposals   here   sketched 


THE   COST  167 

assumed  to  be  sufficient.  If  they  were  proved 
inadequate  I  believe  the  right  plan  of  supple- 
menting them  would  be  rather  by  adding  to  the 
number  and  duration  of  the  manoeuvre  practices 
of  the  subsequent  years  than  by  prolonging  the 
first  period  of  continuous  training. 

The  following  table  shows  the  cost  of  two 
years'  service  calculated  on  the  same  bases  as 
have  been  assumed  above.  Two  years'  service 
would  mean  an  army  with  the  colours  not  of 
200,000  but  of  390,000  men.  This  would  re- 
quire double  the  number  of  officers  and  sergeants, 
and  the  annual  estimates  for  personnel  would 
be  ^34,000,000,  and  the  total  Army  Estimates 
;^4i,ooo,ooo.  There  would  also  be  a  very  great 
extra  expenditure  upon  barracks. 

Estimate  of  Annual  Cost  for  Two  Years'  Service. 

13,650  officers  at  ^^500  a  year  .  ^'6,825,000 
27,300  sergeants  at  p^ioo  .  .  2,730,000 
Pension  for  sergeants'  annual  class 

of  27,300,  decreasing  by   2\  per 

cent.,  gives  after  twenty-five  years 

^12,403;  at  ^£"52  a  year  pension 

is 644,956 

390,000  privates  at  ^45  a  year  .  17,550,000 
Third  year  mounted  troops,  20,000 

at  ;^6o        .....  1,200,000 

First-class  reserve    ....  997,000 

Training  supplementary  officers  and 

sergeants      .....  500,000 

Carry  forward       .  .         .  ;2^3o,446,956 


i68 


BRITAIN   AT   BAY 


Brought  forward    .         .         .  ;!^3o,446,956 
Colonial  troops        ....         3,500,000 

Total  personnel     .         .  ^33,946,956 

Materiel,    allowing     for     extra 

numbers       .....         5,000,000 

Staff  and  administration,  allow- 
ing for  extra  numbers  .         .         .         2,000,000 


^40,946,956 


XIX 

ONE   ARMY   NOT   TWO 

The  training  provided  in  the  scheme  which  I 
have  outlined  could  be  facilitated  at  comparatively 
small  cost  by  the  adoption  of  certain  preparatory 
instruction  to  be  given  partly  in  the  schools,  and 
partly  to  young  men  between  the  ages  of  seventeen 
and  twenty. 

It  has  never  appeared  to  me  desirable  to  add 
to  the  school  curriculum  any  military  subjects 
whatever,  and  I  am  convinced  that  no  greater 
mistake  could  be  made,  seeing  that  schoolmasters 
are  universally  agreed  that  the  curriculum  is 
already  overloaded  and  requires  to  be  lightened, 
and  that  the  best  preparation  that  the  school  can 
give  for  making  a  boy  likely  to  be  a  good  soldier 
when  grown  up,  is  to  develop  his  intelligence  and 
physique  as  far  as  the  conditions  of  school  life 
admit.  But  if  all  school  children  were  drilled  in 
the  evolutions  of  infantry  in  close  order,  the 
evolutions  being  always  precisely  the  same  as 
those  practised  in  the  army,  the  army  would  re- 
ceive its  men  already  drilled,  and  would  not  need 

to  spend   much  time  in   recapitulating  these   prac- 

169 


I70  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

tices,    which    make    no    appreciable    demand   upon 
the  time  of  school  children. 

Again,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  boys 
between  the  ages  of  seventeen  and  twenty  can 
very  well  be  taught  to  handle  a  rifle,  and  the 
time  required  for  such  instruction  and  practice  is 
so  small  that  it  would  in  no  way  affect  or  interfere 
with  the  ordinary  occupations  of  the  boys,  what- 
ever their  class  in  life. 

Every  school  of  every  grade  ought,  as  a  part 
of  its  ordinary  geography  lessons,  to  teach  the 
pupils  to  understand,  to  read,  and  to  use  the 
ordnance  maps  of  Great  Britain,  and  that  this 
should  be  the  case  has  already  been  recognised 
by  the  Board  of  Education.  A  soldier  who  can 
read  such  a  map  has  thereby  acquired  a  know- 
ledge and  a  habit  which  are  of  the  greatest  value 
to  him,  both  in  manoeuvres  and  in  the  held. 

The  best  physical  preparation  which  the  schools 
can  give  their  pupils  for  the  military  life,  as  well 
as  for  any  other  life,  is  a  well-directed  course  of 
gymnastics  and  the  habits  of  activity,  order, 
initiative,  and  discipline  derived  from  the  practice 
of  the  national  games. 

A  national  army  is  a  school  in  which  the  young 
men  of  a  nation  are  educated  by  a  body  of 
specially  trained  teachers,  the  officers.  The  educa- 
tion given  for  war  consists  in  a  special  training 
of  the  will  and  of  the  intelligence.     In  order  that 


ONE   ARMY   NOT  TWO  171 

it  should  be  effective,  the  teachers  or  trainers 
must  not  merely  be  masters  of  the  theory  and 
practice  of  war  and  of  its  operations,  but  also 
proficient  in  the  art  of  education.  This  concep- 
tion of  the  officers'  function  fixes  their  true  place 
in  the  State.  Their  duties  require  for  their  proper 
performance  the  best  heads  as  well  as  the  best- 
schooled  wills  that  can  be  found,  and  impose  upon 
them  a  laborious  life.  There  can  be  no  good 
teacher  who  is  not  also  a  student,  and  a  national 
army  requires  from  its  officers  a  high  standard 
not  only  of  character,  but  of  intelligence  and 
knowledge.  It  should  offer  a  career  to  the  best 
talent.  A  national  army  must  therefore  attract 
the  picked  men  of  the  universities  to  become 
officers.  The  attraction  to  such  men  consists, 
chiefly,  in  their  faith  in  the  value  of  the  work  to 
be  done,  and,  to  a  less  degree,  in  the  prospect  of 
an  assured  living.  Adequate,  though  not  neces- 
sarily high,  pay  must  be  given,  and  there  must 
be  a  probability  of  advancement  in  the  career 
proportionate  to  the  devotion  and  talents  given  to 
the  work.  But  their  work  must  be  relied  upon 
by  the  nation,  otherwise  they  cannot  throw  their 
energies  into  it  with  full  conviction. 

This  is  the  reason  why,  if  there  is  to  be  a 
national  army,  it  must  be  the  only  regular  army  and 
the  nation  must  rely  upon  nothing  else.  To  keep 
a  voluntary  paid  standing  army  side  by  side  with 


172  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

a  national  army  raised  upon  the  principle  of  uni- 
versal duty  is  neither  morally  nor  economically 
sound.  Either  the  nation  will  rely  upon  its  school 
or  it  will  not.  If  the  school  is  good  enough  to 
serve  the  nation's  turn,  a  second  school  on  a 
different  basis  is  needless  ;  if  a  second  school  were 
required,  that  would  mean  that  the  first  could  not 
be  trusted. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  a  national  school 
of  war  the  professional  officers  must  be  the  in- 
structors, otherwise  the  nation  will  not  rely  upon 
the  young  men  trained.  The  200,000  passed 
through  the  school  every  year  will  be  the  nation's 
best.  Therefore,  so  soon  as  the  system  has  been 
at  work  long  enough  to  produce  a  force  as  large 
as  the  present  total,  that  is,  after  the  third  year, 
there  will  be  no  need  to  keep  up  the  establishment 
of  138,000  paid  privates,  the  special  reserve,  or  the 
now  existing  territorial  force.  There  will  be  one 
homogeneous  army,  of  which  a  small  annual  con- 
tingent will,  after  each  year's  training,  be  enlisted 
for  paid  service  in  India,  Egypt,  and  the  oversea 
stations,  and  a  second  small  contingent,  with  extra 
training,  will  pass  into  the  paid  reserve  for  service 
in  small  oversea  expeditions. 

The  professional  officers  and  sergeants  will,  of 
course,  be  interchangeable  between  the  national 
army  at  home  and  its  professional  branches  in 
India,    Egypt,    and   the   oversea    stations,  and  the 


ONE   ARMY   NOT   TWO  173 

cadres  of  the  battalions,  batteries,  and  squadrons 
stationed  outside  the  United  Kingdom  can  from 
time  to  time  be  relieved  by  the  cadres  of  the 
battalions  from  the  training  army  at  home.  This 
relief  of  battalions  is  made  practicable  by  the 
national  system.  One  of  the  first  consequences  of 
the  new  mode  of  recruiting  will  be  that  all  recruits 
will  be  taken  on  the  same  given  date,  probably  the 
ist  of  January  in  each  year,  and,  as  this  will  apply 
as  well  to  the  men  who  re-engage  to  serve  abroad 
as  to  all  others,  so  soon  as  the  system  is  in  full 
working  order,  the  men  of  any  battalion  abroad  will 
belong  to  annual  classes,  and  the  engagement  of 
each  class  will  terminate  on  the  same  day. 


XX 

THE  TRANSITION 

I  HAVE  now  explained  the  nature  and  working  of 
a  national  army,  and  shown  the  kind  of  strength 
it  will  give  and  the  probable  maximum  cost  which 
it  will  involve  when  adopted. 

The  chief  difficulty  attendant  upon  its  adoption 
lies  in  the  period  of  transition  from  the  old  order 
to  the  new.  If  Great  Britain  is  to  keep  her 
place  and  do  her  duty  in  the  world  the  change 
must  be  made ;  but  the  question  arises,  how  is 
the  gulf  between  one  and  the  other  to  be  bridged  ? 
War  comes  like  a  thief  in  the  night,  and  it  must 
not  catch  this  country  unready. 

The  complete  readiness  which  the  new  system, 
when  in  full  swing,  will  produce,' cannot  be  obtained 
immediately.  All  that  can  be  done  in  the  transi- 
tion period  is  to  see  that  the  number  and  quality 
of  men  available  for  mobilisation  shall  be  at  least 
as  high  as  it  is  under  the  existing  system.  It  may 
be  worth  while  to  explain  how  this  result  can  be 
secured. 

Let    us    assume    that    the    Act   authorising   the 

new  system   is   passed  during  a  year,  which  may 

174 


THE   TRANSITION  175 

be  called  '00,  and  that  it  is  to  come  into  force 
on  the  I  St  January  of  the  year  '01.  The  Act 
would  probably  exempt  from  its  operations  the 
men  at  the  date  of  its  passing  already  serving  in 
any  of  the  existing  forces,  including  the  territorial 
army,  and  the  discussion  on  the  Bill  would,  no 
doubt,  have  the  effect  of  filling  the  territorial 
army  up  to  the  limit  of  its  establishment,  315,000 
men. 

On  the  31st  December  '00  the  available  troops 
would  therefore  be  : — 

Regulars    in    the   United   Kingdom   (present 

figure) 138,000 

Special  reserve       ......  67,000 

Army  reserve  (probably  diminished  from  pre- 
sent strength) 120,000 

Territorial  force    ......  315,000 


Total     .......     640,000 


From  the   ist  January  '01   recruiting  on  present 
conditions  for  all  these  forces  would  cease. 

The  regular  army  of 138,000 

would  lose  drafts  to  India  and  the 

Colonies 23,000 

and   would   have    lost   during    '00 

by  waste  at  5  per  cent.        .         .  6,900 

29,000 

This  would  leave  :  

regular  army  under  old  conditions         .         .    108,100 
and  leave  room  for  recruits  under  new  con- 
ditions     91,900 


176  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

The  total  available   for  mobilisation   during  the 

year  '01  would  therefore  be  : — 

Regulars 200,000 

Paid  reserves  (the  present  first-class  reserve. 
I     assume    an     arbitrary    figure     below    the 

actual  one) 120,000 

Special  reserve  (I  assume  a  large  waste  and 

a  loss  from  men  whose  time  has  expired)    .       50,000 

Territorial  force      ....      315,000 

Less  5  per  cent.  .         .         .        i5)75° 

299,250 

669,250 

On  the   I  St  January  '02  the  regular  army  would 

be:— 

Old  engagement   ....       108,000 

Less  waste     ....  5A°° 

Indian  and  Colonial  reliefs    .         .         23,000 

79,600 

Recruits  under  new  system    ....      120,400 
Mounted  troops  serving  second  year      .         .        20,000 

Total  of  regulars    .         .         .  220,000 

New  reserve  ....        91,900 

Less  5  per  cent.         .         .         .  4,5^° 

87,320  87,000 

Paid  reserve 120,000 

Special  reserve,  reduced  by  lapse  of  engage- 
ments          40,000 


Total  liable  for  national  war  .         .         .    467,000 
Add — Territorial  force,  reduced  by  5  per  cent, 
waste  (14,962),  and  lapse  of   (78,75°)  en- 
gagements   205,538 

672,538 

•7\ 


THE   TRANSITION 


177 


In  the  year  '03  there  would  be  : — 

Old  regulars,  79,600;  less  5  per  cent,  waste, 
3,950;  less  drafts  for  abroad,  23,000 — 
leaves  52,050,  say  .... 
Regulars,  recruits  under  new  conditions 
Mounted  troops  serving  second  year 
New  reserve ..... 
Paid  reserve ..... 
Special  reserve      .... 

Total  liable  for  national  war    . 
Territorial  force 


50,000 

150,000 

20,000 

i97>334 

120,000 
30,000 

567,334 
116,512 

683,846 


In  the  year  '04  there  would  be : — 


50,000 
2,500 

47,500 
23,000 


Old  regulars 

Less  5  per  cent. 

Less  drafts 

New  regulars 

Mounted  troops,  second  year 


New  reserve  ....... 

Paid  reserve  ....... 

Special  reserve  may  now  be  dropped. 

Total  liable  fur  national  war  .... 

Territorial  force     .  .  .  .       116,512 

Less  5  per  cent.      .  .  .  5,825 


24,500 

175,500 

20,000 

220,000 
329,000 
120,000 

669,000 


Less 


110,687 
78,750 


31,937 


700,937 


M 


178  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

At  the  end  of  '04  the  territorial  force  would  come 
to  an  end  and  in  '05  there  would  be : — 

(Old  regulars,  24,000,  after  waste  just  enough 

for  drafts.) 
New  regulars  ......    200,000 

Mounted  troops,  second  year         .         .         .      20,000 
New  reserve  ....      478,000 

Less  to  paid  reserve       .         .         20,000 

458.000 


Paid  reserve  ......     120,000 


Total,  all  liable  for  national  war    .         .         .     798,000 

In  these  tables  I  have  taken  the  drafts  for 
India  and  the  Colonies  from  the  old  regulars.  But 
they  can  just  as  well  be  taken  from  the  new  re- 
gulars. If  need  be  the  old  regulars  could,  before  the 
fourth  year,  be  passed  into  the  paid  reserve,  and 
the  full  contingent  of  200,000  one  year's  men  taken. 

The  men  of  the  special  reserve  and  territorial 
force  would  on  the  termination  of  their  engage- 
ments pass  into  the  second  line  reserve  or  Land- 
wehr  until  the  age  of  thirty-one  or  thirty-two. 

It  will  be  seen  that  during  the  years  of  transi- 
tion additional  expense  must  be  incurred,  as,  until 
the  change  has  been  completed,  some  portion  of 
the  existing  forces  must  be  maintained  side  by 
side  with  the  new  national  army.  It  is  partly  in 
order  to  facilitate  the  operations  of  the  transition 
period  that  I  have  assumed  a  large  addition  to 
the  number  of  officers.     There  will  also  be  addi- 


THE   TRANSITION  179 

tional  expense  caused  by  the  increase  of  barrack 
accommodation  needed  when  the  estabHshment  is 
raised  from  138,000  privates  to  200,000,  but  this 
additional  accommodation  will  not  be  so  sreat  as 
it  might  at  first  sight  appear,  because  it  is  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  those  young  men  who  wish 
it,  and  whose  parents  wish  it,  will  be  allowed  to 
live  at  home  instead  of  in  barracks,  provided  they 
regularly  attend  all  drills,  parades,  and  classes. 

It  has  been  necessary,  in  discussing  the  British 
military  system,  to  consider  the  arrangements  for 
providing  the  garrisons  of  India,  Egypt,  and  certain 
oversea  stations  during  peace,  and  to  make  pro- 
vision for  small  wars  or  imperial  police ;  but  I 
may  point  out  that  the  system  by  which  provision 
is  made  out  of  the  resources  of  the  United  King- 
dom alone  for  these  two  military  requirements  of 
the  Empire,  is,  in  the  present  conditions  of  the 
Empire,  an  anomaly.  The  new  nations  which 
have  grown  up  in  Canada,  Australia,  and  New 
Zealand  are  anxious,  above  all  things,  to  give 
reality  to  the  bond  between  them  and  the  mother 
country.  Their  desire  is  to  render  imperial 
service,  and  the  proper  way  of  giving  them  the 
opportunity  to  do  so  is  to  call  upon  them  to  take 
their  part  in  maintaining  the  garrisons  in  India 
and  Egypt  and  in  the  work  of  imperial  police. 
How  they  should  do  it,  it  is  for  them  to  decide 
and  arrange,  but  for  Englishmen  at  home  to  doubt 


i8o  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

for  a  moment  either  their  will  or  their  capacity 
to  take  their  proper  share  of  the  burden  is  to 
show  an  unworthy  doubt  of  the  sincerity  of  the 
daughter  nations  and  of  their  attachment  to  the 
mother  country  and  the  Empire. 

If  Great  Britain  should  be  compelled  to  enter 
upon  a  struggle  for  existence  with  one  of  the  great 
European  powers,  the  part  which  Canada,  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa  could  play  in  that 
struggle  is  limited  and  specific.  For  the  conflict 
would,  in  the  first  instance,  take  the  form  of  a 
naval  war.  To  this  the  King's  dominions  beyond 
the  seas  can  do  little  more  than  assist  during  peace 
by  their  contributions,  either  of  ships,  men,  or 
money,  in  strengthening  the  British  navy.  But 
during  the  actual  course  of  such  a  war,  while  it 
is  doubtful  whether  either  Canada,  Australia,  or 
New  Zealand  could  render  much  material  help 
in  a  European  struggle,  they  could  undoubtedly 
greatly  contribute  to  the  security  of  India  and 
Egypt  by  the  despatch  of  contingents  of  their  own 
troops  to  reinforce  the  British  garrisons  maintained 
in  those  countries.  This  appears  to  me  to  be 
the  direction  to  which  their  attention  should  turn, 
not  only  because  it  is  the  most  effective  way  in 
which  they  can  promote  the  stability  of  the  Empire, 
but  also  because  it  is  the  way  along  which  they 
will  most  speedily  reach  a  full  appreciation  of  the 
nature  of  the  Empire  and  its  purpose  in  the  world. 


XXI 

THE  PRINCIPLES  ON  WPIICH  ARMIES 
ARE  RAISED 

I  HAVE  now  sketched  the  outHnes  of  a  national 
mihtary  system  appHcable  to  the  case  of  Great 
Britain.  It  remains  to  show  why  such  a  system  is 
necessary. 

There  are  three  main  points  in  respect  of  each 
of  which  a  choice  has  to  be  made.  They  are  the 
motive  which  induces  men  to  become  soldiers,  the 
time  devoted  to  military  education,  and  the  nature 
of  the  liability  to  serve  in  war.  The  distinction 
which  strikes  the  popular  imagination  is  that  be- 
tween voluntary  and  compulsory  service.  But  it 
covers  another  distinction  hardly  less  important — 
that  between  paid  and  unpaid  soldiers.  The  volun- 
teers between  i860  and  1878,  or  1880,  when  pay 
began  to  be  introduced  for  attendance  in  camps, 
gave  their  time  and  their  attention  with  no  external 
inducement  whatever.  They  had  no  pay  of  any 
kind,  and  there  was  no  constraint  to  induce  them 
to  join,  or,  having  joined,  to  continue  in  their  corps. 
The  regular  soldier,  on  the  other  hand,  makes  a 
contract  with  the  State.  He  agrees  in  return  for 
his  pay,   clothes,  board   and    lodging   to   give    his 


i82  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

whole  time  for  a  specific  number  of  years  to  the 
soldier's  life. 

The  principle  of  a  contract  for  pay  is  necessary 
in  the  case  of  a  professional  force  maintained 
abroad  for  purposes  of  imperial  police  ;  but  it  is 
not  possible  on  that  principle  to  raise  or  maintain 
a  national  army. 

The  principle  of  voluntary  unpaid  service  appears 
to  have  a  deeper  moral  foundation  than  that  of 
service  by  a  contract  of  hiring.  But  if  the  time 
required  is  greater  than  is  consistent  with  the  men's 
o-iving  a  full  day's  work  to  their  industrial  occu- 
pations the  unpaid  nature  of  the  service  cannot 
be  maintained,  and  the  men  must  be  paid  for  their 
time.  The  merit  of  the  man's  free  gift  of  himself 
is  thereby  obscured. 

Wherein  does  that  merit  consist?  If  there  is 
no  merit  in  a  man's  making  himself  a  soldier  with- 
out other  reward  than  that  which  consists  in  the 
education  he  receives,  then  the  voluntary  system 
has  no  special  value.  But  if  there  is  a  merit,  it 
must  consist  in  the  man's  conferring  a  benefit 
upon,  or  rendering  a  service  to,  his  country.  In 
other  words,  the  excellence  of  the  unpaid  voluntary 
system  consists  in  its  being  an  acceptance  by  those 
who  serve  under  it  of  a  duty  towards  the  State. 
The  performance  of  that  duty  raises  their  citizen- 
ship to  a  higher  plane.  If  that  is  the  case  it  must 
be  desirable,  in  the  interest  both  of  the  State  and 


ill 


HOW   ARMIES   ARE    RAISED  183 

of  its  citizens,  that  every  citizen  capable  of  the  duty 
should  perform  it.  But  that  is  the  principle  upon 
which  the  national  system  is  based.  The  national 
system  is  therefore  an  extension  of  the  spirit  of  the 
volunteer  or  unpaid  voluntary  system. 

The  terms  compulsory  service  and  universal 
service  are  neither  of  them  strictly  accurate.  There 
is  no  means  of  making  every  adult  male,  without 
exception,  a  soldier,  because  not  every  boy  that 
grows  up  has  the  necessary  physical  qualification. 
Nor  does  the  word  compulsion  give  a  true  picture. 
It  suggests  that,  as  a  rule,  men  would  not  accept 
the  duty  if  they  could  evade  it,  which  is  not  the 
case.  The  number  of  men  who  have  been  volun- 
teers since  i860  shows  that  the  duty  is  widely 
accepted.  Indeed,  in  a  country  of  which  the 
government  is  democratic,  a  duty  cannot  be  im- 
posed by  law  upon  all  citizens  except  with  the  con- 
currence of  the  majority.  But  a  duty  recognised 
by  the  majority  and  prescribed  by  law  will  commend 
itself  as  necessary  and  right  to  all  but  a  very  few. 
If  a  popular  vote  were  to  be  taken  on  the  ques- 
tion whether  or  not  it  is  every  citizen's  duty  to  be 
trained  as  a  soldier  and  to  fight  in  case  of  a  national 
war,  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  the  principle  would 
fail  to  be  affirmed  by  an  overwhelming  majority. 

The  points  as  to  which  opinions  are  divided  are 
the  time  and  method  of  training  and  the  nature  of 
the  liability  to  serve  in  war. 


184  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

There  are,  roughly  speaking,  three  schemes  of 
trahiing  to  be  considered — first,  the  old  volunteer 
plan  of  weekly  evening  drills,  with  an  annual  camp 
training  ;  secondly,  the  militia  plan  of  three  months' 
recruit  training  followed  by  a  month's  camp  training 
in  several  subsequent  years  ;  and,  lastly,  the  con- 
tinental plan  of  a  continuous  training  for  one  or 
more  years  followed  by  one  or  more  periods  of 
annual  manoeuvres.  The  choice  between  these 
three  methods  is  the  crucial  point  of  the  whole 
discussion.  It  must  be  determined  by  the  standard 
of  excellence  rendered  necessary  by  the  needs  of 
the  State.  The  evidence  given  to  the  Norfolk 
Commission  convinced  that  body  that  neither  the 
first  nor  the  second  plan  will  produce  troops  fit 
to  meet  on  equal  terms  those  of  a  good  modern 
army.  Professional  officers  are  practically  unani- 
mous in  preferring  the  third  method. 

The  liability  of  the  trained  citizen  to  serve  in 
war  during  his  year  in  the  ranks  and  his  years  as 
a  first-class  reservist  must  be  determined  by  the 
military  needs  of  the  country.  I  have  given  the 
reasons  why  I  believe  the  need  to  be  for  an  army 
that  can  strike  a  blow  in  a  continental  war. 

I  myself  became  a  volunteer  because  I  was 
convinced  that  it  was  a  citizen's  duty  to  train 
himself  to  bear  arms  in  his  country's  cause.  I 
have  been  for  many  years  an  ardent  advocate  of 
the  volunteer  system,  because  I  believed,  as  I   still 


HOW   ARMIES    ARE    RAISED  185 

believe,  that  a  national  army  must  be  an  army  of 
citizen  soldiers,  and  from  the  beginning  I  have 
looked  for  the  efficiency  of  such  an  army  mainly 
to  the  tactical  skill  and  the  educating  power  of 
its  officers.  But  experience  and  observation  have 
convinced  me  that  a  national  army,  such  as  I  have 
so  long  hoped  for,  cannot  be  produced  merely  by 
the  individual  zeal  of  its  members,  nor  even  by 
their  devoted  co-operation  with  one  another.  The 
spirit  which  animates  them  must  animate  the  whole 
nation,  if  the  right  result  is  to  be  produced.  For 
it  is  evident  that  the  effort  of  the  volunteers,  con- 
tinued for  half  a  century,  to  make  themselves  an 
army,  has  met  with  insuperable  obstacles  in  the 
social  and  industrial  conditions  of  the  country. 
The  Norfolk  Commission's  Report  made  it  quite 
clear  that  the  conditions  of  civil  employment  render 
it  impossible  for  the  training  of  volunteers  to  be 
extended  beyond  the  present  narrow  limits  of  time, 
and  it  is  evident  that  those  limits  do  not  permit 
of  a  training  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  which  is 
victory  in  war  against  the  best  troops  that  another 
nation  can  produce. 

Yet  the  officers  and  men  of  the  volunteer  force 
have  not  carried  on  their  fifty  years'  work  in  vain. 
They  have,  little  by  little,  educated  the  whole 
nation  to  think  of  war  as  a  reality  of  life,  they 
have  diminished  the  prejudice  which  used  to  attach 
to    the    name    of   soldier,    and    they    have  enabled 


i86  BRITAIN   AT   BAY 

their  countrymen  to  realise  that  to  fight  for  his 
country's  cause  is  a  part  of  every  citizen's  duty, 
for  which  he  must  be  prepared  by  training. 

The  adoption  of  this  principle  will  have  further 
results.  So  soon  as  every  able-bodied  citizen  is  by 
law  a  soldier,  the  administration  of  both  army  and 
navy  will  be  watched,  criticised,  and  supported 
with  an  intelligence  which  will  no  longer  tolerate 
dilettantism  in  authority.  The  citizen's  interest  in 
the  State  will  begin  to  take  a  new  aspect.  He 
will  discover  the  nature  of  the  bond  which  unites 
him  to  his  fellow-citizens,  and  from  this  perception 
will  spring  that  regeneration  of  the  national  life 
from  which  alone  is  to  be  expected  the  uplifting 
of  England. 


XXII 

THE   CHAIN   OF   DUTY 

The  reader  who  has  accompanied  me  to  this  point 
will  perhaps  be  willing  to  give  me  a  few  minutes 
more  in  which  we  may  trace  the  different  threads 
of  the  argument  and  see  if  we  can  twine  them  into 
a  rope  which  will  be  of  some  use  to  us. 

We  began  by  agreeing  that  the  people  of  this 
country  have  not  made  entirely  satisfactory  arrange- 
ments for  a  competitve  struggle,  at  any  rate  in  its 
extreme  form  of  war  with  another  country,  although 
such  conflict  is  possible  at  any  time  ;  and  we  observed 
that  British  political  arrangements  have  been  made 
rather  with  a  view  to  the  controversy  between 
parties  at  home  than  to  united  action  in  contest  with 
a  foreiofn  state. 

We  then  glanced  at  the  probable  consequences 
to  the  British  people  of  any  serious  war,  and  at  the 
much  more  dreadful  results  of  failure  to  obtain 
victory.  We  discussed  the  theories  which  lead 
some  of  our  countrymen  to  be  unwilling  to  consider 
the  nature  and  conditions  of  war,  and  which  make 
many  of  them  imagine  that  war  can  be  avoided  either 

by  trusting  to  international  arbitration  or  by  inter- 

187 


i88  BRITAIN   AT    BAY 

national  agreements  for  disarmament.     We  agreed 
that  it  was  not  safe  to  rely  upon  these  theories. 

Examining  the  conditions  of  war  as  they  were  re- 
vealed in  the  great  struggle  which  finished  a  hundred 
years  ago,  we  saw  that  the  only  chance  of  carrying 
on  war  with  any  prospect  of  success  in  modern  times 
lies  in  the  nationalisation  of  the  State,  so  that  the 
Government  can  utilise  in  conflict  all  the  resources 
of  its  land  and  its  people.  In  the  last  war  Great 
Britain's  national  weapon  was  her  navy,  which  she 
has  for  centuries  used  as  a  means  of  maintaining 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  The  service  she 
thus  rendered  to  Europe  had  its  reward  in  the 
monopoly  of  sea  power  which  lasted  through  the 
nineteenth  century.  The  great  event  of  that  cen- 
tury was  the  attainment  by  Germany  of  the  unity 
that  makes  a  nation  and  her  consequent  remarkable 
growth  in  wealth  and  power,  resulting  in  a  maritime 
ambition  inconsistent  with  the  position  which  Eng- 
land held  at  sea  during  the  nineteenth  century  and 
was  disposed  to  think  eternal. 

Great  Britain,  in  the  security  due  to  her  victories 
at  sea,  was  able  to  develop  her  colonies  into  nations, 
and  her  East  India  Company  into  an  Empire.  But 
that  same  security  caused  her  to  forget  her  nation- 
alism, with  the  result  that  now  her  security  itself  is 
imperilled.  During  this  period,  when  the  concep- 
tion of  the  nation  was  in  abeyance,  some  of  the 
conditions  of  sea  power  have  been  modified,  with 


THE    CHAIN    OF    DUTY  189 

the  result  that  the  British  monopoly  is  at  an  end, 
while  the  possibility  of  a  similar  monopoly  has  pro- 
bably disappeared,  so  that  the  British  navy,  even  if 
successful,  could  not  now  be  used,  as  it  was  a  hundred 
years  ago,  as  a  means  of  entirely  destroying  the 
trade  of  an  adversary.  Accordingly,  if  in  a  future 
war  Britain  is  to  find  a  continental  ally,  she  must 
be  able  to  offer  him  the  assistance,  not  merely  of 
naval  victory,  but  also  of  a  strong  army.  Moreover, 
during  the  epoch  in  which  Great  Britain  has  turned 
her  back  upon  Europe  the  balance  of  power  has 
been  upset,  and  there  is  no  power  and  no  combina- 
tion able  to  stand  up  against  Germany  as  the  head 
of  the  Triple  Alliance.  This  is  a  position  of  great 
danger  for  England,  because  it  is  an  open  question 
whether  in  the  absence  of  a  strong  British  army  any 
group  of  Powers,  even  in  alliance  with  England, 
could  afford  to  take  up  a  quarrel  against  the  com- 
bination of  the  central  States.  It  thus  appears 
that  Great  Britain,  by  neglecting  the  conditions 
of  her  existence  as  a  nation,  has  lost  the  strength 
in  virtue  of  which,  at  previous  crises  in  European 
history,  she  was  the  successful  champion  of  that 
independence  of  States  which,  in  the  present 
stage  of  human  development,  is  the  substance  of 
freedom. 

Our  consideration  of  the  question  of  might  showed 
that  if  Great  Britian  is  to  be  strong  enough  to 
meet  her  responsibilities  her  people  must  nationalise 


I90  BRITAIN    AT   BAY 

themselves,  while  our  reflections  on  the  question 
of  right  showed  that  only  from  such  nationalisation 
is  a  sound  policy  to  be  expected.  In  short,  only  in 
so  far  as  her  people  have  the  unity  of  spirit  and  of 
will  that  mark  a  nation  can  Great  Britain  be  either 
strong  or  just.  The  idea  of  the  nation  implies  a 
work  to  be  done  by  the  British  State,  which  has  to 
be  on  the  watch  against  challenge  from  a  conti- 
nental rival  to  Great  Britain's  right  to  the  headship 
of  her  empire,  and  which  at  the  same  time  has  to 
give  to  that  empire  the  direction  without  which  it 
cannot  remain  united.  Great  Britain  cannot  do  the 
work  thus  imposed  upon  her  by  her  position  and 
her  history  unless  she  has  the  co-operation  of  all 
her  people.  Thus  the  conception  of  the  nation  re- 
veals itself  in  the  twofold  shape  of  duties  laid  upon 
England  and  of  duties  consequently  laid  upon  every 
Englishman.  It  means  that  England  must  either 
decline  and  fall  or  do  a  certain  work  in  the  world 
which  is  impossible  for  her  unless  she  constrains  all 
her  people  to  devote  themselves  to  her  service.  It 
thus  appears  that  England  and  her  people  can  ex- 
pect no  future  worth  having  except  on  the  principle 
of  duty  made  the  mainspring  both  of  public  and  of 
private  life. 

We  attempted  to  apply  the  principles  involved  in 
the  word  nation  to  the  obvious  and  urofent  needs  of 
the  British  State  at  the  present  time. 

Victory    at    sea    being    indispensable    for    Great 


THE   CHAIN    OF    DUTY  191 

Britain  in  case  of  conflict,  we  inquired  into  the  con- 
ditions of  victory,  and  found  in  the  parallel  instances 
of  Nelson  and  Napoleon  that  both  by  sea  and  land 
the  result  of  the  nationalisation  of  war  is  to  produce 
a  leader  who  is  the  personification  of  a  theory  or 
system  of  operations.  The  history  of  the  rise  of 
the  German  nation  shows  how  the  effort  to  make  a 
nation  produced  the  necessary  statesman,  Bismarck. 
Nationalisation  creates  the  right  leadership— that  of 
the  man  who  is  master  of  his  work. 

Reviewing  the  needs  of  the  naval  administration, 
we  saw  that  what  is  wanted  at  the  present  tinie  is 
rather  proper  organisation  at  the  Admiralty  than  an 
increase  in  mere  material  strength  ;  while  turning 
to  the  army,  we  discovered  that  the  only  system 
on  which  can  be  produced  the  army  that  Great 
Britain  requires  is  that  which  makes  every  able- 
bodied  citizen  a  soldier. 

To  make  the  citizen  a  soldier  is  to  give  him 
that  sense  of  duty  to  the  country  and  that  con- 
sciousness of  doing  it,  which,  if  spread  through  the 
whole  population,  will  convert  it  into  what  is  re- 
quired— a  nation.  Therefore  to  reform  the  army 
according  to  some  such  plan  as  has  been  here 
proposed  is  the  first  step  in  that  national  revival 
which  is  the  one  thing  needful  for  England,  and 
if  that  step  be  taken  the  rest  will  follow  of  itself. 
Nationalisation  will  bring  leadership,  which  in  the 
political    sphere    becomes    statesmanship,  and    the 


192  BRITAIN    AT    BAY 

right  kind  of  education,  to  give  which  is  the  highest 
ultimate  function  of  national  existence. 

I  have  tried  in  these  pages  to  develop  an  idea 
which  has  haunted  me  for  many  years.  I  think  if  the 
reader  would  extend  to  it  even  for  a  short  time  the 
hospitality  of  his  mind  he  might  be  willing  to  make 
it  his  constant  companion.  For  it  seems  to  me 
to  show  the  way  towards  the  solution  of  other 
problems  than  those  which  have  here  been  directly 
discussed.  I  cannot  but  believe  that  if  we  could 
all  accustom  ourselves  to  make  some  sacrifices  for 
the  sake  of  England,  if  only  by  giving  a  few 
minutes  every  day  to  thinking  about  her  and  by 
trying  to  convince  ourselves  that  those  who  are 
not  of  our  party  are  yet  perhaps  animated  by  the 
same  love  of  their  country  as  we  ourselves,  we 
might  realise  that  the  question  of  duty  is  answered 
more  easily  by  performance  than  by  speculation. 
I  suspect  that  the  relations  between  the  political 
parties,  between  capital  and  labour,  between  master 
and  servant,  between  rich  and  poor,  between  class 
and  class  would  become  simpler  and  better  if 
Englishmen  were  to  come  to  see  how  natural  it  is 
that  they  should  spend  their  lives  for  England. 

THE     END 


Printed  by  Ballantyne,  Hanson  &>  Co. 
Edinburgh  <5f  London 


This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


MAR  7     1938^ 


?\%. 


RErOUMMtl 

m    SEP    61^ 
JUL  29198(1 


Form  L-9-15m-7,'32 


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^ 


3  1158  01280  3887 


AA    000  734  472    4 


TrnflmmtmnininnrminininiiintmniinmmiiiiiiinmmfflnniirhnnintiHfliittniuiiiiiinifiiHiiuiiiuunffiU^ 


